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Abstract 
People make important decisions in emergencies. Often these decisions involve high 
stakes in terms of lives and property. Bhopal disaster (1984), Piper Alpha disaster 
(1988), Montara blowout (2009), and explosion on Deepwater Horizon (2010) are a 
few examples among many industrial incidents. In these incidents, those who were 
in-charge took critical decisions under various ental stressors such as time, fatigue, 
and panic. This thesis presents an application of naturalistic decision-making (NDM), 
which is a recent decision-making theory inspired by experts making decisions in real 
emergencies.  
This study develops an intelligent agent model that can be programed to make human-
like decisions in emergencies. The agent model has three major components: (1) A 
spatial learning module, which the agent uses to learn escape routes that are 
designated routes in a facility for emergency evacuation, (2) a situation recognition 
module, which is used to recognize or distinguish among evolving emergency 
situations, and (3) a decision-support module, which exploits modules in (1) and (2), 
and implements an NDM based decision-logic for producing human-like decisions in 
emergencies.  
The spatial learning module comprises a generalized stochastic Petri net-based model 
of spatial learning. The model classifies routes into five classes based on landmarks, 
which are objects with salient spatial features. These classes deal with the question of 
how difficult a landmark turns out to be when an agent observes it the first time during 
a route traversal. An extension to the spatial learning model is also proposed where 
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the question of how successive route traversals may impact retention of a route in the 
agent’s memory is investigated.  
The situation awareness module uses Markov logic network (MLN) to define different 
offshore emergency situations using First-order Logic (FOL) rules. The purpose of 
this module is to give the agent the necessary experience of dealing with emergencies. 
The potential of this module lies in the fact that different training samples can be used 
to produce agents having different experience or capability to deal with an emergency 
situation. To demonstrate this fact, two agents were developed and trained using two 
different sets of empirical observations. The two are found to be different in 
recognizing the prepare-to-abandon-platform alarm (PAPA), and similar to each other 
in recognition of an emergency using other cues.  
Finally, the decision-support module is proposed as a union of spatial-learning 
module, situation awareness module, and NDM based decision-logic. The NDM-
based decision-logic is inspired by Klein’s (1998) recognition primed decision-
making (RPDM) model. The agent’s attitudes related to decision-making as per the 
RPDM are represented in the form of belief, desire, and intention (BDI). The decision-
logic involves recognition of situations based on experience (as proposed in situation-
recognition module), and recognition of situations based on classification, where 
ontological classification is used to guide the agent in cases where the agent’s 
experience about confronting a situation is inadequate. At the planning stage, the 
decision-logic exploits the agent’s spatial knowledge (as proposed in spatial-learning 
module) about the layout of the environment to make adjustments in the course of 
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actions relevant to a decision that has already been made as a by-product of situation 
recognition.  
The proposed agent model has potential to be used to improve virtual training 
environment’s fidelity by adding agents that exhibit human-like intelligence in 
performing tasks related to emergency evacuation. Notwithstanding, the potential to 
exploit the basis provided here, in the form of an agent representing human fallibility, 
should not be ignored for fields like human reliability analysis. 
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List of Acronyms & Notations 
ACO Ant Colony Optimization. 
ACT The concept type for an act, used in ontology. 
ADC-IDAC Accident Dynamic Simulator-Information, Decision, and 
Action in a Crew. 
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ANIMATE The concept type for an animate being, used in ontology. An 
actor of the action. 
AVERT All-hands Virtual Emergency Response Trainer. 
BDI Belief-Desire-Intention (an agent model). 
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BST The predicate “Before seeing a threat”. 
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CPN Colored Petri-Net. 
C-RPD Computational-RPD. 
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D1 The dataset from Group 1 participants. 
D2 The dataset from Group 2 participants. 
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ELDS Experiential Learning and Decision Support. 
EVACUATE An evacuate situation. 
FIRE A fire situation. 
FOL First-Order-Logic. 
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GSPN Generalized stochastic Petri-Net. 
GSPNRL The GSPN based model of Route Learning. 
Gt The predicate “Greater”. 
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HSES The predicate “Has some emergency situation”. 
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KETA The predicate “Knows emergency type for an alarm”. 
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KETT The predicate “Knows emergency type for a threat”. 
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KMLPA The predicate “Knows muster location for a PA”. 
L The predicate “Listens”. 
LA Learning Alarms scenario. 
LE Learning scenario. 
LF The Linear Form of a CG. 
LH Learning hazard scenario. 
LIFEBOAT The secondary or alternative muster location. 
MCMC Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm. 
MC-SAT Markov Chain SATisfiability algorithm. 
MESSHALL The primary muster station. 
MLN Markov logic network. 
MN Markov network. 
NC Navigation command. 
NDM Naturalistic decision-making. 
OBR Ontology-based reasoning. 
OO2APL Object-oriented 2APL (An agent programming language). 
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the United States Department of Labor). 
OWL Web Ontology Language. 
P(.) A probability function. 
PA Public address. 
PAPA Prepare to abandon platform alarm. 
PER Primary Escape Route. 
PN Place-Transition Net. 
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R The predicate “Recognizes”. 
ROI Region of Interest. 
RPD Recognition primed decision. 
RPDM Recognition primed decision model. 
SA Situation awareness. 
SER Secondary Escape Route. 
SMK_MSH Constant for smoke in MSH. 
SMK_STAI Constant for smoke in stairwell. 
SMK_VENT Constant for smoke coming out from a vent in MSH. 
SOLAS Safety of Life At Sea (an international convention). 
SPN Stochastic Petri-Net. 
ST The predicate “Sees threat”. 
STO Situation theory ontology. 
TA Training/practice Alarm scenario. 
Te Testing data set. 
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TH Training hazard scenario. 
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Notations 
 Transition firing rate in a Petri-Net. 
 Identifier name for time duration. 
 The difficulty level of a landmark. 
 The set of transition rates. 
k The rate of a transition, where k is some integer subscript. 
 The subset of S such that sites are occupied; for S −  
the sites are not occupied. 
 Steady state distribution vector of a CTMC. 
0 Constant for time duration in the context of FIRE situation. 
1 Constant for time duration in EVACUATE situation. 
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k The rate of kth transition in a Petri-Net model. 
𝜙𝑘 The potential function for the kth clique of the MN comprising G. 
a1 An arbitrary agent. 
ag Identifier name for the proposed agent. 
agnt Conceptual relation “agent”, not agent in AI, see definition 6.1.  
Ak The kth place in the GSPNRL model. 
al Identifier name for an alarm value. 
attr The conceptual relation “attribute”, see definition 6.2. 
chrc The conceptual relation “characteristic”, see definition 6.3. 
𝔇 A domain for the type of things in the context of an ontology. 
E The set of edges for the graph G. 
e(pi) The average % of wrong decisions per decision point. 
emg_type Identifier name for an emergency type, FIRE or EVACUATE. 
expr The conceptual relation “experiencer”, see definition 6.4. 
fX(.) Sojourn time density function. 
F(x) The distribution function of firing time. 
G The graph used in developing the MN. 
inst The conceptual relation “instrument”, see definition 6.5. 
involve The conceptual relation “involve”, see definition 6.9. 
k The running variable used in numbering the cliques of graph G. 
ℒ A language people use to talk about things in the domain 𝔇. 
L The set of landmarks. 
LBH or M2 A constant for LIFEBOAT used as parameter in predicates. 
MX The Xth marking of CTMC, or the process is in state X.  
M0 Initial marking of a Petri-Net. 
mloc Identifier name for muster location. 
MSH or M1 A constant for MESSHALL used as parameter in predicates. 
N1 The trainer model in the proposed GSPNRL model. 
N2 The action generator and learning model in GSPNRL. 
N3 The route model in GSPNRL. 
ni(x) The number of true groundings of ith formula. 
NUM A datatype for some places in the GSPNRL. 
NUMLEVELS A datatype for some places in the GSPNRL. 
obj The conceptual relation “object”, see definition 6.6. 
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P A finite and non-empty set of places in a Petri-Net. 
℘ The power set notation. 
p_a Identifier name for PA. 
PAGPA A constant for PA related to GPA alarm used as parameter in 
predicates. 
PAPAPA A constant for PA related to PAPA alarm used as parameter in 
predicates. 
pk The kth decision-point on the route R1. 
PiG1 Where i {1,2, …, 17}. Codes for participants used in the 
experiment. 
Q A transition rate matrix, or infinitesimal generator. 
Qr The set of questions or queries. 
R1 The primary escape route in AVERT simulations. 
req The conceptual relation “require”, see definition 6.8. 
Rj The set of rules containing j number of rules, where j > 0. 
S The set of sites containing objects or empty [objects could be 
formulas representing situations]. 
send, ack Places to maintain asynchronous communication between N1 and 
N2 in the GSPNRL model. 
SITi The ith situation. 
T A finite, nonempty set of transitions in a Petri-Net. 
thme The conceptual relation “theme”, see definition 6.7. 
thrt Identifier name for a threat or hazard, possible values are 
SMK_MSH, SMK_STAI and SMK_VENT. 
tk The kth transition in a Petri-Net model. 
Trk The kth place in N1. 
U A variable name for the MLN. 
wi The weight for an ith element. 
Wk The set of k weights, w1, w2, …, wk. 
  
Operators  
𝐼−, 𝐼+ Backward and forward incidence operators, respectively. 
 Logical negation 
 Logical implication 
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Chapter 1  
Introduct ion ,  overview, and co-
authorship  sta tement  
1.1 Problem statement  
With the advent of computers in c.1950, the world is now witnessing an ever-
increasing pace in the technological advancement and expansion in industries whose 
products range from simple pencils to sophisticated fighter jets that can perform 
powerful and computer assisted maneuvering during typical flight operations. Some 
machines like smartphones would like to talk as well! There are lucid and varying 
opinions among scientists as to which algorithms or machines should be called 
intelligent and which should not, what reasoning is legitimate or correct for a smart 
behavior to fulfill the requirements for the status of an intelligent being, and what 
reasoning lacks this status. One school of thought considers ‘conscious thought 
process’ as a fundamental agency of the human mind that has no parallel in terms of 
representing it as an algorithm, and, therefore, at least some conscious thinking must 
be non-computational, and hence cannot be represented by a Turing machine (Lucas, 
1961; Penrose, 1989, 1991). Words like soul (Al-Ghazālī, 1998; Alanen, 2014 p. 88; 
Descartes, 2015; S. A. Khan, 1989) or mind (Penrose, 1989) have been used to better 
explain this eccentricity in some attitudes, because these attitudes, such as 
consciousness, intention, beliefs and much like, do not seem to fit in a metric space. 
The discussion on the well-known mind-body problem is one example where eminent 
philosophers, such as Aristotle (384-322 BC), had a view that mind has no physical 
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form (Aristotle, 2001), otherwise it would have been affected in a limited way (by 
physical objects) just as an eye, which is affected by only photons of light and not by 
the sound waves. The other school of thought contends this theory and argues that it 
is possible to make machines that can think, not in the sense of by consuming masses 
of data in the name of learning1 (Hassler, 2016), as is the case of deep learning, but in 
the way a real solution to machine-intelligence problem makes sense (Minsky, 1988, 
1991).   
The present thesis does not go into issues concerning the theological or ideological 
interpretations of how intelligence should be defined. The proposed approach takes a 
practical way by aiming to develop models (of mechanisms as they are understood 
today) for some mental attitudes that could be used by agent programs to make them 
behave human-like in some acceptable sense in a limited scope. This line of research 
is favored in several works related to human factors engineering. As an example, 
consider Reason's (1990) model of a fallible machine that is based on the assumption 
that human error has origin in certain mental processes that generate it inadvertently. 
In earlier days, computers would perform tasks that were tedious due to lengthy 
calculations. Now machines are needed so as to assist humans in their complex 
multitude of jobs ⎯ requiring a significant cognitive workload ⎯ starting from 
medical diagnostics to computer games, virtual reality, crime investigation, assisting 
jurisprudence, accident investigation, training using high fidelity simulators and 
virtual environments, commanding a firefighting team, piloting a fighter airplane, and 
what not. Machines, which can assist people in diagnosing a patient’s disease, or 
 
1 see, for example, how the computer program, AlphaGo, was trained for playing the game Go 
(Borowiec & Lien, 2016). 
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helping trainees to learn better responses, should fulfill the requirements of artificial 
intelligence (AI), but above all there must exist a relationship of trust between the 
machine and the human participants involved so that the participants can show faith 
in the machine’s output. A foundational test for machine intelligence is termed as the 
Turing test (Turing, 1950), which says if a person cannot differentiate between a 
machine’s response and a human’s response during an interaction, then the machine 
should be given a fair credit of being the one showing some intelligence. This study 
argues that the conventional AI techniques lack trust in the end users’ eyes because 
the way computations are performed is superficial or extraneous in that the machine 
⎯ or the algorithm involved ⎯ does not seem to take into account the human mind’s 
psyche. Also, the machine does not incorporate the human problem-solving 
techniques to the extent a human does, for instance, a medical practitioner exploits 
his problem-solving skills to conclude a patient’s critically deteriorating health, or a 
fire commander comes to decide a course of action from a plethora of experiences 
he/she has had at his/her disposal.  
The main goal of this thesis is to introduce methods or models for agents, targeting 
mental agencies of learning, situation-awareness, and decision-making, where the 
computation is performed in the way it is thought to be performed by human beings. 
For simplicity, the present thesis focuses on route-learning instead of general learning. 
Models of route-learning, situation awareness, and decision-making are presented in 
the context of offshore emergencies. In other words, a coherent picture of the agent 
modeling, as proposed here, contains models for different but related capabilities for 
an agent. The agent will be able to learn routes in the same fashion a human being 
would learn ⎯ some locations will be easy, and some will be difficult for learning. 
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The agent will be able to develop an understanding of an emergency by classifying 
which emergency is of which type. Finally, the agent will be able to make decisions 
based on its experience as to what actions are needed to respond to the current 
emergency. 
1.2 Research objectives  
The present work focuses on developing an agent model that produces human-like 
behavior when subjected to a similar context in which a person interacts. The 
following are the research objectives: 
(a) To develop an agent model that simulates how much of a route will be 
remembered after the agent is exposed to a route for the first time. The model 
should simulate human-like behavior of remembering a route when a person 
traversed it the first time.   
(b) To develop agents with different skills of remembering parts of a route. 
(c) To develop agents with different route knowledge in an environment.  
(d) To develop agents with different experiences of recognizing fire and 
evacuation emergencies. 
(e) To develop agents with different ability to make decisions as to what needs to 
be done in an emergency situation in a similar way people make decisions. 
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1.3 Overview of agent modeling  
Agent field is attributed to John von Neumann’s work on cellular automata and game 
theory2 (Dyson, 2012; Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009). The notion of agent seems 
like a newborn in computing ever since its inception in the field perhaps nearly half a 
century ago. Surely, it is after World War II and the advent of computers and AI that 
anything like autonomous agents began to come to light.  According to Alan Kay 
(1984), the idea of agent goes with John McCarthy (1927-2011) in the mid-1950s, 
and the term was coined by Oliver G. Selfridge3 (1926-2008) a few years later.  
In contemporary times, agent modeling is considered as an area of investigation where 
a system is designed in a way that it can solve problems, while at the same time 
contains basic and relevant capabilities, such as autonomous behavior and 
intelligence. This strand of agent research is motivated through a study by Nwana 
(1996). In such a modeling work, the focus remains on the individual’s attributes, 
properties, and functionalities so that their collective embodiment may have features 
essential to define an agent. On the other hand, the term agent-based modeling has a 
history of being used in disciplines where instead of individual behaviors, a coarse-
grained or global behavior is the main focus of study. Such a global view that is 
generated by interactions of individual agents is important in a number of areas, 
including game theory, complex adaptive systems, nonlinear systems, complexity, 
 
2 See The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern 
(1944). 
3 See Selfridge (1988). 
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cybernetics (Heath & Hill, 2008), sociology (D. Klein, Marx, & Fischcach, 2018), 
and perhaps to some extent statistical mechanics.  
Nonetheless, the importance of an individual agent cannot be undermined because of 
a few interesting concerns. The first concern is a rather theoretical debate on the 
number of and nature of minimal attributes that are required to define an agent 
(Minsky, 1988, 1991; Penrose, 1989; Wooldridge, 2009). The second concern is 
related to the tools that can best represent the attributes or agencies of an agent. It 
turns out that there are many models, with support for representing different agencies, 
for an individual agent. An interesting model for the present study is the Belief-
Desire-Intention agent model (Rao & Georgeff, 1995) that is based on Bratman’s 
theory of practical reasoning (Bratman, 1987). A BDI agent (see Figure 1.1) has 
beliefs about the world it is acting in. The desires form a set of motivational factors 
or knowledge for the agent. An agent might be developed that uses certain strategies  
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Figure 1.1. A general design of the components in a typical BDI agent architecture. 
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during interaction with other agents (in competition or cooperation) that maximize 
the wellbeing of the interacting agents (Parsons & Wooldridge, 2002). Such a strategy 
or policy is an expression of desire the agent will have. Many practical 
implementations of the BDI architecture use goals to mean desire as well as a target 
that the agent wants to achieve. Intention, on the other hand, is a goal that the agent 
is committed to deliberate. As shown in Figure 1.1, a BDI agent receives inputs from 
the environment to stay current. Based on current percepts, the agent selects a goal ⎯ 
in BDI logic, this goal is called intention ⎯ and decides a course of actions. The 
course of actions related to an intention is called a plan (Rao & Georgeff, 1995). BDI 
agents are rational agents, which means they are designed to select the best course of 
action against an intention.  
At last, is a concern pointed out in (Kay, 1984) as, “… current artificial intelligence 
techniques contain the seeds of architecture from which one might construct some 
kind of mentality that is genuinely able to learn competence”, where mentality and 
competence refer to that of human beings. Contrary to Kay’s belief about AI in 1984, 
the author thinks that the seeds to construct human-like behavior does not contain 
only the genes from AI, but contributions of other fields cannot be neglected. 
Cognitive Psychology and Human Factors have played an important role in our 
understanding of the human thought process.   
1.3.1 What is an agent? 
As the notion of agent is used in many disciplines, from computer science to 
economics (Ross, 1973), the meaning of the notion remains vague until a specific 
account of agenthood is manifested. In a broader AI sense, an agent is an entity that 
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is situated in an environment, and that has the ability to act autonomously in order to 
meet its delegated objectives (Wooldridge, 2009). Perhaps being autonomous is the 
unanimously accepted criteria of agency for an agent.  
There are different views among scientists for a definition of the notion of agent. A 
few of these are listed below: 
1. Wooldridge & Jennings (1995) define the notion by using two separate titles, the 
weak notion of agency and the strong notion of agency. These forms are defined 
as: 
(a) The Weak Notion of Agency is a general way to use the term ‘agent’ to 
mean a hardware or software that should possess the following properties: 
• Autonomy: Agents operate without the direct intervention of humans 
or others, and have some kind of control over their actions and internal 
state; 
• Social ability: Agents interact with other agents (and possibly humans) 
via some kind of agent-communication language;  
• Reactivity: Agents perceive their environment and respond in a timely 
fashion to changes that occur in it;  
• Pro-activeness: Agents do not simply act in response to their 
environment; they are able to exhibit goal-directed behavior by taking 
the initiative. 
(b) The Stronger Notion of Agency: According to this, the notion of ‘agent’, in 
addition to having the properties associated with the weak notion of 
agency, is either conceptualized or implemented using concepts that are 
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more usually applied to humans. For example, it is quite common in AI to 
characterize an agent using mentalistic notions, such as knowledge, belief, 
intention, and obligation (Shoham, 1993). Some AI researchers have gone 
further, and considered emotional agents. 
2. The KidSim Agent (D. C. Smith, Cypher, & Spohrer, 1994) is defined as a 
persistent software entity dedicated to a specific purpose.  
3. Russel & Subramanian (1995) define the notion of agent as, “An agent is anything 
that can be viewed as perceiving its environment through sensors and acting upon 
that environment through effectors”. 
4. Shoham (1993) argues that “An agent is an entity whose state is viewed as 
consisting of mental components such as beliefs, capabilities, choices, and 
commitments. These components are defined in a precise fashion, and stand in 
rough correspondence to their commonsense counterparts. In this view, therefore, 
agenthood is in the mind of the programmer: What makes any hardware or 
software component an agent is precisely the fact that one has chosen to analyze 
and control it in these mental terms.”  
Put differently, Shoham is of a belief that any entity, be it a computer program, or 
hardware, can be called an agent as long as it has been ascribed mental qualities.  
It will, however, remain a question for investigation as to whether such an 
ascription of mental attitudes is meaningful in a given context (McCarthy, 1979). 
5. “Autonomous agents are computational systems that inhabit some complex 
dynamic environment, sense and act autonomously in this environment, and by 
doing so, realize a set of goals or tasks for which they are designed.” (Maes, 1995). 
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6. “Intelligent agents continuously perform three functions: perception of dynamic 
conditions in the environment; action to affect conditions in the environment; and 
reasoning to interpret perceptions, solve problems, draw inferences, and 
determine actions” (Hayes-Roth, 1995). 
The attributes of agency are what makes an entity, software, or hardware, an agent. 
Thus, the weak notion of agency limits the attributes to four: autonomy, social ability, 
reactivity, and pro-activeness. In the stronger notion of agency, several mental 
qualities such as beliefs, desires, or intentions, are required to be ascribed to the agent, 
and this ascription is considered legitimate when it expresses the same information 
about the machine that it expresses about a person (McCarthy, 1979). 
1.3.2 Intelligence, Fallibility and agents 
Intelligence is attributed as a property of fallible beings. Arguably, this is because 
fallible beings are endowed with the brilliance to prefer something over something 
else that often is based on a good reason; and for that matter, there are infrequent 
miscalculations (Turing, 1947).  
Agents are now a part of many types of decision-support systems. Computer games, 
virtual-reality, evacuation simulation, complex adaptive systems, and planning such 
as generating a sequencing plan and conflict-free trajectories for a set of aircraft 
attempting to land at a given airport (Man, 2015), are but a few examples. The kind 
of agency that is addressed here must show coherence with the notion of fallibility, 
which is a fundamental characteristic of human beings, in order that it could be 
regarded as a sort of being showing intelligence. The present work aims at developing 
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a model of a fallible machine, called an artificially intelligent agent, or simply an 
agent, that in some way is inspired by corresponding human mental attitudes.  
Fallibility should not be regarded as an outcome arising on the surface by a failing 
component of the involved computing machinery, but it reflects an effort that is 
unsuccessful this time, and that must be remembered in all future attempts. Reason 
(1990) says that fallibility is inherent within the methods that are responsible to 
perform the job for which the method was employed. So, the process of modelling 
fallibility in mental attitudes, is not straight-forward. The target is to achieve agent 
behavior that can be considered ‘similar’ to human response as long as the context 
remains the same.  
1.4 Mental qualities of an agent in emergencies  
Harman (1976) says that reasoning is distinguished from logic in that it is a process 
that modifies premises about concluding something by adding or deleting some 
conditions in the antecedents. In this respect, reasoning has no premises and it does 
not conclude anything. The theory of reasoning is important in decision-making 
because when people deliberate, they make intentions to achieve some goal. Beliefs 
and desires interplay in making of intentions in a given context (Bratman, 1987). The 
account on beliefs, intentions, and then decision-making in traditional approaches to 
decision-making are much suited for optimal or algorithmic style selections among 
different candidate choices in well-structured or laboratory settings. Even if the 
algorithmic style strategies follow the theory of probability, the principals of expected 
utility theory, and the Bayesian formalism, people are found to rather rely on certain 
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heuristics and biases in making decisions in real life (Klein, 2008). For example, in 
their (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) proposal to three biases4 that invalidate or 
overturn people’s ability to depend on optimal selection, in case they have it, the 
authors explain if people are asked to evaluate probability that a person belongs to a 
class of, say, engineers or lawyers, and a brief personality description is shown to 
them, then people will only use prior probabilities of such events if the personality 
description has not been shown before asking. However, if people are exposed to even 
a brief personality description that will act as a temptation, and they will use the 
features in the personality description to match those they already know about 
engineers and lawyers and come up with an estimated probability based on 
representativeness or similarity.  
In short, there are pitfalls pointed out in (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982) that 
decision-making, as real people do, is not based on the standards set by the laws of 
probability theory, it is rather based on simple heuristics and biases that render no 
need for people to compare available options with one another (Klein, 1998, 2008). 
This is especially true for real situations that typically are instances where (i) the 
decision problem is ill-structured (unlike artificial or well-structured problems), (ii) 
there is a time stress (as opposed to ample time), (iii) the environment is dynamic (as 
opposed to static or laboratory environments), (iv) the goals are uncertain or 
competing (as opposed to clear or well-known goals), (v) the decision maker has to 
keep an eye on the chosen actions for possible re-assessment (unlike one-shot 
actions), and (vi) there is an involvement of high-stakes in terms of life and/or 
 
4 These biases are: (i) the representativeness bias, (ii) the availability bias, and (iii) the adjustment 
and anchoring bias. 
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property (as opposed to situations where a wrong decision would not have devastating 
consequences) (Zsambok, 1997).  
This new approach to decision-making is termed as Naturalistic Decision Making. 
Basic to an NDM-based decision-making approach are three important capabilities: 
1. Learning: An agent should possess knowledge about important things in the 
environment for a problem that it is to be decided upon. 
2. Situation awareness: An agent should be capable of noting the changing 
environment to characterize a new situation or recognize it as the one it has 
already seen in the past. 
3. Decision-making: An agent should be able to make plans based on intentions 
formed due to current recognition of a situation and re-assess its plans for any 
modification as a result of changes in the environment or as a result of failing 
expectancies. 
The present work considers these capabilities in a particular context so that the 
resulting models can easily be worked out and at the same time, they should have 
enough generality that they can be applied or used in other contexts. The context that 
is considered here is the offshore emergency environment. As an example of how the 
models proposed here would form the agent’s overall behavior when an event 
happens, consider an example in which an agent is monitoring an airplane’s flight 
operations during a typical flight. At some moment, an alarm for proximity warning 
starts sounding. The agent also receives a verbal message about the situation that the 
airplane is getting close to the ground. If the agent knows what to do in this situation. 
The agent tries to get the airplane altitude or position with other instruments, and if 
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possible, visually. With all this information, the agent needs to build “an intention” 
for doing a course of action. In Object-Oriented-2APL (OO2APL5) (Dastani & 
Testerink, 2014), which is a BDI agent platform, this intention is generated in the 
form of a trigger that calls a plan associated with the trigger. Figure 1.2 depicts how 
the information gathering, to situation-awareness, and finally to decision-making 
stages should proceed. The only difference in Figure 1.2’s depiction and the way 
standard BDI logic works is in the estimation of the probability that the alarm is not 
a false alarm. This inclusion of probability is based on the approach presented in this 
thesis as explained in the following chapters.  
The capability in (1), in the preceding paragraph, asks to model learning, which is 
taken to be spatial learning because this type of learning is directly involved in 
emergencies in that the workers are given training for egress in the event of an 
emergency by exploiting dedicated escape routes. The capability in (2), is taken here  
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Figure 1.2. Stages of a BDI agent from perceiving to situation recognition to decision-
making. Note that the probability that the situation is really what the alarm means is based 
on proposed agent model. 
 
 
5 OO2APL is a design pattern that can be used with an object-oriented programming language such 
as Java. This enables a programmer to develop a multiagent system comprising BDI-agents. 
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as SA related to emergencies where important factors to be noticed are platform 
alarms, public address announcements, and typical hazards like fire and smoke. 
Finally, modeling decision-making, as mentioned in (3), means to develop the 
method(s) by means of which effective decision-making could be performed during 
emergencies, where the agent will not have ample time to weigh an option against 
every other possible option. In this respect, an NDM approach called Recognition-
Primed Decision-making (G. Klein, 1998, 2004, 2008) model based agent model is 
proposed. 
1.5 Spatial learning, situation recognition,  and 
decision-making: an overview  
This section reviews concepts in previous studies relevant to modeling the capabilities 
mentioned in Section 1.4.   
1.5.1 Spatial learning: An overview of how people learn routes 
In the event of an emergency, people should prefer evacuation through escape routes 
because they are designed to facilitate quick evacuation. Also, workers at offshore 
installations, children in schools, and employees in industries receive regular 
evacuation drills. The first aspect of human behavior that is discussed in this thesis is 
route learning due to its importance in emergency evacuation training. Though route 
learning is a ubiquitous experience, it involves features of places that stimulate 
efficiency, which can be seen in the resulting shorter evacuation time. Since 
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evacuation time is a crucial aspect of during evacuation, a great deal of literature aims 
to unearth factors and features significant in route learning.  
A few aspects on the subject of route learning are discussed here, but interested 
readers should consult the works by (Golledge, 1977, 1990, 1991, 1999a; Lynch, 
1960; Passini, 1977; Tolman, 1948; Tuan, 1977). Also, chapters 2 & 3 explain in detail 
about the past work in the field of route/environment learning and relevant modeling 
approaches.  
Route learning in a new environment is a classical problem that falls under a broader 
category of Environmental Knowing (Moore & Golledge, 1976) where people collect 
different features as cues to build their mental representation of the environment 
(Golledge, 1977; Lynch, 1960). This sort of environmental knowing based on learning 
individual routes is termed as route-based environmental learning. People learn and 
become aware of features in the environment, but this spatial learning develops 
through stages in that people begin with selective and fragmentary information about 
places, and over time they add individual information until a holistic mental image is 
prepared (MacEachren, 1992). This mental representation is often called a cognitive 
map, and it is this representation that a person uses to find routes from one place to 
another in the environment (Tolman, 1948).  
The features (of places) may be called landmarks that are normally used for two 
purposes. The first is to orient in the environment (along a route), and the second 
purpose is to prime upcoming decision-points (e.g., where to take a turn, when to start 
looking for a door, and so on). These features are the real stimulants for learning a 
route that enhance a person’s view about the environment. They can be real or 
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imagined, confined to a particular point (say a post office), or extend in space, as the 
mountains of Sierra Nevada. Sometimes, the features of a landmark may be formed 
due to a feeling, for example, a forbidden house that is always drowned in a cloak of 
darkness. At times, these are mere subjective matters, of which others remain ignorant 
(Golledge, 1999a). One thing is for sure that people, somehow, discover the presence 
of these features and they use them to differentiate the places (Tuan, 1977).  
Several types of spatial information are accrued as part of the features of a landmark. 
Humans learn identities of places, location, shape, color, size, magnitude, and the time 
of their existence (Golledge, 1990). This spatial information is what makes a feature 
salient so that a landmark could be remembered and could serve a purpose in 
navigating a route. Nonetheless, this saliency of features is not an invariant attribute. 
Due to individual differences and differences in the saliency of features, it is 
reasonable to assume that no two wayfinding tasks are equal (Allen, 1999). Studies 
suggest that landmarks with different saliency levels (of features) will have 
distinguished tendencies to stimulate one’s ability to remember and recognize 
(McKinlay, 2016; Yurkiewicz & Tsao, 2012) a decision-point along a route. 
In the context of built structures, such as buildings, airports, railway stations, hotels, 
and offshore installations, route learning is an important area of investigation because 
when an emergency situation occurs, some personnel in the environment may not be 
able to respond as quickly as is needed for evacuation. Muster drills are, therefore, 
part of a training curriculum for safety practices. However, new workers are more 
likely to forget a part of an escape route because of relatively little exposure. 
Similarly, workers who are exposed to more than one location to perform their jobs 
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suffer the same risk of forgetting parts of an escape route at one of the workplaces 
because of extra burden on their memories for remembering spatial information 
belonging to different places (Chowdhury, 2016). To overcome this problem, escape 
routes are equipped with exit signs that are installed as navigation aids. The SOLAS 
Chapter II-2 regulation 13 (IMO, 2009) requires all exit signs to be made up of photo-
luminescent material for better visibility in a blackout or low visibility conditions. 
Despite this, many incidents have been reported where the designated signage system 
fails to fulfill the needs in real emergencies. This is especially true when a designated 
escape route has been compromised and people will have to rely on their memories 
about landmarks to evacuate through other available routes (BBC, 2013; Weinspach, 
Gundlach, Klingelhofer, Ries, & Schneider, 1997). Moreover, workplaces such as 
engine rooms, are cluttered with a variety of machinery and tools, which render the 
workers at risk of being distracted or unable to see an exit sign when a real emergency 
brings panic (Mackintosh, 1973). Therefore, the present thesis urges the importance 
of adding exit signs at locations that have salient environmental features as discussed 
before. 
1.5.2 Situation Awareness 
Situation awareness is considered as an important prerequisite for decision-making in 
in safety-critical systems. The main theme of SA is to consider an operator’s 
understanding of the system status separate from the actual system status (Woods, 
1988). Traditionally, SA models have been of descriptive nature and based on human 
psychology (Endsley, 1988). The first serious attempt towards building a formal 
theory of situation semantic could be found in the works (Barwise & Perry, 1980; 
Barwise, 1989; Barwise & Perry, 1983). Devlin (1991) expanded Barwise and Perry’s 
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formalism to define situation awareness as being a phenomenon that refers to the 
information flow from a situation to a subject such that the subject can reason about 
the situation. Kokar et al. (2009) developed a situation theory ontology based on 
Devlin, Barwise, and Perry’s formalism. However, these attempts do not incorporate 
the concept of uncertainty6 that is a common experience when interpreting a situation. 
Naderpour, Lu and Zhang (2014) propose a cognitive decision support system that 
uses a dynamic Bayesian network (DBN) to represent situations and a fuzzy rule 
system that simulates operator’s behavior by having rules of the form “if the 
probability of an event, say increased vapor pressure, is high and the event is 
catastrophic then the associated risk of the situation is not acceptable”. The use of 
dynamic BN ensures that situations exist in time, and one situation could transform 
into another with the passage of time. However, the automatic generation of a DBN 
based on simple rules is not possible. The attributes or random variables in a Bayesian 
network (BN) are of propositional nature and the network is fixed having the same 
number of fixed variables for its lifetime. Therefore, the reasoning can be made based 
on the same fixed number of variables (Russell & Norvig, 1995, pp. 589-593). 
Modelling SA requires, as a first step, representing the situation and then reasoning 
about it. This latter part is necessary for modeling awareness. The present work 
proposes a computational model of SA based on Endsley’s (Endsley, 1988, 1995, 
2000)  human SA model. The proposed model can be used to realize SA as a cognitive 
mechanism for agent minds so that awareness about an emergency can later be used 
in deciding a reasonable course of action.  
 
6 in perception, and in reasoning about the perceived cues 
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1.5.3 Decision-making: an overview of the RPDM model 
As opposed to conventional theories of decision-making, such as the Classical 
Decision Making, or Behavioral Decision Making, the NDM approach is recent and 
more promising for situations that require decisions to come about under different 
mental stressors, such as time constraint, missing information, changing 
circumstances, and vague goals. Examples of such situations abound. Klein (1998), 
in his book Sources of Power, narrated many real stories from people working in the 
field. For example, the case of a 45 years old man suffering from trigeminal neuralgia. 
The man, on one day after waking up in the morning, finds severe pain on the right 
side of his face. He consulted some doctors who suggested different remedies but 
none was able to diagnose what the actual cause of the pain was. Finally, an expert 
neurologist saw him and in just five minutes diagnosed him as the classic case of 
trigeminal neuralgia. An avid reader can find, from the same account, other examples 
related with firefighting situations, marketing policy decisions, and many more. In 
many real-life situations, a naturalistic decision maker makes many critical decisions 
in a very short time (see Klein, 1998, pp. 2-3). This type of decision-making approach 
is based on an intuition that comes through experience (Klein, 2015) and it opposes 
the comparative evaluation of options that selects one (Klein, 1998, p. 20) out of many 
available choices. Lipshitz, et al., (2001) identified five major contributions of the 
NDM approach, viz., the recognition-primed decision-making model, dealing with 
uncertainty, team decision-making, decision errors, and research methodology. A 
widely studied model of NDM is recognition-primed decision-making (RPDM). 
RPDM is qualitative and needs a computational or quantitative equal for simulating 
situations (such as a fire situation on an offshore oil & gas platform) that suffer from 
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immense time pressure. The aim of proposing a quantitative version of RPDM is to 
develop a cognitive agent model that can be used for simulating and experimenting 
with behaviors typical of operators and fire commanders. Certainly, such agent 
behaviors have potential benefits in improving virtual environment fidelity, which in 
turn gives better training opportunities for personnel working in the relevant 
industries, such as offshore oil and gas industries, aviation and nuclear plants. 
A general model of pilot behavior during midair encounters was developed using the 
RPDM approach in (Hu, et al., 2018). The authors used BN to model different 
components in a midair encounter situation. The authors proposed a Bayesian 
recognition algorithm to model the situation recognition process. The algorithm 
provides a probabilistic similarity criterion, which is used in deciding the plan against 
the recognized situation. Cannellas & Feigh (2016) use Fast-and-Frugal heuristic 
(FFH) program and propose a simple and general mathematical form of NDM. The 
authors divide the whole process of decision-making into components: task type, 
utility functions, incomplete information, estimates of missing value, and cue 
weights. However, they did not explain how the model could be validated via a real-
life or even a laboratory-based case study. A model of RPDM for multi-agent rescue 
simulation is presented in (Nowroozi, et al., 2012). The authors exploit Unified 
Modelling Language (UML) to present various components of the model. The general 
computational RPD (C-RPD) model was used to model a firefighter agent in the 
Rescue Agent Simulation environment (RoboCup Rescue Agent Simulation League, 
2011), which is a platform of the rescue agent simulation league providing a 
benchmark for evaluating rescue operations in emergency situations. C-RPD 
algorithm was tested in national and international tournaments and it outperformed 
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the other participating algorithms because it put out all the fires effectively. Other 
RPDM based models include an RPDM implementation integrated with the Belief-
Desire-Intention agent model (Norling, 2004). In all cases where an RPDM is 
modeled in quantitative terms, there is still a need to validate if the model or the 
underlying theory, i.e., RPDM approach (Klein, 1998), is committed to serving as a 
potential candidate of human decision-making approach when classical decision logic 
is not a choice. The present work proposes to model RPDM and test the model results 
with results from real people. The model can be verified according to the theoretical 
work in (Klein, 1998), and it may validate RPDM as an approach that explains human 
decision-making under mental stressors, provided the results agree with the empirical 
findings. 
1.6 Thesis Organization  
The thesis is written in manuscript format. Four research articles have evolved during 
this study. Table 1.1 presents these papers to elaborate on the connection with the 
overall objectives of the thesis. 
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Table 1.1. Papers and their connection to the overall research objectives of the thesis. 
Article titles Research objectives Associated Tasks 
Chapter 2: A 
Generalized Stochastic 
Petri Net model of route 
learning for emergency 
egress situations.  
• To develop an agent model that simulates 
how much of a route will be remembered 
after being exposed to a route for the first 
time. The model should simulate human-like 
behavior of remembering a route when a 
person, on the average, sees the same route.   
 
• To develop agents with different skills of 
remembering parts of a route. 
• To understand the phenomenon of spatial 
learning, especially route learning.  
• Identify important literature. 
• Identify important escape routes in the 
virtual environment. 
• Identify landmarks along the selected escape 
route. 
• To classify landmarks based on saliency. 
• To understand how saliency of landmarks 
play a role in human’s remembering and 
forgetting of a landmark when a new route is 
traversed. 
• Develop a Generalized Stochastic Petri Net 
model of route learning. 
• Estimate rates that can be used with different 
classes of landmarks in the proposed model. 
• Produce simulations 
• Validate the model based on empirical 
observations. 
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Article titles Research objectives Associated Tasks 
Chapter 3: Human-Like 
sequential learning of 
escape routes for virtual 
reality agents 
To develop agents with different route 
knowledge in an environment. 
 
• To understand the impact of successive 
training on human competence. 
• To develop an agent model that simulates 
how much of a route will be remembered 
after being exposed to a route over n-
successive exposures.  
• To develop a method whereby the model 
proposed in Chapter 2 can be used iteratively 
to represent the effect of successive training. 
Chapter 4: Situation 
Awareness Modeling 
for Emergency 
Management on 
Offshore Platforms 
To develop agents with different experiences of 
recognizing fire and evacuation emergencies. 
  
• To understand the phenomenon of SA. 
• To understand different formal ways of 
modeling SA. 
• To develop an agent model that is capable of 
using cues or environmental features, e.g., 
alarms, hazards like fire & smoke, and 
announcements, to recognize a situation.  
• The agent should be able to learn different 
situations and classify one that is currently 
being observed with one or some of those in 
the situation-KB or a repertoire of situations. 
• This repertoire of situations will act as 
experience for the agent model proposed in 
Chapter 5. 
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Article titles Research objectives Associated Tasks 
Chapter 5: On the 
realization of the 
Recognition-Primed 
Decision Model for 
artificial agents 
To develop agents with different ability to make 
decisions as to what needs to be done in an 
emergency situation in a similar way that people 
make decisions. 
 
• To understand how people make decisions in 
evolving emergencies. 
• To understand the factors people give 
importance in recognizing a situation and 
coming to a decision. 
• To understand how ontologies can be used to 
model situations. 
• To develop an agent model based on the 
concepts in RPDM. 
• The agent uses route data, and the repertoire 
of situations, learned in Chapters 2, 3, & 4 to 
employ the proposed realization of RPDM.  
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1.7 Contribution & Novelty  
1. Very few attempts have been made where a route learning algorithm uses 
landmarks. Landmark recognition has been treated as a function of saliency 
and, to the knowledge of the author, no attempt has so far been made to 
incorporate the phenomenon of forgetting in a route learning mechanism for 
agents. This work, seemingly the first time, models forgetting and 
remembering of a navigation command as a stochastic process, where the 
probability of forgetting or remembering depends on the saliency of the nearby 
landmarks.  
2. Some routes are difficult to remember, and some are easy to learn. Although 
there have been some references in the literature that mention this fact, no 
systematic classification of routes (especially the escape routes) is done based 
on environmental features such as landmark saliency. This work establishes a 
connection between known environmental features, such as cluttered spaces, 
and mirrored layouts, with the level of difficulty one may experience in 
remembering a landmark, and hence the associated navigation command.  
3. Until the time of writing this thesis, the author has been unable to find out 
evidence that shows that a route learning algorithm, on the average, learns an 
escape route the way people learn. That is, no reports of a validation exercise 
where an algorithm is tested against real people’s results have so far been 
obtained. 
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4. Most of the work in situation assessment deals with matching the 
environmental cues with those stored before to look for typical situations. A 
very few attempts are made where a situation assessment methodology uses 
reasoning to model SA so that all three levels of the Endsley’s human SA 
model are satisfied.  
5. Quantification of the components of RPDM has been taken up in only a few 
earlier works. It is difficult to see the exact implementation details in order to 
figure out why most of the results in those works were very promising. For 
example, it might be possible that the comparisons made between a proposed 
quantitative model of RPDM with real data contains an inherent discrepancy. 
An expert’s opinion, which is considered as ‘a result’, collected while the 
expert is not present in that emergency situation, rather his opinion came 
through his experience, is certainly something in disagreement with the NDM 
approach where people make decisions under the stress due to emergency. 
6. Each of the previous studies reported here has focused on a subset of the 
features of the RPDM approach. This work attempts to increase the size of that 
subset. That is, by modelling the constructs in the RPDM approach, such as 
mental simulation, which have not been given the attention they deserve. 
Quantitative RPDM models need to validate the real people decision-making 
approach in emergencies. An attempt that compares the simulated results with 
empirical findings (i.e., data from real people) has not yet been reported in the 
literature. This work is unique in this sense too, that the simulated results are 
compared with virtually real data from real people performing the same tasks. The 
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simulated results are explained in Chapter 5. There are similarities between the 
simulated and real data, but there are marked differences too. Chapter 5 has explained 
those differences but the main advantage that could be gained from the differences is 
that the reported agent may be considered as having different traits. 
1.8 Co-authorship statement  
The idea behind this work was originally proposed by Dr. Brian Veitch from the 
Faculty of Engineering and Applied Science. Dr. Veitch was interested to see how an 
agent can be developed that exploits the faculties of NDM philosophy. Applications 
of such an agent model in training simulators should have positive influence on 
participants training for offshore emergency situations. Dr. Faisal Khan from the 
Faculty of Engineering and Applied Science has contributed to this work by directing 
the author to the required areas of knowledge pertinent to intelligent agent modeling, 
stochastic processes, and other advanced modelling approaches such as Petri nets, 
Markov nets, and ontological representation of knowledge. This work is produced 
after a constant and continuous feedback from Dr. Khan and Dr. Veitch on related 
material that the author discovered, and that the author produced in terms of 
mathematical or formal models and computer programs in a variety of languages such 
as Python, Java, C++ and ML programming languages. 
The author was responsible for composing this thesis. He conducted the literature 
review, developed the agent model for spatial learning module, situation awareness 
module, and finally the decision-support module that combines the spatial learning 
and situation awareness modules to form the proposed agent model for decision-
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making in emergencies. The author produced theoretical agent models and 
implemented them using corresponding technology. The author also used an 
experiment performed by Ms. Jennifer Smith in 2015 as a testbed for validating the 
agent model. In this respect, the author employed knowledge elicitation techniques to 
generate new knowledge pertinent to this study for validation ⎯ replay videos that 
recorded individual participants’ activities during different trials of Smith's (2015) 
experiment were watched and values for related variables were extracted. 
Conclusions were drawn on the basis of which recommendations are presented. 
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Chapter 2  
A General ized Stochast ic  Petr i  Net  model 
of  route  learning for  emergency egress 
s i tuat ions ‡‡
Co-authorship statement. A version of this chapter has appeared as an article in 
the journal titled Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence published by 
Elsevier. The author, Syed Nasir Danial, has developed and implemented the Petri-
net based model and extracted the empirical data using re-play video files for 
validation of the model. The co-authors Dr. Faisal Khan and Dr. Brian Veitch 
supervised this study. All authors read and approved the final draft. 
Abstract. Route learning is an essential activity for a person visiting a new 
environment. The element of forgetting a location (called decision point) along a 
route, where a change in direction is needed, is of immense importance especially 
during emergency evacuation scenarios. It is this element that has not been given 
the attention it deserves in developing a route learning algorithm. This work 
proposes a model of route learning in a new environment based on landmarks using 
generalized stochastic Petri nets because landmarks based route learning has been 
observed as a method natural to humans. The model takes information about 
landmarks along a route and associated navigation commands and then chooses 
whether to save this information as part of the learned route or not. The selection is 
made by exploiting stochastic transitions for which the firing rates are dependent on 
the type of landmark encountered at a decision point. The final output is a route 
having some decision points missing; resembling the situation that humans 
encounter after they visit a route in a new environment. The model results closely 
match empirical results obtained with human subjects.  
 
‡‡ Danial, S. N., Khan, F., & Veitch, B. (2018). A Generalized Stochastic Petri Net model of route 
learning for emergency egress situations. Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence, 72, 170–
182. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.engappai.2018.03.024 
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2.1 Introduction  
Representing human-like intelligent behavior is an active research area in artificial 
intelligence (AI). Today, technological advances seem to support the idea that some 
mental modalities may be modeled as AI constructs. Speech recognition on ordinary 
cell phones, and a recent defeat of Lee Sedol, the world champion of Go8 by AlphaGo 
(Borowiec & Lien, 2016) ⎯ a computer program ⎯ are to mention but a few. This 
work considers learning as a mental modality and considers only one type, viz., the 
route learning in a new environment, to construct a model based on empirical 
understanding of the human route learning process. The purpose is to have a model 
that can be used by a software agent so that the agent can produce human-like 
behavior, such as forgetting a portion of escape route, in a training simulator for 
emergency egress.  
How people learn routes in a new environment is a classical problem. Route learning 
falls under a broader subject area of Environmental Knowing where people collect 
different landmarks as cues to build their own mental representation of the 
environment (Golledge, 1977). This mental representation is often called a cognitive 
map and it is this representation that a person uses to find routes from one place to 
another in the environment (Tolman, 1948). 
Learning a route becomes of prime importance when one considers emergency 
evacuation situations. People need training to egress through designated routes in a 
 
8 Go is an ancient Chinese abstract strategy adversarial two player board game that aims to occupy 
more space on the board than the opponent. Due to shear complexity of the game, the one who is better 
in intuition, creativity and strategic planning will most likely win. 
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facility, such as an offshore petroleum platform. In this regard, a high-fidelity virtual 
environment (VE) is considered a suitable training environment compared to 
traditional classroom type training using video tapes or presentation-based 
methodology. A serious limitation of VEs is the general unavailability of reasonably 
intelligent agents to support various training tasks. For example, if a human 
participant watches an agent performing a typical task, like moving to a muster station 
in the case of a fire alarm and corresponding public announcement  call for 
evacuation, it is hard to show the human participant cases where the agent goes astray, 
because the agent is typically given access to a complete map of the environment and 
a related path finding algorithm, such as A* (Buckland, 2004; Hart, Nilsson, & 
Raphael, 1968), and so can use this map to perfectly retrieve the desired route 
information. This enables the agent to always find a correct path for the desired 
destination instead of making it possible to expose the agent to the dangers of taking 
a wrong route. One way to get around this problem is to model remembering and 
forgetting of landmarks, because it is observed that missing a landmark results in 
forgetting needed turn along a route to a destination (Beusmans, Aginsky, Harris, & 
Rensink, 1995). Although remembering and forgetting can be seen as functions of 
knowledge retrieval mechanisms, such as similarity matching and frequency biases 
(Reason, 1990 pp. 13, 97-98, 125-126), they can also be modelled as functions of an 
information gathering mechanism, where an agent does not remember a landmark due 
to lack of practice or retention time-out. The behavior of these naïve agents is 
important in the assessment of difficulties of learning a route due to physical 
properties of the environment. If given more than one exposure to a route, people tend 
to adapt to these difficulties because of practice (Kyritsis, Gulliver, & Morar, 2014). 
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The form of route learning the present work involves is like ant colony optimization 
(ACO) algorithms (Dorigo & Stutzle, 2004) in the sense that ACOs are inspired by 
pheromone trails and use the trails as landmarks to guide the search of finding the 
best route ⎯ just as people use landmarks to remember certain moves such as move 
left, move right, go straight along their route. We refer to such moves as navigation 
commands (NC) in this work. This paper presents a Generalized Stochastic Petri Net 
(GSPN) model of route learning (GSPNRL) based on remembering landmarks along 
the route. This means that the model allows storing some landmarks, while at the same 
time producing the effect of forgetting by not storing some of the landmarks. The 
GSPN model of route learning is explained by describing parts of the model with the 
help of algorithms presented in Section 2.4. However, the main contribution of this 
study is the GSPN model of route learning. 
Section 2.2 discusses related work and explains different concepts in the human route 
learning process, along with some artificial intelligence aspects. Section 2.3 covers 
topics in the human route-learning process and presents some definitions related to 
the types of Petri nets used in this work. In Section 2.4, the proposed model is 
presented with elements of training and learning. Section 2.5 describes an experiment 
whose data are used to test the validity of the model. The model results are compared 
with the empirical results. The mathematical verification of the model is also 
presented in this section. Results and future directions are discussed in Section 2.6.  
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2.2 Related work 
The subject of Environmental Knowing has an important role in situation awareness 
(Endsley, 1995). Lehtonen, Sahlberg, Rovamo, and Summala (2017) show  how 
learning about an environment increases situation awareness and thereby decreases 
possible accidents of child bicyclists. Beusmans et al. (1995) determine how a route 
learning process is involved in one’s continues effort to stay aware of the surrounding 
environment during driving on a road. The authors performed an experiment in a VE 
where sixteen participants were used as paid volunteers. The participants were given 
verbal navigation commands, such as take the next left or right, without pinpointing 
the landmarks and asked to remember the route, which was a 1770m long complex 
road map. The authors found that some participants developed the skill of navigating 
using landmarks and some of them went further as they developed a mental image of 
the environment. The latter showed less situation awareness between intersections on 
roads and the former showed situation awareness as their ubiquitous property 
irrespective of their location on route. 
Gale, Golledge, Pellegrino, and Doherty (1990) performed an experiment with 
children of ages 9-12 to investigate spatial knowledge acquisition. Their general result 
about the mode of learning supports active exploration through field trips in the real 
environment. However, the use of video tapes also proved to be fairly effective in 
terms of representing fundamental components in spatial learning. The authors found 
that children learned more at intersections where they needed to make decisions about 
their move, rather than in between the intersections. These intersections are termed 
decision points. They also suggest that during a route learning task, knowledge about 
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the features of the surroundings starts being stored concurrently as a background 
process. Another important finding was that successful navigation does not require 
extensive knowledge about the route, rather route navigation seems to be 
parsimonious, i.e., the modeling of route learning may be simpler than other types of 
learning tasks. Plank, Snider, Kaestner, Halgren, and Poizner (2014) used a large 
immersive VE to investigate human memory about remembering positions of 39 
distinct objects in the VE. The experiment started by making the subjects explore the 
positions on day 1. On day 2, the positions of some of the objects were changed and 
the subjects needed to recognize that. The subjects correctly identified 87% of times 
that the objects were moved or not. The authors also suggest that these findings could 
help understand neurocognitive stages related to an early first-pass allocentric space 
processing, followed by integration of the objects’ locations in the spatial cognitive 
map. An allocentric spatial representation expresses location of an object in an 
environment with reference to other objects, provided the environment with all the 
objects takes an arbitrary orientation that defines left/right and up/down positions 
(Grush, 2000). On the contrary, the egocentric spatial representation considers the self 
as the reference point. 
Studies of rats show that the brain creates multiple cognitive maps, each representing 
a different segment of the environment (Derdikman & Moser, 2010). The study 
(Eilam, 2014) details exploration of an unfamiliar environment using home-base and 
looping behavior in mice. The author gives a detailed account of the path integration, 
retracing, and wall-following mechanisms, and describes analogies between humans 
and other animals in biobehavioral mechanisms. Eilam (2014) also suggests that the 
three important phases in spatial learning, viz., the path integration phase, the place 
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recognition (or landmark recognition) phase, and the reorientation phase that works 
while using representations of a surface layout (Wang & Spelke, 2002), may be 
explained in terms of looping being a way to do path integration, home-base behavior 
being an expression for place recognition, and wall-following being moving with 
reference to a surface layout. 
The use of AI techniques in matters related to emergency situations is an important 
area of investigation. Ramchurn et al. (2016) develop a disaster response system 
called Human Agent Collectives-Emergency Response (HAC-ER) system. The HAC-
ER serves as a mediator between humans and agents and provides a platform where 
humans and agents can develop a social relationship to address a number of evolving 
phenomena in an emergency situation, such changing demands. The authors develop 
a novel way to team up agents and humans to act more effectively in emergency 
situations. Sud, Andersen, Curtis, Lin, and Manocha (2007) propose a multi-agent 
navigation graph for real-time path planning for a dynamic VE. The agents use this 
graph as a global data structure to compute, in parallel, the maximal clearance paths 
without using a separate path planning data structure for individual agents. Kang, 
Kim, and Kim (2010) deploy a Region of Interest (ROI) in a VE to enable the system 
to detect abnormal shortest routes selected by different users. The ROI with the 
highest level is selected and a discretized path graph (DPG) is constructed using the 
data sampled in the selected ROI. The VE’s existing navigation-graph is then 
integrated with the DPG using Delaunay triangulation. Nonetheless, in real 
emergencies, several risks related to human factors are in play. This means it is 
possible that some trained personnel become overwhelmed by mental stress and make 
mistakes (Reason, 1990). Musharraf, Khan, Veitch, MacKnnon, and Imtiaz (2013) 
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assess human reliability during emergencies on offshore petroleum platforms. They 
use four major factors that influence stress, which in turn deteriorates human 
performance. Norazahar, Khan, Veitch, and MacKinnon (2016) present a method 
based on Bayesian networks to identify critical human and organizational factors in 
escape and evacuation systems. 
2.3 Background concepts  
2.3.1 Human route learning process 
Route learning is defined as a phenomenon in which a navigator recognizes an origin 
and a destination location, and identifies route segments, turn angles, and the order in 
which they appear, in order to make a complete route (Golledge, 1999a). In other 
words, route learning in humans is characterized by associating specific moves or turn 
angles with a particular entity. The entity is either situated or it has some special 
relationships with a location in the environment. It turns out that the entity has striking 
features that make it easy to remember without an explicit reference to something 
else. This self-appealing characteristic is due to its features in relation with the nearby 
objects such that the entity stands out from its immediate environment. Such an entity 
is commonly referred to as a landmark, and is reported in literature with different 
names, such as occurrence, reference point, and decision-point (Golledge, 1991). 
Various kinds of attributes that may be associated with a landmark include structure 
or shape, size or color, or some other functional characteristic such as a school, a 
hospital, or even a fear associated with a particular house in a neighborhood 
(Golledge, 1999a). Lynch (1960) in his book The Image of the City argued that among 
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the other features of an environment, such as nodes, paths, boundaries and districts 
(in case of a city), landmarks are the most dominant and well-known. There are four 
important attributes associated with a landmark. The first is its identity, which can be 
given by attaching a name or a label. The identity can be a place specific cue or a 
class specific cue. A place specific cue is identified by a unique place location such 
as The Grand Mosque of Makkah in Saudi Arabia, or the British Museum on Great 
Russell Street, Bloomsbury, London WC1B 3DG, United Kingdom. A class specific 
cue is identified by a general label, such as a food court. The second attribute is 
location that can be specified either by using a precise metric system or by a less 
precise means by employing words like “near”, “far from”, “in front of”. The third 
attribute is a measure of magnitude that determines how distinctive the entity is before 
it could be considered as a landmark. The magnitude may include size of the entity, 
its volume, shape or even color. The permanence of the landmark on the temporal 
scale is the final attribute that plays a key role for developing spatial knowledge 
structures (Golledge, 1993). 
To humans, and also with other animals, there is a natural tendency to remember a 
navigation command (such as move left or go straight) one has made once traversing 
near a landmark. It has been observed that practicing a route traversal again and again 
strengthen the binding between landmarks and associated navigation commands. This 
tendency is the major contributor, in humans, to learn routes. The present study uses 
place specific names to identify landmarks along a route. The landmarks considered 
here are invariant in space and time. Each landmark is selected empirically, at or near 
a decision-point, due to its salience in the VE. 
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2.3.2 Petri Nets 
Petri (1966) developed a network that became known as a Petri net. Since then, the 
original Petri net has seen much advancement. Colored Petri-Nets (CPN) (Jensen, 
1981, 1996), Stochastic Petri-Nets (SPN), and Generalized Stochastic Petri-Nets 
(Ajmone Marsan, 1990; Ajmone Marsan, Conte, & Balbo, 1984; Bause & Kritzinger, 
1996; Trivedi, 2002) are among a few widely-used variants in a multitude of 
disciplines. Petri nets are an important class of formal design and modelling 
techniques. Systems that exhibit concurrency or parallelism are the best examples 
where the strength of Petri nets can be witnessed. The concurrency might be involved 
in all or some of the events occurring in the system under certain constraints, such as 
precedence or frequency of the occurrence of these events (Peterson, 1977). It is 
important to note that the standard Petri nets, also called Place-Transition nets, do not 
involve any concept of time, and therefore, can only be used to understand qualitative 
properties of a system. However, timed Petri nets are used in many disciplines from 
biological to engineering sciences to model and analyze the quantitative aspects of a 
system under investigation (Febbraro, Giglio, & Sacco, 2016; L. Li & Yokota, 2009; 
Maciel, Trivedi, Matias, & Kim, 2011; Murata, 1989). 
2.3.2.1 PLACE-TRANSITION NETS 
The graphic representation of a Place-Transition (PN) net forms a bipartite graph 
containing two main components: places and transitions, connected by directed arcs. 
A place is drawn using circles and is used to represent conditions or variables. A 
transition is drawn using rectangles. They represent any activity or function call that 
may alter the conditions or variables on places. Each place has tokens, which 
represent a value or data of the associated variable or condition. Tokens in PNs are 
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represented by small black dots inside a place, or by a number if they are too many. 
The number of tokens on each place defines the state of the PN and is usually referred 
to by the PN marking. A PN marking is described by a vector, M, where the ith 
component of M represents the number of tokens at the ith place. In case of CPNs, 
there can be many types of tokens in a single net, whereas in the PNs, only one type 
of token is defined. Thus, PNs contain type-free tokens. A token can move from one 
place to another through an enabled transition only. If a transition is not enabled, the 
tokens from its input place cannot move through. A transition is enabled if all of its 
input places contain at least one token. An enabled transition may fire, and when it 
fires it deletes tokens from each of its input places and creates them on each of its 
output places depending on the multiplicity of the involved input and output arcs 
(Ajmone Marsan et al., 1984). 
2.3.2.2 COLORED PETRI NETS 
The notion of color or type for tokens in a Petri net was first introduced by Jensen 
(1981). The result is Colored Petri net. A CPN is an extension of PN, where a color is 
used to represent datatype or type (such as an integer, a string, or a composite type). 
A token in CPN is defined to be of a specific color. A CPN is defined in (Bause & 
Kritzinger, 1996 pp. 147-148) as a 6-tuple CPN= {P, T, C, 𝐼−, 𝐼+, M0}, where: 
(a) P is a finite and non-empty set of places, 
(b) T is a finite and non-empty set of transitions, 
(c) PT=  ,  
(d) C is a color function defined from PT into finite and non-empty sets, 
 45 
 
(e) 𝐼−, 𝐼+ are, respectively, the backward and forward incidence functions defined 
on  PT such that 𝐼−(𝑝, 𝑡), 𝐼+(𝑝, 𝑡) ∈ [𝐶(𝑡) → 𝐶(𝑝)𝑀𝑆], ∀(𝑝, 𝑡) ∈ 𝑃 × 𝑇, 
(f) M0 is a function defined on P describing the initial marking such that 𝑀0(𝑝) ∈
𝐶(𝑝)𝑀𝑆, ∀𝑝 ∈ 𝑃. 
CPNs offer a convenient way to model complex concurrent problems. The concept of 
color or datatype allows that typed places can take typed tokens that represent certain 
real-world processes. Also, different types of tokens, representing different processes, 
would get the benefit of using the same net resulting in low net size and complexity 
(Gorton, 1993). 
2.3.2.3 STOCHASTIC PETRI NETS 
The continuous-time Stochastic Petri-Net is an extension of PN. Formally, it is 
defined over PN= {P, T, 𝐼−, 𝐼+, M0}, as SPN = (PN, ), where 
(a) P= {p1, p2, …, pn} is a finite and non-empty set of places, 
(b) T= {t1, t2, …, tm} is a finite and non-empty set of transitions, 
(c) PT=, 
(d) 𝐼−, 𝐼+ are, respectively, the backward and forward incidence functions in 
PT →ℤ, 
(e) M0: P→ℤ, is the initial marking, where a marking represents the distribution 
of tokens over the places, 
(f) = {1, 2, …m}, where i is, possibly, the marking dependent rate of 
transition ti. This means that the firing time of each transition follows an 
exponential distribution of the random variable involved.  
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2.3.2.4 GENERALIZED STOCHASTIC PETRI NETS 
Bause and Kritzinger (1996) define a GSPN as a 4-tuple GSPN = (PN, T1, T2, W), 
where, 
(a) PN= (P, T, 𝐼−, 𝐼+, M0) is the underlaying Place-Transition net, 
(b) T1T is the set of timed transitions, T1  , 
(c) T2T is the set of immediate transitions, T1T2=, and T=T1T2, 
(d) W=(w1, w2, …, w|T|) is an array whose entry wi  ℝ+ 
i. is a (possibly marking dependent) rate of a negative exponential 
distribution specifying the firing delay, when transition ti is a timed 
transition, i.e., tiT1 or 
ii. is a (possibly marking dependent) firing weight, when transition ti is 
an immediate transition, i.e., ti T2.   
A GSPN model or its colored variant in which colored tokens are used, as with the 
case of a CPN, can be converted into a Markovian model for performance evaluation 
purposes. The net is unfolded first. The unfolding process includes generating one 
copy of the original net per color by replicating the places, transitions, and arcs. The 
underlying Markovian model is constructed based on the unfolded net, and its solution 
is used to define performance measures on the colored net (Balbo, Chiola, & Bruell, 
1992) such as estimating the steady state probability distribution as reported in 
Section 2.5.5. 
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2.3.3 Continuous Time Markov Chain 
A stochastic process {Xn: n = 0, 1, …} with a finite or countably infinite state space 
𝕊 is said to be a Markov chain, if for all i, j, i0, …, in−1𝕊, and n = 0, 1, 2, …, the 
probability P(Xn+1= j | Xn = i, Xn−1 = in−1, …, X0=i0)=P(Xn+1=j|Xn=i).  
The above property is called Markovian property according to which, given the state 
of a Markov chain at present, Xn, its future state, Xn+1, is independent of the past states 
Xn−1, Xn−2, …, X1, X0. If the time spent between transitions is a continuous random 
variable such that when the process Xn or X(n) enters in state i, it remains there for 
some period of (exponentially distributed) time and then moves to the next state, the 
process X(n) is said to be a Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC) (Ghahramani, 
2005; Trivedi, 2002). The sample path of a typical CTMC may look like the one 
depicted in Figure 2.1, where each horizontal line represents the duration of time the  
X(t)
t
 
Figure 2.1.  The sample path of a typical CTMC. Source: (Adopted from Ajmone 
Marsan (1990).) 
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process is in a particular state. The time the process spends in a state is called the 
sojourn time of that state. The sojourn times follow the negative exponential 
distribution, because this is the only distribution with the memoryless property as 
required by the Markovian property of CTMC. The density function of sojourn time 
is given by 
 𝑓𝑋(𝑥) = 𝜇𝑒
−𝜇𝑥𝑢(𝑥), (2.1) 
where u is the unit step function, and  is the rate of the pdf.  
2.3.4 CTMC model  
A CTMC model can be constructed by specifying a state space, 𝕊 and a transition rate 
matrix, Q (also called the infinitesimal generator). The state space, 𝕊={s1, s2, …, sn}, 
is a finite collection of states the CTMC model can visit (Mo, 2013). The matrix Q is 
a |𝕊||𝕊| matrix, and it has the off-diagonal elements as nonnegative rationals. The 
diagonal entries follow −(∑ 𝜆𝑗,𝑖𝑖≠𝑗 ) that consequently make the sum of each row 
equals to zero (Aziz, 2000).  
2.3.4.1 SOLVING CTMC MODEL 
The probability that a CTMC model will stay in a state j after t units of time provided 
that it is in state i presently is denoted by pij(t) and is represented as follows: 
 𝑝𝑖𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑃[𝑋𝑡+𝑠 = 𝑗|𝑋𝑠 = 𝑖]. (2.2) 
Mo (2013) argues that an irreducible, finite CTMC has a unique steady state 
probability distribution vector, . In case the CTMC is irreducible and infinite then 
there will at most be one steady state vector. A CTMC (𝕊, Q) can be solved by solving 
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the balance equation of (𝕊, Q). The balance equation of the CTMC (𝕊, Q) is given 
by: 
 𝜋𝑄 = 0. (2.3) 
Since,  is a steady state vector, it satisfies:  
 ∑ 𝜋𝑗 = 1.
𝑗
 
(2.4) 
Solving Eqs. (2.3) and (2.4) yields the steady state probability distribution of the 
CTMC model (𝕊, Q). As an example, consider a simple problem of an electric kettle 
that can be either in good running state or in a faulty state. The state space is 
𝕊={runnable, faulty}. If the transition rate, qrf, from runnable to faulty state is  and 
from faulty to runnable state (say after getting repaired) is , then, the left hand side 
of Eq. (2.3) can be written as: 
 
𝜋𝑄 = (𝜋𝑟 , 𝜋𝑓) [
−𝜆 𝜆
𝜇 −𝜇
] 
 
which can be solved by comparing to zero to give the steady state distribution vector 
as 𝜋 = (𝜋𝑟 , 𝜋𝑓) = (
𝜇
𝜆+𝜇
,
𝜆
𝜆+𝜇
). 
2.4 Methodology  
A number of experiments on route learning can be seen as a phenomenon that occurs 
on two axes. The first is the training part. This may employ any method or methods 
of giving spatial knowledge to a learner, for example, through verbal communication 
or maps, video touring, or practice in a virtual environment. The second part is to  
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Start
Identify Landmarks (L) near 
decision points and classify the 
difficulty levels according to LCP. 
Set stochastic transition rates to deal 
with difficulty levels associated with 
decision points.
t8, t9 deal with MEDIUM level,
t10, t11 deal with LOW level,
t12, t13 deal with HIGH level, 
t14, t15 deal with HIGHEST level, and
t16, t17 deal with LOWEST level.
Sort cI,  "I  as they appear on the route 
such that for all I, (cI, pI)  (cI, LI) is a 
valid command-decision point (or 
command-landmark) pair on the route.
Initialize marking M0 by placing:
(a) one Dot type token on the place Tr1, 
(b) one Dot type token on the place A1, 
(c) one Dot type token on the place A24, 
(d) one NUM type token on the place A22,
(e) a multiset of thirteen tokens, which 
contain the difficulty levels of decision-points 
as they appear on the route, of type 
NUMLEVELS on the place A23.
Set J:= 1
Is the firing transition 
related with forgetting?
Identify the navigation commands, c, 
required to make up the desired route.
Identify which among the enabled stochastic 
transitions fire. Let the input of this 
transition is (cJ, J), where J is the difficulty 
level associated with LJ.
Compute the probabilistic firing 
delay for the stochastic transitions
Ignore (cJ, LJ).
Save (cJ, LJ) 
in memory.
YES
J:= J + 1
Simulation time 
ends
NO
Validate (cJ, LJ), 
for 1   J   n with 
empirical findings.
YES
Is validation 
acceptable?
Result:={(cJ, LJ)|J   n }
YES
End
NO
Modify stochastic 
transition rates. 
(See Table 1 for 
details)
Update the 
marking of the 
GSPN
NO
 
Figure 2.2. The general methodology for modeling landmarks-based route learning. 
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assess the extent to which the spatial knowledge is retained after the training is 
complete. Allen (1999) says that a successful landmark-based navigation requires 
recognition of landmarks and then remembering the associated navigation commands. 
The level of difficulty in remembering landmarks and associated navigation 
commands is modeled in the present work. Allen (1999) further says that, due to 
individual differences and other environmental factors, it is reasonable to suppose that 
no two wayfinding tasks are alike. We have developed a modeling approach, which is 
explained in Figure 2.2, to develop a model of route learning based on landmarks.  
The approach is followed by modeling three main components (see Figure 2.3) of 
route learning activity separately: (i) the trainer model (N1), whose purpose is to pass 
on navigation commands in succession to N2, (ii) the action generation and learning 
model (N2), which generates actions in the environment according to the received 
navigation command and then attempts to remember the actions and landmarks (N2 
receives inputs from N1 and N3), and (iii) the route model (N3) that sends a sequence 
of perceived difficulty levels associated with landmarks or decision points to N2. This 
route information is provided, on the place A23, as part of the initial marking, M0, 
where a marking in a Petri net refers to the distribution of tokens on the places at any  
 
Figure 2.3. A block diagram of the proposed model 
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Figure 2.4. GSPN model of landmark based route learning. Transitions t8 - t17 are the stochastic transitions. All other 
transitions are immediate transitions. Transitions, t8, t10, t12, t14, and t16, are executed when the decision is not to 
store a landmark and its associated navigation command, whereas, the transitions, t9, t11, t13, t15, and t17, are used 
for saving the information about landmarks and associated navigation commands. The operator ++ is used to construct 
a multiset of tokens. The operator ` is a binary operator in Snoopy. It takes a non-negative integer as a left operand that 
specifies the number of copies of the element provided as the right operand. The place A23 has thirteen tokens. Notice 
that the current distribution of tokens as shown here constitutes the initial marking M0.  
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 Algorithm 2.1: demonstrating the working of transitions in N1 
1 while true do 
  ;    //i.e., true until there are commands for N2 
2  perform t1;      //means to prepare the NCs 
3  perform t2;      //sends the NC via channel ‘send’ 
4  perform t3;      //listen to acknowledgement from N2 on ‘ack’ 
5  perform t4;      // interpret the acknowledgement and act accordingly 
    
 
 Algorithm 2.2: demonstrating the working of transitions in N3 
1 while A22, A23, and A24 contain at least a single token do 
2  perform t33;      //observe landmarks 
3  perform tj ,   28  j 32 ;  /* where j is chosen randomly such that the input     
                            token on tj satisfies its guard expression. The transition tj  
                            delivers information regarding observed difficulty level to  
                            tj+k-20 and tj+k-19, where k=0, 1, 2, 3, 4, for successive  
                            increasing values of j. This step contributes in enabling  
                            tj+k-20 and tj+k-19 simultaneously. 
    
 
moment of time, of the proposed GSPN model of route learning (Figure 2.4). Marking 
of a Petri net represents the state of the system being modelled. N1 and N2 are 
connected by two channels: the places send and ack. The former sends navigation 
commands from N1 to N2, and the latter receives acknowledgements from N2. N1 
involves the places Tr1 to Tr4, send, and ack, and transitions t1 to t4. N1 forms a 
model to represent a trainer who has knowledge of a specific route and sends the 
navigation commands to the learner, N2, via the channel send and then waits on the 
learner to process the command before sending the next command. This process 
continues until there are no more commands left with the trainer, as explained in 
Algorithm 2.1. A token on N1’s place shows a state the trainer is in. For example, a 
token on Tr1 means that the trainer has a command for the learner to follow. 
The net N3 in the GSPN model (see Figure 2.4) is responsible for collecting the route 
information in terms of how difficult a landmark might be to remember by a person 
who visits it the first time. Here, landmarks are divided in five classes: (i) lowest  
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 Algorithm 2.3: Landmark Classification Procedure (LCP) 
 Input: A route consisting of decision points, p1, p2, …, pn. 
 Output: , the level of difficulty to remember a landmark 
1 for integer i:=1 to n do 
2        if pi is crowded by many objects then 
3             HIGH 
4        else if near pi there are two similar landmarks leading to different locations then 
5             MEDIUM 
6        else if there is an easier route originating in close proximity to p i then 
7             HIGHEST /*here, the remaining part of the route is deliberately ignored in  
                                        favor of re-routing.*/ 
8        else if pi has a clear landmark nearby then 
9             LOW 
10        else  
11             LOWEST /*no landmarks needed to move forward, the route here is so easy  
                                        that the entire scene is remembered.*/ 
 return  
    
 
 Algorithm 2.4: demonstrating the working of transitions in N2 
1 while true do 
2  perform t5;      //understands the NCs from N1 
3  perform t6;      //run the NCs and begin learning surroundings 
4  perform t7;      // acknowledge N1 for executing the NC 
5  perform any one of t8-t17;      //remember or forget NC with landmarks 
6  perform any one of t18-t27;    /* depends on which of A5-A14 gets token from the  
                                       transitions t18-t27. The purpose is to enable transition                                                     
                                       t7 so that the acknowledgement of executing the NCs can  
                                       be sent to N1.*/ 
    
 
difficulty, (ii) low difficulty, (iii) medium difficulty, (iv) high difficulty, and (v) 
highest difficulty, as per chances that they serve as cues to recall required changes in 
one’s heading. The transitions t28, t29, t30, t31, and t32 are enabled when the guard 
expressions on them are true. For example, t28 is enabled only when a medium 
difficulty level landmark is passed in the transition t33. The net N3 works according 
to Algorithm 2.2. The GSPN model is 1-bounded. Therefore, if any of the transitions 
in the set t28, t29, t30, t31, t32 is enabled, all others in this set will be disabled. It 
should be noted that only N3 uses colored tokens; N1 and N2 use uncolored tokens. 
The datatype NUM is for numeric values starting from zero, and NUMLEVELS is  
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Table 2.1. The meaning or purpose of the transitions used in the proposed GSPN model. The 
index sets are I1={8, 10, 12, 14, 16} and I2={9, 11, 13, 15, 17}. 
Transitions Meaning/context 
t1  prepare or collect the navigation command. 
t2  send the command to N2 via channel send. 
t3  collect the acknowledgment of N2 via the channel ack. 
t4  define the next step after last acknowledgment. 
t5  read the navigation command. 
t6  interpret the command and standby on acknowledgment. 
tiI1 read the landmark difficulty level, process it according to its value with 
the navigation command and do not save this information in memory. 
tiI2 read the landmark difficulty level, process it according to its value with 
the navigation command and save this information in memory. 
t18-27 prepare for acknowledgment. 
t33 read landmark difficulty levels in order. 
t28-32 send the difficulty level according to matched guard expression 
t7 send the acknowledgment to N1 via channel ack. 
 
derived from NUM and the enumerated type D = {LOW, LOWEST, MEDIUM, 
HIGH, HIGHEST}, which represents difficulty levels to remember landmarks. A 
variable of type NUMLEVELS is a tuple (pair) containing a value of type NUM as the 
first element, and an element of D as the second element. The purpose of integers in 
the first place is to bring an order in the tokens on the place A23 according to an input 
route. The values of the set D are used to show difficulty level associated with 
landmarks.  
The classification of landmarks proposed in the preceding paragraph is justified 
because experiments with humans suggest that recognizing and remembering 
landmarks involve a host of factors, such as to avoid losing sight of familiar 
landmarks (Yurkiewicz & Tsao, 2012), being different or unique in color, layout, 
shape, or some other attribute associated with a particular location (Golledge, 1977). 
Most importantly, repeated or mirrored layouts, and crowded passages are the factors 
that are found to have adverse effects on human navigational abilities (McKinlay, 
2016). On the other hand, the use of WiFi, wall-mounted antennas, and sensors, for 
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local navigation gadgets in indoor spaces, as suggested by McKinlay (2016), may be 
unsuitable in emergency evacuation situations because of the emerging hazards, and 
highly time-critical situation. A method to classify landmarks as to how difficult they 
might be to remember is proposed here in Algorithm 2.3. 
The first purpose of N2 is to generate the required actions to follow the input from 
N1. The second purpose is to either enter into a state of forgetting or the state of 
remembering the landmark and associated navigation command. Algorithm 2.4 
explains the working of net N2. Note that Algorithms 2.1, 2.2, and 2.4 are described 
to explain the basic execution cycle in the GSPN model in terms of simple 
programming constructs, rather than directly implementing in program on a platform 
without the support of the concept behind stochastic Petri-nets. A computer program 
for implementing a transition, say t9, would need to materialize the intention behind 
the transition, for example, fetching the landmark related information (such as, 
position, color, size, etc.), the navigation command, and then saving this data into a 
repository, which may be a simple data structure or a table in a relational database 
management system. Since forgetting and remembering are more dependent on time 
compared to other activities, such as fetching a navigation command from N1 (see 
Table 2.1), the transitions that deal with forgetting and remembering are modelled by 
stochastic timed transitions. For all other activities, immediate transitions are used, 
which correspond to vanishing states because the sojourn time of markings that enable 
the immediate transitions is not exponentially distributed. When enabled, the 
immediate transitions take zero time to fire. The stochastic transitions, (ti, ti+1), 
i{8, 10, 12, 14, 16}, are in conflict. If A16 has a token, it can only contribute in  
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Table 2.2. The stochastic transition rates of the GSPN model in Figure 2.4. The rates Q1 and 
Q2 are taken at random from the range 𝛼, whereas Q3 and Q4 are randomly selected from near 
the lower-end and the upper-end values in the range 𝛼, respectively. 
Transitions    
     (ti) 
Rate range 
() 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4  
t8  (0.2, 0.4] 0.39 0.39 0.25 0.395 MEDIUM 
t9 1−i-1 0.61 0.61 0.75 0.605 MEDIUM 
t10 (0.05, 0.2] 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.20 LOW 
t11 1−i-1 0.89 0.88 0.92 0.80 LOW 
t12 (0.4, 0.6] 0.49 0.46 0.41 0.55 HIGH 
t13 1−i-1 0.50 0.53 0.59 0.45 HIGH 
t14 (0.6, 1.0] 0.79 0.73 0.65 0.85 HIGHEST 
t15 1−i-1 0.20 0.26 0.35 0.15 HIGHEST 
t16 (0.0, 0.05] 0.04 0.005 0.001 0.05 LOWEST 
t17 1−i-1 0.96 0.99 0.999 0.95 LOWEST 
 
enabling t8 and t9. Similarly, A17 can only enable t10, t11, and so on. Finally, a 
token on A20 may only enable t16 and t17. Once a pair of transitions are in conflict, 
anyone may fire depending on exponential firing delay. Thus, firing of t8, which deals 
with the medium difficulty landmarks, means that the model will not retain the 
navigation command and observed landmark, whereas, t9, which also deals with the 
medium difficulty landmarks, calls for saving the navigation command and the 
observed landmark. In the same way, the transitions t10-t11, t12-t13, t14-t15, and 
t16-t17 deal, respectively, with low difficulty, high difficulty, highest difficulty, and 
lowest difficulty levels of forgetting/remembering a navigation command and 
associated landmarks. The first in each pair models forgetting and the second 
remembering.  
2.4.1 Model description 
The model presented in Figure 2.4 is a landmark-based route learning model for 
agents. The model has thirty places, twenty-three immediate, and ten stochastic 
transitions. The temporal nature of the model is specified by the use of probabilistic 
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firing delays in stochastic transitions. The stochastic transitions use negative 
exponential distributions with rates, t, assigned randomly from the ranges defined in 
Table 2.2. The rate ranges are selected so that: (i) at the lowest difficulty possible, the 
rate of forgetting is at the minimum, (ii) at the highest difficulty possible, the rate of 
remembering is at the minimum. The boundaries of the rate ranges are defined 
arbitrarily to produce the results close to empirical values. The arcs used in the model 
are all standard arcs. An arc without an explicit arc-expression means that the default 
expression, i.e., 1`dot is used.  
As with any mathematical modeling exercise, there is a certain level of abstraction 
involved here. All places except A21, A22, and A23 are of Dot type. For any variant of 
colored Petri nets, Dot is a simple type that does not associate any value with it. Thus 
the tokens used with the places Tr1-Tr4, send, ack, A1-A20, and A24 do not carry 
any value. A navigation command is assumed at Tr1, for instance, whenever there is 
a token (of type Dot) present at Tr1. For simplicity, values of navigation commands, 
such as move left, move right are not used, rather only the flow of the commands is 
considered. Similarly, when there is a token (of type Dot) at ack it would mean that 
the previous navigation command has been used and now is the time to pass on the 
next command. A token on a place primarily represents the state the agent is in. If, for 
example, in some application there is an agent based only on N1 then that agent can 
only send navigation commands to another agent that is supposed to act accordingly. 
This forms a basic trainer-learner approach, which simulates the situations when the 
trainer agent is separate from the learner agent. On the other hand, an agent that knows 
the route information, say by visiting the environment long time ago, may act as a 
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trainer as well as a learner at the same time. In this case, the agent would have a 
portion of its mind representing N1 and another portion acting as N2 and N3. This 
reflects situations when an individual agent traversing the route would tell itself about 
where to go when it observes a particular landmark. 
The tokens used with the place A22 are of integer type. These are primarily used for 
counting the cycles and sending the right route information to the net from the place 
A23. The tokens used with the places A21 and A23 are of type NUMLEVELS, which is 
a compound type as mentioned in this section before. The identities of the landmarks 
(see Section 2.5.1) have not been made part of the declaration of NUMLEVELS in 
order to reduce the complexity of the model.   
2.5 Simulating Smith’s experiment  
J. Smith (2015) performed an experiment to assess the utility of VE training on 
learning and competence of human participants during emergency egress situations 
on offshore petroleum platform. The experiment involved 36 participants that formed  
S1: Basic 
training
Group 1 Practice Testing Feedback
Group 2 Testing Feedback Testing Feedback Testing Feedback
E2 is formed as a result of the testing performed here.
E1 is formed as a result of the testing performed here.
Training (S2), 
practice, testing and 
feedback sessions
Training (S3), 
practice, testing and 
feedback sessions
 
Figure 2.5. Training exposure to participants Source: Adopted from (J. Smith, 2015). 
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two groups: Group 1 containing 17 and Group 2 containing 19 participants. The VE 
used in this study was All-hands Virtual Emergency Response Trainer (AVERT). 
AVERT is a simulator of an offshore oil and gas facility that comprises several decks. 
It is used to train participants for better response in emergency situations, such as fires 
and explosions. Figure 2.5 shows the difference in training the participants of both 
groups received. Group 1 was given repeated exposure to training and Group 2 was 
trained once. The practice sessions were interactive. The testing sessions included 
interactive tasks that were performed in AVERT, followed by a quiz. These testing 
sessions were recorded as replay video files so they can be watched later on the 
simulator. The training content in the experiment targeted six learning objectives: (1) 
establish spatial awareness of the environment, (2) routes and mapping, (3) alarm 
recognition, (4) continually assess situation and avoid hazards on route, (5) register 
at temporary safe refuge, and (6) general safe practices (J. Smith, 2015 p. 59-60). The 
present study considers only the first two of these learning objectives because they 
are directly related with route learning activity, and also because this keeps the 
complexity of the model low. The participants were instructed to behave as if it was 
their first day of training for a job on an offshore platform. An important part of the 
training was how to correctly respond to an emergency. The learning materials on the 
basic training included AVERT Platform Orientation with a platform video tour, and 
lecture style instructions on Keeping a Safe Workplace and Responding to 
Emergencies. A 30-minute platform exploration was also performed by each 
participant. They also watched five route videos highlighting important primary and 
secondary escape routes. Two of the routes were from a cabin in the accommodation  
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Table 2.3. Difficulty level, , associated with each decision points in R1. 
Decision  
point (pi) 
R1 
p1 HIGH 
p2 LOWEST 
p3 LOWEST 
p4 LOWEST 
p5 LOWEST 
p6 LOW 
p7 MEDIUM 
p8 HIGHEST 
p9 LOWEST 
p10 LOWEST 
p11 LOWEST 
p12 LOWEST 
p13 LOW 
 
 
S
D
p1: Turn left
p3: Move 
right
p5: Go up
p6: Go up
p7: Move left
p8: Move right
p9: Go up
p10: Move out
p11: Move left
p
1
2
: 
M
o
v
e
 l
e
ft
-i
n
p13: Move in
p2: Move straight
p4: Go up
Decision 
points 
Nearby landmarks 
(landmarks’ identities) 
Near p1 are a number of objects, here and 
there, leading to different locations 
p2 Some pipes 
p3 A steel railing 
p4 Equipment stairs # 1 
p5 Stairwell ending at an arch 
p6 Small stairwell 
p7 Two doors on opposite ends of a 
corridor  
p8 A fire exit door with a warning sign 
p9 Stairwell with a door on just left. 
p10 A fire exit door 
p11 A blue colored pillar 
p12 Lifeboat station 
p13 Mess hall door 
 
(a) (b)
 
Figure 2.6. (a) The route, R1, from worksite (S) in the engine room to the primary 
muster station (D). Decision points, 𝑝𝑖, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 13, with required navigation 
commands are shown. The route is scaled for better readability. (b) Description of 
landmarks at the decision points. 
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block of the platform, and three routes were from a worksite in the engine room. The 
route videos played a key role in the participants’ learning of the designated escape 
routes. The routes required a participant to remember his/her cabin, worksite (in the 
engine room), and primary (mess hall) and secondary (lifeboat) muster stations. After 
the training, the participants were tested to see how they egressed to their muster 
point, and competence was assessed. Both groups received the basic training. 
2.5.1 The primary escape route 
The primary escape route from the worksite in the engine room to the muster station 
(the mess hall) is depicted in Figure 2.6. This route is named here as R1. There were 
two other escape routes from the worksite, but only a small fraction of the participants 
followed those routes during testing scenarios. R1 is composed of a list of ordered 
pairs having a navigation command as the first component and a decision point or a 
landmark as the second. This information is collected by carefully watching the route 
videos that were used for training and collecting the salient features of the route. It 
turns out that there are 13 decision points, p1, p2, …, p13 that make up R1. 
Algorithm 2.3 is used to determine the difficulty levels, R1, associated with the 
landmarks near the decision points in R1, and the results are reported in Table 2.3. 
These values are used as input to the place A23 of the GSPN model. The choice of 
exactly how many landmarks should be used in condition#1 on line#2 in Algorithm 
2.3 so as to make it true is critical and application dependent. In Smith’s case study, 
there were around twelve possible routes at p1 and the location lies within a big hall 
that had more than forty objects (including four stairwells, two service generators, 
many pillars and railings, ten canisters, and other machinery relevant to an engine 
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room) cluttered around. This extraneous information, which was provided in as little 
time as around 37 seconds (in training and testing scenarios), suggested the difficulty 
level for p1 to be HIGH. For condition# 2 on line# 4 there were exactly two similar 
landmarks at the opposite ends of a long corridor near p7. The corridor had symmetric 
appearance on both ends. An easier detour was found near p8. This detour uses the 
central stairwell to reach a muster station. This condition is tested in Algorithm 2.3 
on line#6. The decision point p6 had a clear landmark (condition#4 on line #8), which 
was an arch near a stairwell. Similarly, p13 also satisfied condition#4 on line#8 
because of the presence of a red colored mess hall door situated opposite to starboard 
side lifeboat station. The difficulty levels associated with p6 and p13 were set to LOW. 
The remaining decision points fell into the category of LOWEST difficulty level.   
2.5.2 Datasets for model validation 
2.5.2.1 EMPIRICAL DATASET (E1) 
The empirical dataset E1 comprises the average number of wrong decisions (% 
values) per decision point obtained when the participants of Group 2 were tested for 
a scenario that asked to muster at the primary muster station from the worksite at the 
decision point p1. The results are shown in Figure 2.7. During the testing scenario, 
47% of the participants failed to produce the correct path from p1. The point p6 had a 
clear landmark, which was an arch near a stairwell. The 12 participants who reached 
p6 correctly followed this decision point except one who made a mistake here. The 
decision point p7 was a door at the end of a stairwell, opening out into a corridor 
having a similar look on both sides. The doors at the opposite ends of the corridor 
were similar. These doors were the potential landmarks because they were different 
than the other doors in terms of their orientation and signage, but they were two, and 
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were identical in color and layout. Their signages were also exactly the same. The 
right and the left side portions of the corridor, as viewed from p7, were perfect 
examples of a mirrored layout, which resulted in around 26% of those who arrived 
here selecting the wrong direction. As for p8, there was a clear landmark, which was 
a single fire exit door. However, 71% of those who reached p8 made a detour from a 
location just after p7, and thereby left the route R1. We consider it a deliberate action 
because of the possibility of an easy alternative to the destined muster station, which 
was the platform’s mess hall. We think that the participants considered the remaining 
part of R1, or at the very least just the landmark near p8, as difficult compared to their 
chosen alternative route, which ran through the central stairwell. Therefore, p8 
witnessed 71% failure in choosing the right direction. The point p13 was reached by 
all the 19 participants except one who reverted back to some other location. The rest 
of the decision points were successfully followed by all the participants who reached 
there. The average percentage of wrong decisions, e(pi), per decision point, pi, 
committed by the participants was estimated by counting how many participants made 
a wrong choice at an ith decision point provided the participant arrived at the decision 
point, and dividing the result with the total number of participants.  
2.5.2.2 EMPIRICAL DATASET (E2) 
The participants of Group 1, after receiving the basic training, were given five practice 
sessions before the first testing scenario of this study. This testing scenario (TE) was 
related to egressing from worksite to mess hall (called TE2) in the event of an 
emergency. The participants were assessed on their familiarity with the escape routes. 
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As with the E1, only the primary escape route is considered here. The other testing 
and practice scenarios as depicted in Figure 2.5 were developed to assess the learning 
objectives (3)-(6) (see Section 2.5) and are, therefore, not considered here due to 
scope of the present study. The e(pi)s were computed by watching participants’ 
performance in replay videos. These results are depicted in Figure 2.7.  
2.5.3 Simulation and results 
The proposed route learning model is developed in the software environment Snoopy 
(Heiner, Herajy, Liu, Rohr, & Schwarick, 2012). The simulation interval was set to a 
start and an end point at 0 and 100, respectively. The initial marking was set to M0, 
which is shown as a distribution of tokens over the entire set of places in Figure 2.4. 
Usually, stochastic simulations require a significant number of simulation runs 
(Marwan, Rohr, & Heiner, 2012). We use repeated stochastic simulations by setting 
the number of runs at 500 for samples S1 and S3, and at 5000 for samples S2, S4, S5, 
 
Figure 2.7. Empirical and simulation results. 
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and S6. Each sample is then averaged. As an example, consider the case of S2. The 
simulation output generates 5000 series each simulating the decision points (followed 
or forgotten) in R1. The average of these series is a more reliable estimate of learning 
compared to individual series.  
As mentioned earlier, the outputs are simulated routes corresponding to the route R1, 
with some missing decision points showing the phenomenon of forgetting. Figure 2.7 
reports six samples obtained by setting up the model for route R1. The average percent 
wrong decisions (errors) per decision point, e(pi), 1  i  13, obtained in empirical 
datasets E1 and E2 are shown for comparison with the simulated results. Sample 1 
(S1) is the average percentage of wrong decisions per decision point for 500 
simulations, which can be considered as the average performance of 500 agents. The 
deviations from the observed data is clearly visible. Sample 2 (S2) is the average 
obtained by running 5000 simulations. S1 and S2 are obtained when the rates for the 
transitions t8-t17 are set according to the values of the set Q1 (see Table 2.2). The 
samples S3 and S4 are computed for 500 and 5000 simulations with a different set of 
values, Q2, for the transition rates. The transition rates, Q1 and Q2, are randomly 
chosen, whereas, Q3 and Q4 are taken close to the minimum and the maximum values 
in the transition rates described in Table 2.2. The paired two-tailed t-tests for S1, S2, 
S3, and S4, with the empirical series E1 accept, with 95% confidence, the null 
hypothesis that these samples have, statistically, the same mean as that of the E1. It is 
clearly seen in Figure 2.7 that S5 and S6, which were obtained when the transition 
rates were set to Q3 and Q4, respectively, make lower and upper bounds of the GSPN 
model for the failure to remember navigation command at a decision point. This 
means that depending on what values of rates are chosen for stochastic transition in 
 67 
 
the model, the model output cannot go beyond these limits unless the ranges defined 
in Table 2.2, for Q3 and Q4, are modified. Now, comparing the simulated results with 
the series E2, it is clearly seen that the model output deviates significantly where the 
difficulty level is HIGH or above, i.e., at points p1 and p8. This is because the 
participants were not naïve because they had been through to a practice session 
(before testing) that had improved their spatial skills. To address sequential learning, 
the proposed model may be used in a repeated manner each time producing an epoch 
of learned route, and in each iteration the rates of the stochastic transitions may be 
modified in some (say linear) manner to produce better results. 
2.5.4 Analysis of the proposed model 
Marcie model checker (Heiner, Rohr, & Schwarick, 2013) is used to analyze various 
mathematical properties of the GSPN model in Figure 2.4. The model has a finite 
reachability graph, containing 312 states and 481 edges with zero absorbing state, and 
is live and reversible. It is 1-bounded, and therefore, safe (Bause & Kritzinger, 1996).  
2.5.5 Performance evaluation 
The CTMC associated with the GSPN model is derived below. If ℒ denotes this 
CTMC, then the steady state distribution (Ajmone Marsan, 1990) representing that ℒ 
in state i at time t is given by 
 𝜋(𝑡) = Pr {ℒ(𝑡) = 𝑖}, (2.5) 
where, 𝜋(𝑡) = (𝜋1(𝑡), 𝜋2(𝑡), … , ). 
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Table 2.4. States in the CTMC of the GSPN model in Figure 2.4, obtained for the sample S4. 
States containing the places A5-A14 are shown for brevity. The actual markings involved 
unfolding (of the GSPN) due to the colored subnet N3. For clarity only A22 was replaced by 
its corresponding uncolored place in the markings below. The rest of the places are shown as 
they appeared in Figure 2.4. 
States (Mj) Markings 𝜋𝑗 × 10
−4 
M0 Tr2, A1, A24, A22-1, A23 5.94 
M292 Tr3, A5, A3, A22-8, A23 37.16 
M306 Tr3, A6, A3, A22-8, A23 57.95 
M307 Tr3, A7, A3, A22-1, A23 11.04 
M308 Tr3, A7, A3, A22-7, A23 11.04 
M309 Tr3, A8, A3, A22-1, A23 84.07 
M310 Tr3, A8, A3, A22-7, A23 84.07 
M311 Tr3, A9, A3, A22-2, A23 44.42 
M117 Tr3, A3, A10, A22-2, A23 50.70 
M274 Tr3, A11, A3, A22-9, A23 70.11 
M275 Tr3, A12, A3, A22-9, A23 25.01 
M276 Tr3, A13, A3, A22-13, A23 0.48 
M277 Tr3, A13, A3, A22-12, A23 0.48 
M278 Tr3, A13, A3, A22-11, A23 0.48 
M279 Tr3, A13, A3, A22-10, A23 0.48 
M280 Tr3, A13, A3, A22-6, A23 0.48 
M281 Tr3, A13, A3, A22-5, A23 0.48 
M282 Tr3, A13, A3, A22-4, A23 0.48 
M283 Tr3, A13, A3, A22-3, A23 0.48 
M284 Tr3, A14, A3, A22-13, A23 94.64 
M285 Tr3, A14, A3, A22-12, A23 94.64 
M286 Tr3, A14, A3, A22-11, A23 94.64 
M287 Tr3, A14, A3, A22-10, A23 94.64 
M288 Tr3, A14, A3, A22-6, A23 94.64 
M289 Tr3, A14, A3, A22-5, A23 94.64 
M290 Tr3, A14, A3, A22-4, A23 94.64 
M291 Tr3, A14, A3, A22-3, A23 94.64 
 
The steady state probability distribution for ℒ exists and is reported in Table 2.4. The 
steady state distribution vector 𝜋 = (𝜋1, 𝜋2, 𝜋3, … , ) is obtained by solving the 
following system of linear equations (Mo, 2013):  
 𝑞𝑖𝜋𝑖 = ∑ 𝑞𝑗𝑖𝜋𝑗
𝑗≠𝑖
, (2.6) 
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where, 𝑞𝑖 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 , and 𝑄 = (𝑞𝑖𝑗) is the so-called infinitesimal generator, i.e., the 
matrix of transitions rates (see Table 2.2 for the values used here). Since  is a steady 
state distribution vector, it satisfies: 
 ∑ 𝜋𝑗 = 1
∀𝑗
, (2.7) 
Now, let G(.) be a performance function that determines the average value of learned 
navigation commands and landmarks (or decision points). Using the vector  the 
expected value of G can be estimated as (Ajmone Marsan, 1990; Mo, 2013): 
 𝐸[𝐺(𝑋)] = ∑ 𝐺(𝑗). 𝜋𝑗,
𝑗∈𝕊
 
(2.8) 
where, 𝕊 is the state-space. 
For the case study of Section 2.5, let X represent the state that involves remembering 
the navigation commands and associated landmarks, viz., the states involving the 
places  A6, A8, A10, A12 and A14, then G(X) represents that the state X is being reached 
or the process is in state X (in terms of the GSPN model, that the marking MX is 
reached and the desired place has n = 1 token). Thus, for a state m where learning is 
not involved, G(m) is considered as 0, otherwise 1. It can be seen, using Table 2.4, 
that 
 𝐸[𝐺(𝑋)] = ∑ 1. 𝜋𝑗 = 1059,
𝑗∈𝒜
 
(2.9) 
 
where, 𝒜={M306, M309, M310, M117, M275, M284 - M291}. The above equation shows the 
average fraction of time the model stays in states responsible for learning. It follows 
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that if Y corresponds to the states where the model does not remember navigation 
commands and landmarks,  
 𝐸[𝐺(𝑌)] = ∑ 1. 𝜋𝑗 = 178,
𝑗∈ℬ
 
(2.10) 
where, ℬ={M292, M307, M308, M311, M274, M276 - M283}. Thus, the total fraction of time 
the system is in learning state is 85.6%. The sums in Equations (2.9) and (2.10) are 
for the case of S4. The average learning time for the empirical data reported 
previously, is estimated using ∑ (100 − 𝑒(𝑝𝑖))/𝑛1≤𝑖≤𝑛 , which is found to be 86.6%. 
That is, the average percentage of learning route R1 is 86.6%, which is very close to 
the value obtained for S4. Equations (2.9) and (2.10) are also used to estimate the 
values corresponding to the samples S5 and S6. The percentages of time that the 
model spends in learning are found to be 88.6% for S3 and 80.0% for S4. This means 
that the lower the rates of stochastic transitions, t8, t10, t12, t14, and t16, the greater 
is the average learning. 
2.6 Conclusion  
The proposed GSPN model for route learning in a new environment is validated by 
using Smith’s experiment for the case of escape routes on an offshore petroleum 
platform (J. Smith, 2015). The case study clearly demonstrates estimation of the 
difficulty level associated with a variety of decision points. The results of paired t-
tests confirm (with 95% confidence) that the simulations generated similar results as 
obtained with human participants. Equation (2.9) uses steady state probabilities to 
determine how long the model stays in those states where the transitions (see Figure 
 71 
 
2.4 and Table 2.4) for saving the navigation commands and respective landmarks are 
executed. This estimates how much learning is done when compared to the results of 
Equation (2.10), which determines the proportion of time the model stays in states 
responsible for not saving the landmarks and associated navigation commands.  
A software agent, based on the GSPN model, would provide an interesting venue for 
trainees to see the effects of forgetting a location in a route during egress in an 
emergency evacuation scenario in a VE (Dooley, 2017; Hayden, 2015). The model 
may be used, as an application of machine learning, to produce student models in an 
intelligent virtual training system for emergency evacuations (Gilmore & Self, 1988). 
Other applications of this model may include computer games in which a software 
agent uses the GSPN model to learn routes based on its continuous exposure to the 
game world. Different agents can show different ability to learn routes by using 
different sets of firing rates of the transitions t8-t17 and thereby will demonstrate 
different strength in opposing or favoring the human player. The quantification of 
landmarks and their impact on learning, as presented here, is an important result in 
the sense of better situation awareness. The case studies suggest that an ith landmark 
along a route should be treated as if it is a temporary destination before the final 
destination point. Thus, every other landmark that is situated before the ith landmark 
should be of reasonable difficulty so that it can be easily remembered by people so 
there is no need to detour, as this may delay the evacuation process. Mirrored layouts 
should be avoided, and the emergency egress routes should have clear signage at 
every decision-point so that people do not need to remember other objects in the 
environment for finding the right direction. It turns out that escape routes are not used 
during normal operating hours, especially those that use ladders to egress. Workers 
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should be trained regularly so that their navigation skills remain dependent on 
designated signage system rather than relying on ordinary or natural environmental 
cues. The GSPN model should be a good choice for software or intelligent agents in 
a virtual environment where access to the environment’s geometry would make it easy 
to recognize and classify landmarks to be used as input to the model. Algorithm 2.3 
defines, in a broader sense, what needs to be done for landmark classification. A 
consensus on landmark classification based on exact numbers of nearby objects, or 
shape, color or size of an object is still an open problem and the authors have found 
only a few articles discussing this problem in a broader sense. 
As mentioned before, the model takes only a single exposure of training. Future work, 
therefore, should enhance the capability to add multiple exposures of training so that 
after a certain number of iterations the model output is free from any missing 
knowledge. This may involve a systematic and iterative adjustment in the firing rates 
of the stochastic transitions. Still another dimension of work is to add support for 
learning multiple routes and then integrate them all to produce survey knowledge of 
the environment. Because of the presence of multiple routes between the same source 
and destination points, this strand of work may exploit naturalistic decision making 
(G. Klein, 2004) to model how an agent selects routes from a set of learned choices 
in a moment of high stress. 
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Chapter 3  
Human-l ike sequentia l  learning of  escape 
routes  for  vir tual  real i ty  agents *** 
Co-authorship statement. A version of this chapter has appeared as an article in 
the journal titled Fire Technology published by Springer-Verlag. The lead author, 
Syed Nasir Danial, has developed and implement the model and extracted the 
empirical data using re-play video files for validation of the model. The co-author 
Jennifer Smith performed the experiment and verified the data extracted from the 
experiment. Co-authors Dr. Faisal Khan and Dr. Brian Veitch supervised the study. 
All authors read and approved the final draft. 
Abstract. The Piper Alpha disaster (1988) witnessed 167 casualties. The offshore 
safety guidelines developed afterward highlighted the need for effective and regular 
training to overcome the problems in evacuation procedures. Today, virtual 
environments are effective training platforms due to high-end audio/visual and 
interactive capabilities. These virtual environments exploit agents with human-like 
steering capabilities, but with limited or no capacity to learn routes. This work 
proposes a sequential route learning methodology for agents that resembles the way 
people learn routes. The methodology developed here exploits a generalized 
stochastic Petri-net based route learning model iteratively. The simulated results are 
compared with the route learning strategies of human participants. The data on 
human participants were collected by the authors from an earlier study in a virtual 
environment. The main contribution lies in modeling people’s route learning 
behavior over the course of successive exposures. It is found that the proposed 
methodology models human-like sequential route learning if there are no easy 
detours from the original escape route. Although the model does not accurately 
capture individual learning strategies for all decision nodes, it can be used as a 
model of compliant, rule-following training guides for a virtual environment. 
 
*** Danial, S. N., Smith, J., Khan, F., & Veitch, B. (2019). Human-Like Sequential Learning of 
Escape Routes for Virtual Reality Agents. Fire Technology, 55(3), 1057–1083. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10694-019-00819-7. 
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3.1 Introduction  
Effective wayfinding and mustering during an emergency are critical for managing 
the safe evacuation of an offshore petroleum platform. Ordering the full evacuation 
of a platform is a time-sensitive decision and requires all personnel onboard to be 
accounted for at the temporary safe refuge area. Conventional muster drills provide 
offshore personnel with repeated weekly exposure to their escape routes and muster 
procedures (e.g., knowing what to do in the event of an emergency). These drills are 
performed in benign conditions and as a result, may not provide crews with sufficient 
exposure to the offshore platform to develop survey knowledge (a mental map-like 
representation of the platform). The training is especially important for crew members 
who are working in an unfamiliar, or new work environment.  
Virtual environments (VEs) provide a means to practice escape routes virtually, which 
enables people to learn the platform before they step foot on the real platform. 
Certainly, VEs provide easy access to training where a required number of training 
exposures can be given to participants at the expense of fidelity of the real 
environment. VE training can help prepare people to navigate the platform safely in 
the event of an emergency. VEs also provide a virtual lab setting to investigate human 
behavior while participants learn emergency escape routes. Artificially intelligent 
(AI) agents can be used in the VE to improve the fidelity of VE training. These agents 
can be developed with a range of behaviors, from people who are fully compliant with 
safety protocols, to people who have poor situation awareness and panic in emergency 
situations. Agents can be programmed to exhibit these behaviors. In general, agents 
have limited capabilities to express human cognitive behavior, such as the strategy a 
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person would take to learn their escape route. This paper proposes a method that can 
be used to develop a sequential learning strategy of escape routes for agents. The 
approach is validated on human performance data collected over a series of training 
sessions in a VE. 
Sequential route learning is a natural way to learn a route over some exposures to the 
route. In each exposure, information about locations along a route that requires a 
person to change their course is remembered due to the presence of exit signs, 
environmental cues, or landmarks (Allen, 1999). Such locations are commonly 
referred to in the literature as decision-points. The signage considered here does not 
only comprise the conventional exit symbols, but environmental cues are also coupled 
to make the location more salient. For example, a fire exit door is red in color as well 
as has an exit sign near the top of the door. The coupling of environmental cues with 
exit signs supports recent findings (Galea, Xie, & Lawrence, 2014), where the authors 
found that only 38% of the sampled participants were able to see static exit signs. 
Adding environmental cues to exit signs makes a more salient landmark near a 
decision-point, but not all decision-points are easy to remember. There may be many 
reasons why a particular landmark is forgotten after being observed (e.g., lack of 
attention, (Reason, 1990)). Intersecting escape routes often become a problem as they 
require careful decision-making if a person is to stay on the shortest unobstructed 
route during a real emergency (Koutamanis, 1995). The information gathered at each 
decision-point is known as a navigational command (e.g., turn left, turn right, or 
continue going straight on the route). For this paper, the agent stores two pieces of 
information at the decision-points: (1) recognizing the landmark along the route, and 
(2) recalling the navigational command at the landmark. The landmarks along a route 
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are the basis to remember the navigational commands (Waller & Lippa, 2007) that 
direct the agent when to stay on the route and where to make a turn.  
The problem of wayfinding during an emergency has a wide scope. Airports, railway 
stations, industrial buildings, and public places are important locations where there 
are a fair number of people, at all the times, who do not know the environment very 
well, or who have only limited memories of the most important escape routes. 
However, as the VE used in this study simulates the environment of an offshore 
petroleum platform, the discussion here is focused on this particular context. The time 
to reach the designated muster station from a current location is an important variable 
to determine the effectiveness of an evacuation training exercise (Kristiansen, 2005), 
and therefore, it has significance in real emergencies. The Piper Alpha disaster 
witnessed 167 casualties due in part to insufficient evacuation procedures (Cullen, 
1993). The SOLAS Chapter II-2 Regulation 13 (IMO, 2009 p. 167) has specific 
guidelines about the use of signs in an escape route on offshore platforms. The 
regulation requires all signs to be photoluminescent material, or marked by light, or 
both. The OSHA fact sheet describes the operational features of all escape routes and 
advocates at least two routes for safe and rapid arrival at muster points in case of an 
emergency (OSHA, 2003). Nevertheless, on real platforms, there are locations where 
people must use environmental cues to orient towards the exit direction. These include 
engine gear rooms and open spaces.  
A colored Generalized Stochastic Petri-Net (GSPN) based Route Learning (GSPNRL) 
model that uses landmarks is proposed in (Danial, Khan, & Veitch, 2018) to represent 
how humans forget some landmarks, while remembering others when these are 
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observed during the first visit to an unfamiliar, or new environment. The present work 
extends the scope of the GSPNRL model. We propose a methodology whereby the 
model can be used in an iterative way, such that each iteration produces a trace of a 
single route learning exercise. Successive iterations of the model should reveal a 
learning curve that converges. This means that the total number of landmarks missed 
from learning in the model after the first iteration should decrease in the successive 
iterations. The literature review shows that, although, some route learning and 
generation models (Caduff & Timpf, 2005; Goldschmidt, Manoonpong, & Dasgupta, 
2017; Götze & Boye, 2016) consider landmarks as cues that direct an agent nearer to 
its goal, how should successive training exposures impact the learning of a route? 
Even if a sequential route learning model for agents is developed, how does its output 
show resemblance with human route learning curve obtained over multiple training 
exposures? The proposed methodology aims to answer these questions by generating 
simulated responses from agents and then comparing these responses with real 
people’s route learning responses collected in a virtual environment. 
The approach developed in this study has potential to be used in intelligent agents to 
augment VE training. These intelligent agents could provide opportunities for 
participants to learn the consequences of forgetting a decision-point along a route. For 
example, during an emergency evacuation scenario, a tutoring agent can show trainees 
the consequences of forgetting navigational commands or a decision point along an 
egress route. Such scenarios are important to show the importance of escape route 
learning to novice personnel beginning work at an offshore installation. Simulating 
the route learning of agents with different levels of route knowledge is another 
application that can be used to represent the real-world variability of people in 
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simulated emergency evacuation scenarios. The route learning approach proposed 
here can be used during the design phase of a ship or offshore platform or similar 
complex space because it provides a model to analyze which escape routes are easier 
or more difficult to learn. 
Section 3.2 provides the theoretical background on wayfinding, reviews the use of 
VE training for wayfinding, and outlines the modeling of intelligent agents for 
wayfinding and evacuation behaviors in emergencies. Section 3.3 briefly explains the 
GSPNRL model (see details in Chapter 2, and Appendix A). In section 3.4, a case 
study for collecting human performance data for validation of the proposed approach 
is presented. Section 3.5 shows the simulation results and compares them with 
empirical results collected in Section 3.4. Section 3.6 shows sensitivity analysis of 
the GSPNRL model. Section 3.7 discusses the results and concludes with possible 
future directions. 
3.2 Literature review  
Passini (1977) defines wayfinding as a process that leads a person from a source to a 
destination location. During this process, people learn to recognize the origin and the 
destination locations, and to remember certain environmental features that help them 
to remember which way to take (Golledge, 1999a). These environmental features are 
called landmarks, and they play an important role in adjusting the direction of travel 
towards the desired destination (Gale et al., 1990; Lee, Shusterman, & Spelke, 2006; 
Lynch, 1960; Nys, Gyselinck, Orriols, & Hickmann, 2015). Many experiments 
involving human participants have shown the importance of landmarks during a 
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course of learning a new route. As an example, the experiment reported in (Gale et 
al., 1990) shows that children of ages 9-12 learned more about the environmental 
features of the route on intersections. Emo (2014) investigated the effect of spatial 
configuration, such as the structure of the space and the integration of paths, on 
individual decision-making and visual attention during wayfinding. Sources that 
cover various aspects of route and survey knowledge acquisition ⎯ the concepts like 
home base behavior, and path integration ⎯ can be found in (Eilam, 2014; Golledge, 
1999b; Vandenberg, 2016). The study (Sharma et al., 2017) attempts to quantify the 
influence of landmarks on wayfinding by using electroencephalograph (EEG) signal 
analysis. EEG signals comprises signals coming from human brain with respect to 
various states the human body undergoes, such as resting position, and a stressed 
mental state (Kumar & Bhuvaneswari, 2012). The authors conducted a wayfinding 
experiment in a VE with two groups. Participants in the first group were given 
navigational tasks in an environment with landmarks. In the second group, landmarks 
were removed. The EEG data were collected using a 64-channel device. The 
behavioral analysis revealed that the participants of the first group took less time to 
complete the navigational tasks and committed fewer errors due to the presence of 
landmarks. The EEG data analysis showed that the left-hemispheric activation was 
more visible in those participants who used landmarks compared to those who did 
not. The questions of which landmarks have more influence and how they contribute 
to learning a route when more than one training exposure is given have not been 
addressed.  
The Fire Safety Engineering Group at the University of Greenwich (2017) developed 
buildingEXODUS as software to simulate evacuation from built environments using 
 84 
 
adaptive agents. The evacuation model simulates people-people interactions, people-
fire interactions, and people-structure (such as exit signage) interactions. Although 
these agents are adaptive and the interaction with the signage system is stochastic 
(Galea, 2003), i.e., many simulations are needed to come up with a viable solution, 
and successive simulations produce different results, they lack consideration of the 
failure of signage system or insufficiencies in the signage system. Also, 
buildingEXODUS does not take into account environmental landmarks. It relies only 
on a signage system.  
Landmarks are used when it is difficult to use signage, for example, due to signage 
noise (as at airports or railway stations) or due to difficulty in seeing the signs in 
complex structures such as engine rooms on offshore platforms, and also due to a 
phenomenon called learned irrelevance (Mackintosh, 1973), which is a kind of an 
impairment in attentional set-shifting that results in an inability of a person to use or 
learn information that was considered unimportant in the past (Gruszka, Hampshire, 
& Owen, 2010). Many incidents have been reported where the designated signage 
system failed to fulfill the needs of people in real emergencies. Such include the 
Nairobi Westgate shopping mall terrorist attack (BBC, 2013) in which the escape 
routes were compromised and redirection of people away from compromised exit 
routes consumed valuable egress time. In such situations, people use their instinct of 
using landmarks to navigate towards a safe location. Similarly, during the evacuation 
of Dusseldorf Airport due to a fire incident, many people could not see the emergency 
exit signs and that delayed the evacuation process (Weinspach et al., 1997). 
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Two problems are of particular importance: the case of compromised escape routes, 
and the case when people are unable to see or recognize the exit signs for some reason. 
Dynamic signage systems have been proposed to address the first problem. These are 
systems that can guide people towards a safe escape route, just as ordinary exit signs 
do, but can also redirect evacuees away from an escape route that has been 
compromised (Xie, Filippidis, Galea, Blackshields, & Lawrence, 2012). The second 
problem may have different solutions including: (1) the use of photoluminescent 
material for exit symbols (IMO, 2009), and (2) the consideration of size and 
placement of signage. For agents in VEs, the computation of visibility catchment area 
(VCA) should also accommodate these solutions (Filippidis, Galea, Lawrence, & 
Gwynne, 2001) so that an agent could detect a sign in the same way a human 
counterpart would see that sign. A VCA for an agent can be defined either from the 
agent’s perspective or from the exit sign’s viewpoint. In the former approach, the VCA 
is defined as an area around the agent so that when some object falls into this area the 
agent is able to see that object. In the later approach, which is considered 
computationally efficient, VCA is defined as an area that surrounds an exit sign such 
that when the agent comes into that area the navigation sign is expected to be visible 
unless another object obstructs the sign. The present work proposes to use other 
environmental cues (the landmarks), in addition to using the recommended signage, 
as part of evacuation training curriculum for cases where most of the people are part 
of the workforce, and therefore can be trained. Route learning based on landmarks, 
and not based only on the available signage, is an important solution regarding 
selecting an alternate route in cases when a primary escape route is blocked, or when 
exit signs are difficult to observe. Further, there are practical limitations of using 
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signage on every point in a large facility such as an oil and gas offshore platform, so 
wayfinding based on landmarks is of general importance.  
Caduff and Timpf (2005) modeled how knowledge about landmarks in an 
environment can be integrated into wayfinding tasks so that an agent can generate a 
route based on the available landmarks. The authors considered the environment as a 
graph containing many routes from a source to a destination. Each node of a route 
within the environment has a landmark. The authors ignored the possibility of 
turnarounds. Landmark selection is made by assigning a low weight to the most 
salient landmark and high weight to the least salient one. A weighting function is used 
that expresses the weight of a node in a route as a linear combination of the distances 
(between the nodes and the landmarks), orientation (of the traveler concerning the 
landmarks), and salience of landmarks. Finally, route generation exploits a revised 
version of Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm (Dijkstra, 1959; Sedgewick & Wayne, 
2011 p. 638) using node weights, and provides a route based on landmarks. However, 
as a part of a graph, the authors focus more on shortest path generation based on 
landmarks rather than answering more fundamental questions of human cognitive 
abilities (e.g., remembering or forgetting a landmark due to lack of training) and 
therefore, the effect of training on remembering landmarks remains unaddressed.  
3.3 Overview of the GSPNRL model  
The literature on human wayfinding behavior, as explained in the preceding section, 
suggests that wayfinding is centered around the concept of landmarks. In the absence 
of a landmark, or if a landmark is either not remembered or the associated heading is 
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forgotten, a navigator explores the environment to try to discover a route to the 
destination. Communicating with others around is also a way to figure out a possible 
heading that may lead to the destination. Figure 3.1 explains the steps that are typical 
of a human wayfinding behavior. The GSPNRL model (Figure 3.2) follows the logic 
presented in the flowchart in Figure 3.1 except that the explore behavior used in agent 
programming is considered as something an agent can use from its steering 
capabilities (Buckland, 2004). The primary focus of the GSPNRL model is to capture 
a navigator’s state of remembering or forgetting a landmark with associated direction  
• Familiarize with the current location
• Set current location as the source location.
• Set a destination location.
Look around to see a landmark, any thing 
that reminds of a possible heading.
Follow the direction 
until reach to another 
decision-point
Start
Landmark found?
Is it the 
destination?
Yes
End
Yes
Any direction in 
memory?
No
Yes
• Explore the 
environment to find a 
heading that keeps 
you on the route (this 
includes 
communicating with 
other people for a 
possible direction).
• Choose a direction
No
No
 
Figure 3.1. A typical human wayfinding behavior 
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Figure 3.2. The GSPNRL model.
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at all decision-points along a route. The model could be used as a route learning 
mechanism in intelligent agents so that the agents can exhibit human-like route learning 
behavior, at the same time exploiting other built-in features such as communicating with 
other agents about a direction. 
The GSPNRL model is primarily a combination of three nets labeled as N1, N2, and N3 
in Figure 3.2. The net N1 sends the navigation commands to N2, one after another. N1 
could be a trainer (which may be another agent sending commands via a communication 
medium and then receiving back the acknowledgments), or it could be the same agent 
retrieving its memory, from a repository of experiences, and previously used navigation 
commands at a location observed through N3. The navigation commands include 
directions such as move left and move right. 
The net N3 takes a list of difficulty levels associated with the landmarks or decision-
points along the route in the order of occurrence as the agent traverses from the origin to 
the destination. The landmarks are divided into five classes based on their difficulty to 
remember: (i) lowest difficulty, (ii) low difficulty, (iii) medium difficulty, (iv) high 
difficulty, and (v) highest difficulty. The idea behind this classification is that there is less 
chance for a navigator to remember a navigation command used near a location that has 
a high difficulty. That is, if the location where a navigation command was used previously 
does not constitute a good landmark, it will be difficult to remember that navigation 
command. Thus, in future, the agent is likely to miss that navigation command and hence 
may not follow the route. A location that is difficult to remember would mean that its 
features are not salient (Götze & Boye, 2016) and, therefore, people would face difficulty 
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to learn it. On the other hand, easy to remember locations, due to salient environmental 
features, increase the chances to remember the navigation commands (McKinlay, 2016).  
This behavior would mimic the situation of forgetting and remembering what has been 
seen a moment before. Since the GSPNRL model, as shown in Figure 3.2, does not 
explicitly consider multiple training sessions, an iterative approach is proposed in this 
work. The GSPNRL model requires minor adjustments in its inputs to accommodate each 
iteration. The execution of an iteration of the model is like a function call in a typical 
computer programming loop, and each iteration simulates a single training/learning 
session. 
Figure 3.3 demonstrates two hypothetical cases: (A) a perfect learning case and (B) a 
forgetting navigational commands case. In the perfect learning case (Figure 3.3.A), the 
output will be formed by developing a 1:1 correspondence between all the navigation 
commands and the corresponding landmarks relevant to a route. It means that the agent 
knows each move and turn required from the origin to the destination of a route. In 
situations when the agent cannot retain some of the required navigation commands 
(Figure 3.3.B), the output will not form a 1:1 correspondence with the landmarks and the 
associated navigational commands. This behavior reflects the forgetfulness of navigation 
commands along a route when a person is not given sufficient training. 
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Figure 3.3. (A): A perfect learning case in which an agent using the model will retain everything 
that it was trained for. The input I1 is the set of landmarks, and I2 refers to the navigation commands 
required to reach the destination, (B): A realistic learning case in which an agent using the model 
does not retain everything that it was trained for. The question marks refer to the missing 
information in the output node. The learning model is proposed in Figure 3.2. 
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3.4 Collecting the human performance data in a route-
learning scenario: a case study  
3.4.1 AVERT simulator 
The virtual environment used in this study is the All-hands Virtual Emergency Response 
Trainer (AVERT). AVERT is a simulator of an offshore facility comprised of several 
decks. It allows participants to train and develop better responses to emerging hazards. 
The training curriculum of the AVERT virtual environment includes basic offshore safety 
practices with the help of a learning management system. 
3.4.2 Evacuation task in the AVERT simulator  
Training scenarios in AVERT were designed to teach participants the escape routes 
available to them from their worksite in the engine room of the platform. There were 
three escape routes from the engine room, and they are ranked based on highest to lowest 
priority (primary, secondary, and tertiary routes). All the routes have been marked with 
required exit signs according to SOLAS Chapter II-2 Regulation 13 (IMO, 2009 p. 167). 
For this work, the primary escape route is the only route used. During the training and 
testing scenarios, participants were required to follow one of the escape routes and muster 
at their designated muster station or lifeboat station. The participants’ worksite was 
located in the engine room on the 3rd deck, and the muster stations (both the mess hall 
and lifeboat) were situated at A-deck.  
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A schematic of the primary escape route along with a description of landmarks is shown 
in Figure 3.4. The primary escape route is named R1. To go from the worksite in the 
engine room to any of the muster stations, one has to climb up three decks. R1 uses the 
equipment stairwell#1 that leads to the 2nd deck. From here, the route goes up to the 
upper-deck using another stairwell. From the upper deck, there are two ways to reach A-
deck. The first, using the central stairwell, and the second, using a direct stairwell situated 
near a corner of a corridor in the upper-deck. R1 uses the direct stairwell to reach A-deck 
near the starboard side of the vessel just opposite to the lifeboat station on the same side, 
which is the secondary muster point. Opposite to the secondary muster station is the 
primary muster station, i.e., the mess hall. 
3.4.3 Experimental results 
J. Smith (2015) experimented to assess the efficacy of AVERT training for offshore 
emergency scenarios. Thirty-six people participated in the experiment, which divided the 
participants into two different training exposure groups: Group 1 participants were given 
repeated exposure to training and learning exercises (17 participants), and Group 2 
participants received one initial exposure to the training (19 participants). After the 
training was completed, both groups were tested on a series of learning objectives. The 
training material for Smith’s experiment targeted six learning objectives, which are: (1) 
establish spatial awareness of the environment, (2) routes and mapping, (3) alarm 
recognition, (4) continually assess situation and avoid hazards on route, (5) register at 
temporary safe refuge, and (6) general safe practices (J. Smith, 2015 pp. 59-60). The 
present work uses the scenarios that cover the first three learning objectives. Participant 
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data from group 1 was used for the validation of the simulation results reported in the 
paper. All group 1 participants completed each training and testing scenario only once, 
and in each scenario, the decision-points or landmarks were encountered only once.  
The participants were tested repeatedly over the course of three separate sessions (S1, 
S2, & S3). Each of the sessions involved test scenarios in responding to a range of 
activities. Only the work related to the first two sessions is used here (see Figure 3.5). 
Session one (S1) was designed to train and test the participants for environmental 
awareness. S1 contains a 30-minute video tour (called LE1) of the virtual platform, two 
training/learning scenarios (LE4, LE5) and two testing scenarios (TE2, TE4). Session 
two (S2) was designed to train and test the participants for emergency alarm recognition 
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p2: Move straight
p4: Go up
pi Nearby landmarks 
p1 Crowded location  
p2 A pile of black pipes 
p3 A steel railing 
p4 Equipment stairs # 1 
p5 Stairwell ending at an arch 
p6 Small stairwell 
p7 Two doors on opposite ends of a 
corridor  
p8 An exit door opening in central 
stairwell 
p9 A fire exit door with a warning sign 
p10 Stairwell where there is a door on 
just left. 
p11 A fire exit door 
p12 A blue colored pillar 
p13 Lifeboat station 
p14 Mess hall door 
 
(a) (b)
0
p8: Move straight
Start of detour.
Detouring commands:
1. Move right
2. Go up
3. Turn left
4. Turn right
5. Go straight
6. Enter into mess hall
Central 
stairwell
Figure 3.4. (a) A schematic of the primary escape route (R1) in AVERT simulator from the 
worksite to the muster stations, (b) description of the landmarks near the decision-points (DP), pi, 
there are fourteen decision-points. The distances are not scaled but are presented for better 
readability. 
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during muster drills. This session contains two training scenarios (LA1, LA4) and two 
testing scenarios (TA2, TA4). Details of the training and testing scenarios and the 
participants’ performance are given in (J. Smith, 2015). 
Initially, participants received basic training and watched three route videos that 
highlighted the primary, secondary, and tertiary escape routes available from the worksite 
in the engine room to the muster stations. Each of the decision-points was explored in 
route videos. Typically, a participant watched each video two to three times. The 
participants then performed practice scenarios (LE4 & LE5) and testing scenarios (TE2 
& TE4). Practice scenario LE4 required participants to practice how to egress from the 
worksite to the lifeboat station using the primary route. Practice scenario LE5 was 
designed for practicing the egress procedure using the secondary route. Other scenarios 
(LE2 and LE3) dealt with routes from cabins, which are not considered here, but these 
scenarios exposed a portion of the route that leads to the central stairwells. 
In testing scenarios TE2 and TE4, the participants were asked to egress, respectively, at 
primary muster and lifeboat stations as quickly as practicable using any route. The same 
tasks were asked in the scenarios LA1, LA4, TA2 and TA4 with the addition of two 
alarms. In this training session, the general platform alarm (GPA) or the PAPA was 
sounded as a means to indicate which muster station to target. Both the alarms are 
S1: Basic 
Training
Practice in 
AVERT
Testing in 
AVERT
Feedback
S2: 
Advanced 
Training
Practice in 
AVERT
Testing in 
AVERT
Feedback
 
Figure 3.5. Training exposure to group-2 participants. 
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different audible signals. The GPA alarm requires the participants to go to the primary 
muster station, i.e., the mess hall. The PAPA alarm indicates a higher severity of an 
emergency and requires the participants to reach the lifeboat station at the starboard side 
of the vessel. Table 3.1 presents a sample of data collected from the participants for the 
scenarios LE4, TE2, TE4, and LA1. This data is binary, representing whether a 
participant has followed the navigation command needed to be followed at a decision-
point or not. Figure 3.4 shows the navigation commands to be followed at each decision-
point. Each participant was taught these commands through the route videos and the 
training sessions.  
During the training and testing scenarios, the participants’ route selection (primary, 
secondary or tertiary routes) and how much they were able to stay on the route were 
recorded. Since an overwhelming number of trials performed by each participant exploits 
R1 as the main route, the secondary and the tertiary route learning data were not of good 
statistical size and have been excluded from analysis. Therefore, the route learning 
observed and simulated here only uses R1 as the target route for spatial learning. For each 
training and testing scenario, the participants’ data were compared to the fourteen 
decision-points (pi) for the R1 escape route. It was observed that some of the participants 
used the central stairwell as a detour from decision point p8 in R1 from the worksite 
scenarios (this will be discussed in further detail in the next section). 
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Table 3.1. A sample of data from four scenarios LE4, TE2, TE4, and LA1 with 10 participants tagged as CAG1, CSG1,…, MWG1. 
Each column represents the data for each decision-points p1, …, p14. A ‘1’ shows that the participant has made the right decision at the 
respective decision-point and a ‘0’ means that the participant did not follow the required action. Each entry contains four values, for 
example, for the participant CAG1, the values for p1 are 0011 where the first 0 is for LE4, the second 0 is for TE2, the third value ‘1’ is 
for TE4, and the last value is recorded from the scenario LA1. 
 p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8 p9 p10 p11 p12 p13 p14 
CAG1 0011 1011 0011 0011 0011 0011 0001 0001 0001 0001 0001 0011 0011 0001 
CSG1 0000 0000 0000 0000 1101 1101 1101 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0101 
DCG1 0001 0001 0001 0001 1101 1101 1000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0101 0101 0101 
HSG1 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 0011 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 0101 
JHG1 0001 0001 0001 0001 1000 0001 0001 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0001 
JMG1 0001 0001 0001 0001 1111 1111 1111 0101 0101 0101 0101 0101 0111 0111 
KHG1 1101 1101 1101 1110 1101 1101 1101 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 1000 1101 
MBG1 0000 0000 0000 0000 1101 1101 1101 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 0101 
MPPG1 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 0101 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1001 
MWG1 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 0111 1010 0010 0010 0010 1010 1010 0101 
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3.4.3.1 AGGREGATE SEQUENTIAL LEARNING 
The task performance measures how many decision-points are correctly followed 
because this demonstrates how well a route is learned. Route learning is estimated by 
calculating the percent average number of failures to follow the required navigation 
command at each decision point in the entire route for a given scenario. A high value 
of failures means less learning and a low value of failures means more learning. 
Figure 3.6 shows the average percentage of participants who failed to follow the 
decision-points p1-p6 in successive scenarios. The gradual learning is indicated by the 
trend in the decision errors as the participants performed successive sessions (as 
shown in Figure 3.6 from left to right). Each scenario, whether it is for practice or 
testing, teaches the participants about the decision-points on route R1. A high value 
at LA4 in Figure 3.6 shows that the participants forgot some decision-points at which 
they performed well in the previous scenarios. This is an example of typical human 
behavior. Figure 3.7 shows the average number of participants who did not follow the 
required navigation commands at decision-points p7 to p14. The navigation commands 
required to follow R1 are shown in Figure 3.4. Only eight cases out of eighty trials 
for ten participants over eight scenarios (LE4, LE5, TE2, TE4, LA1, LA4, TA2, and 
TA4) are found where a participant either did not reach any muster station or was 
mustered at a wrong muster station. The reason for splitting R1 into two parts as 
shown in Figures 3.6 and 3.7 is to demonstrate that almost half of the route up to p6 
comprises a portion where the participants showed significant learning due to 
successive training. The other half of the route is the segment from p7 to p14 where, 
in most trials, the participants preferred a comparatively easy detour from location p8. 
It means most of the participants did not go to p9; instead, they used the central 
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stairwell, by turning right from p8 instead of going straight to reach the muster stations 
(see Figure 3.4). The participants had earlier exposure of using the central stairwell 
that also goes directly near the mess hall. Since p9 is considered as the highest  
 
Figure 3.6. The average number of participants failed to follow the navigation commands 
corresponding to decision-points p1-p6. Percentage values are shown on the y-axis. 
 
Figure 3.7. The average number of participants failed to follow the navigation commands 
corresponding to decision-points p7-p14. Percentage values are shown on the y-axis. 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
LE4 TE2 TE4 LA1 LA4 TA2 TA4
A
ve
ra
ge
 f
ai
lu
re
 o
cc
u
rs
 a
t 
p
1
-p
6
Scenarios
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
LE4  TE2  TE4  LA1  LA4  TA2  TA4
A
ve
ra
ge
 f
ai
lu
re
 o
cc
u
rs
 a
t 
p
7
-p
1
4
Scenarios
 100 
 
difficulty level decision point, around 40 percent of the participants ( 9%), took the 
detour and used the central stairwell from p8.  
3.5 Simulation results  
The GSPNRL model is developed in the software environment Snoopy (Heiner et al., 
2012). The start and end simulation times were set as 0 and 100, respectively. The 
repeated exposure to training sessions is simulated using the method proposed in 
Figure 3.8. A total of seven scenarios  (LE4, TE2, TE4, LA1, LA4, TA2, and TA4) are 
simulated where each simulation uses 5000 runs. The rates of the stochastic 
transitions, t8-t17, are obtained randomly from the rate ranges defined in Table 3.2. 
The model inputs are (a) the landmarks (regarding difficulty levels denoted by ) 
START
Execute the model: Yk := GSPNRL(I1, I2, W).
(Note: Yk comprises simulated pairs (cj, Lj), where Lj is the jth 
landmark and cj is the associated navigation command.)
[Assign rates to stochastic transition]: 
Set W := (w1, w2, , w10).
Set k :=1
Modify stochastic 
transition rates
(1) a list L of landmarks near decision-points on a route.
(2) a list, c,  of navigation commands for each decision-point.
(3) integer MAX   Total number of scenarios to learn in sequence. 
Validate Yk with empirical findings 
for all decision-points.
validation 
acceptable?
Set k:= k+1
YES NO
k > MAX
NO
YES
STOP
 
Figure 3.8. A method to apply the GSPNRL model for a sequential route learning task. 
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Table 3.2. Range of the stochastic transition rates. Rates were assigned to the GSPNRL 
model randomly from the range below. 
Stochastic 
transitions (ti) 
Firing rate () Difficulty levels () 
t8 (0.2, 0.4] MEDIUM 
t9 1 − 𝛼𝑖−1 MEDIUM 
t10 (0.05, 0.2] LOW 
t11 1 − 𝛼𝑖−1 LOW 
t12 (0.4, 0.6] HIGH 
t13 1 − 𝛼𝑖−1 HIGH 
t14 (0.6, 1.0] HIGHEST 
t15 1 − 𝛼𝑖−1 HIGHEST 
t16 (0.0, 0.05] LOWEST 
t17 1 − 𝛼𝑖−1 LOWEST 
 
along R1 near each decision point, and (b) the navigation commands required at each 
decision point (see Figure 3.4). The difficulty levels assigned to each landmark are 
based on the following criteria: (a) how crowded the space is near the landmark, (b) 
the symmetry in the environment, known as mirrored layouts (McKinlay, 2016), (c) 
the presence of easy detours nearby, and (d) any salient features, such as color, or 
shape, that allow the landmark to stand out from its surroundings. If, at some decision 
point, p, condition (a) holds, then its difficulty level  is set to HIGH. If condition (b) 
is true, then  is set to MEDIUM. The value HIGHEST will be assigned to  if 
condition (c) is true. If condition (d) is found true, then  will be set to LOW. In any 
other case, the value of  will be set to LOWEST, which is typical of situations where 
participants can remember the entire scene, for example, recognizing the mess hall or 
lifeboat station. 
The way of assigning difficulty levels to landmarks requires perceiving certain 
environmental characteristics, such as the presence of many objects, as mentioned in 
(a), or the presence of mirrored layout, as mentioned in (b). Table 3.3 shows the initial 
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Table 3.3. Initial difficulty levels assigned to each decision-points in R1. 
Decision point (pi) R1 
p1 HIGH 
p2 LOWEST 
p3 LOWEST 
p4 LOWEST 
p5 LOWEST 
p6 LOW 
p7 MEDIUM 
p8 HIGH 
p9 HIGHEST 
p10 HIGHEST 
p11 LOW 
p12 LOWEST 
p13 LOWEST 
p14 LOW 
 
scores assigned to the landmarks near the decision-points p1, p2, …, p14 on R1. In 
Smith's (2015) case study, the decision point p1 lies in a big hall where twelve different 
routes originated. There were more than forty objects of different kinds, such as 
stairwells, two service generators, many pillars, railings, and other machinery typical 
of an engine room. This suggested the difficulty level at p1 to be HIGH. The corridor 
near p7 is symmetric from both ends, and it was difficult to remember the correct 
direction. The difficulty level of p7 is assigned as MEDIUM. The decision-points p9, 
and p10 are assigned HIGHEST difficulties because of the presence of an easier detour 
near p8 that uses a central stairwell to arrive at the mess hall. The point p8 has been 
set to one step easier than p9. The decision-points p6, p11, and p14 had clear, salient 
features, as shown in Figure 3.4, which made their difficulty levels equal to LOW. All 
the other decision-points are assigned the LOWEST difficulty level. 
The agent model is used sequentially for simulating the successive scenarios (LE4, 
TE2, TE4, LA1, LA4, TA2, and TA4) in the order the participants carried out the 
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scenarios with updated difficulty levels corresponding to the landmarks as described 
in Figure 3.8. Figure 3.9 shows the results from the agent modeling the participants’ 
behavior in the scenario LE4. For each decision-point there is a separate box 
representing the minimum, the first quartile Q1, the median, the third quartile Q3 and 
the maximum number of times (in percentages) the agent remembers a landmark 
(decision-point) (Figure 3.9A); forgetting a landmark is shown in Figure 3.9(B). The 
decision-points with higher difficulty levels, such as p9 and p10, show higher 
variability than those with lower difficulty levels, such as p2, p6, p11. It means that if 
many agents are used in a single scenario, they will differ in their ability to remember 
or forget a decision-point. Moreover, in all cases where a decision-point is 
 
Figure 3.9. Simulated results for the scenario LE4. Represents an agent that models 
remembering/forgetting the decision-points and the associated navigation commands. (A) The 
boxplots shown here are based on the percentage of times a decision-point is remembered 
during 5000 runs of the simulation of LE4. (B) The boxplots shown here are based on the 
percentage of times a decision-point is forgotten during 5000 runs of the simulation of LE4. 
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remembered, the agent will use the navigation command associated with that 
decision-point. The navigation commands used in this work per decision-points are 
mentioned in Figure 3.4 along with a description of landmarks near a decision-point. 
Figures 3.10-3.12 represent simulated behaviors for the scenarios TE4, LA4, and TA4. 
As the participants’ average behavior, i.e., the average number of times each decision- 
point is remembered in a scenario, is similar in LE4 and TE2, TE4 and LA1, and TA2 
and TA4, the agent that simulates LE4 may be used in TE2. Similarly, the agents that 
simulate TE4 and TA4 can be used for the scenarios LA1 and TA2 respectively. The 
average failure to remember navigation commands associated with the decision-
points per scenario is reported in Figures 3.13 and 3.14. The result of the first 
simulation, comprising 5000 runs, simulates the learning observed in the first 
scenario, i.e., LE4. After every one or two simulations, the difficulty levels associated 
 
Figure 3.10. Simulated results for the scenario TE4. Represents an agent that models 
remembering/forgetting the decision-points and the associated navigation commands. (A) 
The boxplots shown here are based on the percentage of times a decision-point is remembered 
during 5000 runs of the simulation of TE4. (B) The boxplots shown here are based on the 
percentage of times a decision-point is forgotten during 5000 runs of the simulation of TE4. 
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Figure 3.11. Simulated results for the scenario LA4. Represents an agent that models 
remembering/forgetting the decision-points and the associated navigation commands. (A) 
The boxplots shown here are based on the percentage of times a decision-point is remembered 
during 5000 runs of the simulation of LA4. (B) The boxplots shown here are based on the 
percentage of times a decision-point is forgotten during 5000 runs of the simulation of LA4. 
 
Figure 3.12. Simulated results for the scenario TA4. Represents an agent that models 
remembering/forgetting the decision-points and the associated navigation commands. (A) 
The boxplots shown here are based on the percentage of times a decision-point is remembered 
during 5000 runs of the simulation of TA4. (B) The boxplots shown here are based on the 
percentage of times a decision-point is forgotten during 5000 runs of the simulation of TA4. 
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with all the landmarks are decreased by one step (see the flowchart in Figure 3.8). 
Again, the choice of whether the difficulty levels should be decreased after each 
simulation, and to what extent, depends on the difficulty levels of the landmarks. For 
instance, the HIGHEST difficulty level should require more practice sessions than the 
MEDIUM difficulty level. However, to keep the simulation process simple, in Figures 
3.13 and 3.14 we decrease the difficulty levels of every decision point after two 
simulations until LA1. We have done this because initially most of the decision-points 
carried higher values of the difficulty levels. After LA1, the difficulty levels were 
decreased after each simulation. The justification for this decrease is based on the 
assumption that the past exposure to these landmarks will make them more 
recognizable in repeated exposures and, as a result, easier to remember. This process 
is repeated until the difficulty levels associated with all the landmarks are reduced to 
a minimum. As an alternative to this approach, one may consider changing the rates  
 
Figure 3.13. The average number of participants failed to follow the navigation commands 
corresponding to the decision-points p1-p6 are represented by black filled bars. Simulation 
results corresponding to each scenario are shown by unfilled rectangular bars. Percentage 
values are shown on the y-axis. 
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of the stochastic transitions in successive learning episodes of scenarios. A repeated 
application of the model on input sets (such as I1 and I2) produces the result where 
there is a 1:1 correspondence between each value of I1 and I2. The simulation results 
are shown by rectangular bars (unfilled) in Figures 3.13 and 3.14. The rectangular 
bars (colored in black) show the experimentally observed results obtained for human 
participants (also reported in Figures 3.6 and 3.7) for comparison purposes. There is 
a close relationship between the simulated and the observed values in Figure 3.13. 
The paired two-sample t-test between the simulated and observed series, where each 
series contains the average percentage of participants who failed to do as required in 
the scenarios LE4 to TA4, accepts the null hypothesis, with 95%  
 
 
Figure 3.14. The average number of participants failed to follow the navigation commands 
corresponding to the decision-points p7-p14 is depicted with black rectangular bars. The unfilled 
bars show the simulated results. Percentage values are shown on the y-axis. 
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confidence, that both series have the same mean. However, the result of a t-test on the 
series reported in Figure 3.14 rejects the null hypothesis of equal means, with 95% 
confidence. 
3.6 Sensitivity Analysis  
Parametric sensitivity analysis (Muppala & Trivedi, 1990) of the proposed model is 
carried out to observe how sensitive the remembering or forgetting behavior is to the 
rates of the stochastic transitions. The stochastic transitions t8-t17 have separate 
output places, which are A5-A14. The derivatives of the steady-state probabilities 
concerning a fractional change in the parameter values are reported in Figure 3.15. 
The parameter values, that is, the values of the rates, are taken in the ranges defined  
 
 
Figure 3.15. The derivatives of steady-state probabilities (that is, the probability that the 
output place of the transition tn, the place An-3, has one token) concerning small changes in 
the parameter  are shown. The parameters 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are the rates of the stochastic 
transition t8, t10, t12, t14, and t16 respectively. 
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in Table 3.2 so that the reachability graph of the GSPNRL model does not change. 
The parameters 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are the rates of the stochastic transition t8, t10, 
t12, t14, and t16 respectively. For 3, 4, and 5 the model is insensitive to any 
changes in the values, however, small changes in the probabilities are observed for 
higher values of 1 and 2. Overall, the GSPNRL model is not sensitive to changes in 
the rates of stochastic transitions for the range of values described in Table 3.2. 
3.7 Discussion and conclusion  
The simulation results for R1 up to p6 show close resemblance with the experimental 
results of participants (see Figure 3.13). On the other hand, the t-test results for the 
simulated and experimental series reported in Figure 3.14 show that both series are 
different. The GSPNRL model was successful at modeling the forgetting commands 
and critical decision-points on R1 from p1-p6. After these nodes, the model is no 
longer effective at matching the human participants’ variable performance. One 
possible reason for this simulated behavior is the use of linear decrement in the 
difficulty levels beyond p6. The observed behavior in Figure 3.14 seems to fluctuate, 
reflecting that some participants kept repeating the mistakes they tried to learn. There 
may also be a psychological reason for the observed fluctuation beyond p6, such as 
focus of attention. Generally, it is difficult to reproduce such an erratic behavior from  
a modeling perspective. The model could not accurately represent the deviations from 
the designated route made by participants. However, it does provide a model of 
someone who learned the route over time. This could be useful, intelligent agent 
behavior for in-simulation instructions and learning aids to help improve participants’ 
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performance. Ideally, when modeling real-world emergency evacuation situations, 
agents can come in several forms: those that comply with the mustering and 
wayfinding procedures, and those that have difficulty following them. Those that 
follow the procedures are useful to set examples for participants and to teach 
participants what to do properly in the event of an emergency. Those that have 
difficulty following safety procedures would be useful to implement in a simulation 
to add realism. Therefore, although the model does not accurately capture the 
observed individual behavior for all decision nodes, it does have the potential to be 
used as a model of compliant, rule-following training guides for a VE. Such VEs can 
be used in a variety of training settings, such as to train students or workers. Trainees 
who observe agents based on the proposed GSPNRL model could learn the dangers 
of making the wrong decisions. For example, an agent that makes a wrong choice at 
some decision point could later find it difficult to reach a muster location due to an 
evolving hazard.  
A VE where intelligent agents, based on the proposed work, can collaborate with 
human participants would be an effective venue for team muster drills. Also, the 
participants can make a note of decision-points that require their keen attention to stay 
on the desired route.  Non-interactive scenarios in which such agents perform certain 
tasks can be developed to teach the tasks to human trainees as part of basic training. 
Another type of application of the agent model is for assessing the evacuation 
qualities of newly designed spaces. For example, agents could be deployed in a large 
hotel, or cruise ship, in the design stage, as a way of evaluating the ease of use of 
escape routes in a variety of scenarios. Such an evaluation might help identify areas 
that are likely to be relatively problematic in an emergency evacuation. Having 
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identified these areas, they might be redesigned, or aids to escape, such as signage, 
might be added. 
So far, the difference between simulation results and the observed performance from 
participants in the latter half of route R1 (as shown in Figure 3.14) has been attributed 
to the model’s performance. The model uses decreasing difficulty levels in successive 
scenarios because we want the agents to exhibit progress in route learning in 
successive training scenarios, just as we expect a cohort of trainees to learn the escape 
route by performing successive training sessions. However, the participants’ poor 
performance in the latter half of R1 suggests that they did not acquire the expected 
competency. This may indicate deficiencies in the original training curriculum, 
especially regarding addressing the more difficult scenarios. The cohort performance 
from p1-p6 was satisfactory. This part of the route had only one decision point that 
was of HIGH difficulty level, and that was p1, which came right in the beginning. The 
rest of the points from p2-p6 had less than or equal to LOW difficulty.  
On the other hand, the point p7 is of MEDIUM difficulty, and then the three 
consecutive points, p8, p9, and p10 are of greater than or equal to HIGH difficulty. This 
was the part of the route where the participants showed less than the desired 
competency with an increased rate of errors compared to that observed on p1-p6. The 
proposed approach suggests a reason why the participants did not learn to the 
expected competency and provides some insight into how the training curriculum 
might be adjusted to improve the participants’ learning outcomes.  
Further work is required to improve the model such that it better represents the 
sequential learning strategies of human participants, especially the variability among 
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participants learning across the practice and testing sessions. In this respect, the use 
of dynamic rate selection for stochastic transitions in place of linear decrement in 
difficulty levels should be an interesting problem. The proposed work would benefit 
curriculum developers as it is an indicator of the level of effort required by different 
individuals to learn the route landmarks and navigation commands. Future work aims 
to further verify the GSPNRL model by comparing the agent results with human 
performance data from participants who received training for the same skills, but were 
taught using a markedly different pedagogical approach.  
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Chapter 4  
Situat ion Awareness  Modeling for  
Emergency Management  on Offshore 
Platforms‡‡‡
Co-authorship statement. A version of this chapter is accepted for publication 
in the journal Human-centric Computing and Information Science published by 
Springer-Verlag. The lead author, Syed Nasir Danial, has developed and 
implemented the model and extracted the empirical data using re-play video files 
for validation of the model. The co-author Jennifer Smith performed verification of 
the data extracted from the experiment. Co-authors Dr. Faisal Khan and Dr. Brian 
Veitch supervised the study. All authors read and approved the final draft. 
Abstract. Situation awareness is the first and most important step in emergency 
management. It is a dynamic step involving evolving conditions and environments. 
It is an area of active research. This study presents a Markov Logic Network to 
model SA focusing on fire accidents and emergency evacuation. The model has 
been trained using empirical data obtained from case studies. The case studies 
involved human participants who were trained for responding to emergencies 
involving fire and smoke using a virtual environment. The simulated (queried) and 
empirical findings are reasonably consistent. The proposed model enables 
implementing an agent that exploits environmental cues and cognitive states to 
determine the type of emergency currently being faced. Considering each 
emergency type as a situation, the model can be used to develop a repertoire of 
situations for agents so that the repertoire can act as an agent’s experience for later 
decision-making.  
 
‡‡‡ Danial, S. N., Smith, J., Khan, F., & Veitch, B. (2019). Situation awareness modeling for emergency 
management on offshore platforms. Human-centric Computing and Information Sciences (Accepted 
for publication). 
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4.1 Introduction  
The present work proposes a model based on Markov Logic Network (MLN) 
(Domingos & Richardson, 2007) for representing emergency situations involving 
smoke and fire on offshore petroleum platforms. The model is tested for two important 
situations, FIRE and EVACUATE. In the FIRE situation, fire is observed due to 
smoke at some place on the platform, and all workers need to muster to their primary 
muster station. In the EVACUATE situation, the fire is escalated so that some escape 
routes to the primary muster station are blocked and all personnel need to muster at 
the lifeboat or alternative muster station. The purpose of this work is to have a model 
that can be used by a software agent so that the agent can exhibit human-like situation 
awareness (SA). Such agents can subsequently be used, for example, in training 
simulators to enrich trainees’ experience by showing them various scenarios in which 
the agent shows recognition of different situations (to makes various decisions). A 
participant can learn from the agent what information is important in a given scenario 
for correct SA.  
Representing the emergency response of agents operating in a VE is a challenging 
and active research area. Emergencies on board can arise from several factors, among 
which accidents are on top (B. Khan, Khan, Veitch, & Yang, 2018). The Cullen Report 
(Cullen, 1993) following the Piper Alpha disaster has clear recommendations for 
operators to perform a risk assessment of ingress of smoke or gas into the 
accommodation areas. G. Klein (1998 p. 219) says that VE training is important for 
the crew in many respects, for example, because trainees get opportunities to learn 
from and about each other as a team, and also to learn about the cues that unfold in 
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an evolving training scenario. Thus, a VE has an essential role as a training 
environment, and agents are important elements of VE fidelity (Luck & Aylett, 2000). 
Situations are highly structured parts of the world that span a limited space and time, 
and people talk about them using language. They are composed of objects having 
properties such that the objects stand in relation with one another (Barwise & Perry, 
1980). An agent’s world can be considered as a collection of situations, and the agent 
should be able to discriminate among them. Devlin (1991b) extends Barwise and 
Perry’s Situation Theory (Barwise, 1981; Barwise & Perry, 1983) and proposes a 
representation using a concept called infon, which is an informational item of the form 
“objects a1, …, an do/do not stand in the relation P”. A situation, formally, is then 
some part of the world that is supported by a set of infons.  
This work considers SA as being a phenomenon that refers to the information flow 
(Devlin, 1991a) from a situation to a subject such that the subject can reason about 
the situation. Endsley's (1988) model of human SA describes this information flow as 
a process with three successive levels. Level-1 begins when a person starts perceiving 
information as environmental cues. This part of Endsley’s SA model has a direct 
resemblance with acquiring information about the presence of object a1… an for 
developing relevant infons in a situation. Level-2 in Endsley’s model explains that the 
person should be able to extract meaning from what has already been perceived. 
Level-3 of the model says that the meaning of cues should enable a person to foresee 
something shortly. Kokar, Matheus, and Baclawski (2009) developed an ontology, 
called situation theory ontology (STO), that defines semantics for situation theory by 
including a meta-class describing the types of things (individuals, individual’s 
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properties and relations among them) that constitute a situation as a type in accord 
with Barwise and Devlin’s situation semantics. Inference on the available facts 
(infons) with some background knowledge about the objects and their relations within 
the ontological framework not only supports level-2 of Endsley’s SA model but also 
gives potential to achieve level-3 SA. For example, if an agent knows that fire lit in 
an oil container should not be put out with water, only then can the agent preempt 
somebody from doing so. For that, the agent should project the current information 
about the position of the fire and the water source approaching the oil container into 
a future state using a rule that exploits some predicate like fireEscalates(oil, 
water). STO satisfies many characteristics of Endsley’s SA model, and it was 
implemented in the Web Ontology Language (OWL) using the full profile (OWL-
Full). Now that OWL changed in 2009 and the support for OWL-Full, which is 
required to fulfill the theoretical requirements of Barwise and Devlin’s approach to 
situation modeling, is unavailable, STO is difficult for use as a platform for modeling 
SA. 
The concept of context in the literature related to AI is similar to the situation in the 
SA literature. Sowa (1984, 2000) uses conceptual graphs (CG) to represent context or 
situations. CGs are an extension of Peirce’s existential graphs (c. 1882) with features 
taken from semantic networks of AI and linguistics. CGs are bipartite graphs where 
boxes are used to represent concepts, and circles are used to show relations. As a 
simple example, a situation “Cat is on mat” can be represented in a CG using a linear 
notation as: [Cat]→(On)→[Mat], where Cat and Mat are two concepts (each 
for one object/individual in the real world) related to each other by the relation On. 
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Sowa (2000), and Akman and Surav (1996) say that both context and situation are the 
same notions. Kokar et al. (2009) report that contexts (situations) in AI are dealt with 
using predicates such as isa(c, p) to mean that the proposition p holds true in 
the context c.  
Predicates in FOL are building blocks of the system based on it. CG is 
computationally equivalent to FOL (Sowa, 2000). Rules in FOL are considered as 
hard constraints in that a world is thought to exist only when the rules are valid. This 
is contrary to situations in real life. A rule like smoke causes cancer in FOL is always 
valid, so an agent that smokes certainly has cancer. But this is not the situation in the 
real world where rules are violated, and the violation is only a matter of limitation 
regarding the frequency of cases where the rule is not observed. 
(Domingos & Lowd, 2009) consider FOL rules as hard constraints that limit the 
progress in AI research, and offer a method to describe soft rules using MLNs. Soft 
rules are formed by assigning weights to the FOL rules in MLNs. The weights 
determine how likely the entities of the world might follow a rule. The higher the 
value of the weight, the harder the rule becomes. The present work uses MLNs to 
construct a model for situations in emergency scenarios, particularly those arising on 
offshore petroleum platforms. The purpose is to create software agents for training in 
VEs, where an agent exploits environmental cues to understand different emergency 
situations. This way, the agent can be given an ability to construct a repertoire of 
situations that it observes. Such agents can be expected to make experience-based 
decisions when exposed to emergencies in a solo or a group training environment. 
Applications of such agent models can be found in many fields, including pilot 
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behavior modeling (Hu, Li, & Zhang, 2018) during midair encounter, game 
programming, and so on.  
Being aware of a situation is not merely an outcome of a typical feature matching 
mechanism, as some authors suggest (Nowroozi, Shiri, Aslanian, & Lucas, 2012). 
Awareness helps categorization of things according to certain common grounds. In 
other words, recognition of a situation, should mean first, to model a situation using 
a knowledge representation schema, and second, to devise a mechanism whereby 
inference can be performed on the stored knowledge to extract new knowledge. Since 
MLNs support inference ⎯ even on incomplete data ⎯ the resulting model of SA has 
some resemblance to Endsley’s SA model. Moreover, as MLNs allow conflicting 
rules, it is a more natural choice for modeling situations in which cues at different 
times and space could take different meanings.  
Social agents can interact with human participants during an emergency egress 
scenario to form a group-training situation to learn from human responses and then to 
guide other computing modules for evaluation of human responses. Participants can 
also learn from these agents to respond in a scenario. The use of these agents in 
training exercises reduces the necessity of having a large number of real people in a 
large-scale group training (Nakanishi, Shimizu, & Isbister, 2005). Also, the rehearsals 
with agents are more effective than with human counterparts because of the 
consistent, usually scripted, agent behavior. A more realistic approach is to replace 
the scripted agent’s behavior to more natural, human-like behavior so that a 
participant can trust the agent responses and may consider it a colleague, rather than 
a robot. The works in (Danial et al., 2018; Danial, Smith, Khan, & Veitch, 2019) focus 
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on route learning for agents and propose a model where an agent can exhibit behavior 
that is similar to a human participant while learning a new escape route. Risks 
associated with human responses during an evolving emergency are assessed in 
(Norazahar, Smith, Khan, & Veitch, 2018). The authors assert that hazards (like fires, 
smoke), weather condition, malfunctioning equipment, and inadequate emergency 
preparedness such as that related with the recognition of platform alarms are 
important factors that affect the human response. Musharraf, Smith, Khan, Veitch, and 
MacKinnon (2018) propose a methodology to account for individual differences in 
agent modeling for emergency response training. The problem of modeling SA for 
such agents is still another important area that has potential implications in the way 
agents make decisions in evolving emergencies. (Chowdhury, 2016) explores various 
situations that occur on offshore rigs, platforms, and installations. The author explains 
how fire and evacuation situations are indicated on different platforms. 
Section 4.2 describes some recent work in situation awareness. Section 4.3 describes 
the proposed methodology to model SA based on MLN. Section 4.4 describes a case 
study and experimental results that serve to assess the validity of the proposed model. 
Section 4.5 contains a discussion of the results, and Section 4.6 presents concluding 
remarks and future directions. 
4.2 Previous works  
With the increasing demand of intelligence-based systems, encompassing from smart 
cars to smart homes, the use of situation recognition has become a focal point in 
research because of its importance in enabling artificial intelligence. Récopé, Fache, 
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Beaujouan, Coutarel, and Rix-Lièvre (2019) attempt to discover the reasons for 
interindividual differences in volleyball players’ defensive behavior during different 
identical situations. The authors raised an important question, “Might other 
dimensions of situation assessment, which have so far not been studied to any great 
extent, be involved?” Based on an experiment involving two volleyball teams, the 
authors conclude that an individual’s activity is governed by a specific norm that 
organizes, orients and enhances understanding of the actions as a coherent totality. In 
other words, there is a subconscious sensemaking that individuals use in order to 
determine the relevance of cues corresponding to different situations. 
In order to assess network security within an Internet of Things (IoT), Xu, Cao, Ren, 
Li, and Feng (2017) propose an ontology-based model for SA for network security of 
IoT. Again, ontological knowledge helps identifying concepts and relations in order 
to understand what type of situation is currently being observed. An IoT security 
situation is described by employing knowledge about the context, attack, 
vulnerability, and network flow. A model of how SA spreads among agents in a 
multiagent system is presented in (Bosse & Mogles, 2014). Nasar and Jaffry (2018) 
study this work (Bosse & Mogles, 2014) and extend it, using Agent Based Modeling 
(ABM) and Population Based Modeling (PBM) techniques, by incorporating trust in 
the SA model. Thus, the resulting agents’ beliefs and decisions about the environment 
have been shown to be affected by their trust in other agents. Johnson, Duda, 
Sheridan, and Oman (2017) addressed the issue of decrease in SA when the flight 
control mode changes from automatic to manual mode. The authors proposed a 
cognitive model based on “perceive-think-decide-do” scheme that estimates the 
effects of change in the flight mode on operator behavior. The primary contribution 
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of the proposed model is an attention executive module, which is responsible to detect 
changes in attention on specific control loops based on changes in priorities. The 
authors of (Kingston, Nurse, Agrafiotis, & Milich, 2018) develop a model that uses 
social media posts and process them, by clustering consistent posts, in the way that a 
user can gain more better insights by reading different views (or world view) that the 
system has generated. This approach is not particular to model situation awareness 
for agents; however, people can assess a situation, described through posts, better by 
reading the world views about the posts on tweeter or any other social media platform 
that exploits the proposed technique. 
Yang, Wang, Zeng, Yue, and Siritanawan (2019) develop a probabilistic model for 
robots to decide about a role that otherwise would have been fulfilled by a human had 
there been the same situation. Situations are classified here as: easy, medium, and 
hard. The model takes input as 2D and 3D images, and the robot model should get its 
role first, and then decides upon actions per role and the situation as recognized 
through the images. Roles are recognized by fusing the results of two indicators, the 
distance-based inference (DBI), and the knowledge-based inference (KBI). The DBI 
uses a relative distance between humans and mission critical objects to determine the 
probability of a possible role. The KBI uses a Bayesian network that integrates human 
actions and object existence to determine a possible role. The final role is determined 
as a fusion of DBI and KBI by using information entropy measure. The actions of a 
person that is detected as target, because he is carrying the mission critical object, is 
a major contributor of changes in the situation. Situation levels are determined by 
using the target person actions (moving, stationary) and the relative position of several 
mission related entities at some time t by using a Bayesian network. Actions are 
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decided based on the situation level and the inferred role. The proposed approach is 
robust in recognizing roles because of the fusion of different inference results, it 
would be useful if situations to be encountered are of fundamentally the same type, 
so that they can be classified as easy, medium, and hard. For example, what would a 
robot do if the situation is complex, as is the case of an offshore emergency where the 
environment is cluttered with many objects, crew, alarms, exit signs, announcements, 
and so on. In such conditions, different situations are possible, and the question of 
classifying a situation into easy, medium, and hard seems an idealistic assumption. 
Hu et al. (2018) developed model for predicting pilot behavior during midair collision 
recognition-primed decision model. Features extracted from the environment are 
compared with the stored attributes of situations, and an already encoded situation is 
retrieved based on a Bayesian classifier as a similarity criterion.  
Naderpour, Lu, and Zhang (2014) developed a cognition-driven SA support system 
for safety-critical environments using Bayesian networks. The system consists of four 
major components to deal with (1) receiving cues from environments, (2) assessing 
situation based on dynamic Bayesian network and fuzzy risk estimation method, (3) 
recovering from a situation, that advises measures to reduce the risk of a situation, 
and (4) an interface for better interaction with people. Another study (Snidaro, 
Visentini, Bryan, & Foresti, 2012) categorizes maritime anomalies, such as speeding 
of a vessel, according to the levels in the JDL data fusion model (Llinas et al., 2004). 
Szczerbak, Bouabdallah, Toutain, and Bonnin (2013) use conceptual graphs to 
represent ordinary real-world situations and introduce a method to reason about 
similar situations. Liu, Deng, and Li  (2017) propose an information fusion model 
with three layers for event recognition in a smart space where sensory data is collected 
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in the first layer, context is represented as MLN in the second layer. The third layer 
maps the contextual information of the second layer to corresponding events. To fuse 
uncertain knowledge and evidence Snidaro, Visentini,  and Bryan (2015) develop an 
MLN based SA model for maritime events.  
Gayathri, Easwarakumar, and Elias (2017) use MLN to develop an ontology that can 
be used to recognize activities in smart homes. The purpose is to detect an abnormal 
activity (or a situation) and inform the remote caretaker. Using a technique called 
Event Pattern Activity Modeling (Gayathri, Elias, & Shivashankar, 2014), 
observations collected through sensors have been parsed into concepts in an ontology, 
and the relevant descriptive logic rules are generated. These rules are then converted 
into FOL equivalents, and weights are assigned to FOL rules to develop the MLN 
based activity model. Given the observations through sensors, the MLN activity 
model can be used to suggest different interpretations of the observed data in a 
probabilistic sense. The use of MLNs enable representation of cyclic dependency 
among the rules, which is a major advantage of MLNs over Bayesian networks. 
4.3 A method to model situation awareness  
Take S to be a countable set and ℘(S) to define the set of all subsets of S, where the 
points of S are sites, each of which can either be empty or occupied by an object (such 
as a formula in a logical framework or a particle as it appears in the statistical 
mechanics literature). The sites of S can be represented by binary variables X1, X2, …, 
Xn. The subset   ℘(S) is regarded as describing a situation when the points of  are 
occupied and the points of S −  are not. The elements of ℘(S) are sometimes called 
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configurations. The set S, representing the sites, may have some additional structure. 
As sites are connected, S can be considered as forming an undirected graph G 
(Preston, 1974), so the points of S are the vertices of some finite graph G(S, E), where 
E is the set of edges. The present work involves modeling a probability measure 
(defined in the following subsections), restricted to the sample space Σ = {0, 1}S, 
having a kind of spatial Markov property given in terms of neighbor relations of G 
(Grimmett, 2010), called a Markov random field (Isham, 1981; Kindermann & Snell, 
1980; Pearl, 1988).  
Definition. G(S, E) is countable and does not contain multiple edges and loops. If x, 
y  S and there is an edge of the graph G between x and y, then x and y are considered 
neighbors of each other (Preston, 1974). Formally, the function f: S  S → {0, 1} is 
given by  
 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) = {
1
0
 if x and y are neighbors, (4.1) 
 otherwise 
Definition. If    ℘(S) then the boundary    ℘(S) is defined as:  
 𝜕 = {y ∈  S −  | f(𝑥, 𝑦) = 1, for some x ∈ } (4.2) 
A Markov network (MN) is composed of G and a set of potential functions k. G has 
a node for each variable, and MN has a potential function for each clique12 in G. A 
potential function is a non-negative real-valued function of the configuration or state 
of the variables in the corresponding clique. The joint distribution of the variables X1, 
X2, …, Xn can be developed to understand the influence of a site, i.e., a variable, on 
its neighbors (Raedt, Kersting, Natarajan, & Poole, 2016) as defined below: 
 
12 A clique of a graph G is a complete subgraph of G.  
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𝑃(𝑋 = 𝑥) =
1
𝑍
∏ 𝜙𝑘(𝑥[𝑘])
𝑘
 
(4.3) 
where x[k] is the configuration of the kth clique, i.e., the values of the variables in the 
kth clique. Z is partition function for normalization, 𝑍 = ∑ ∏ 𝜙𝑘(𝑥[𝑘])𝑘𝑥∈Ω .  
4.3.1 Markov Logic Network 
Because a random variable assigned with a value can be considered as a proposition 
(Halpern, 2003 p. 58), Domingos and Richardson (2007) define MN by first 
considering the variables as rules/formulas in FOL. Unlike FOL, a formula in MLN 
is assigned a weight (a real number), not just the Boolean true or false. Formally, 
an MLN U is defined as a set of pairs (Fi, wi) with Fis being the formulas and wis 
being the weights assigned to the formulas.  
If C = {c1, c2, …, c|C|} is the set of constants or ground predicates (the facts), then U 
induces a Markov network ML,C such that the probability distribution over possible 
worlds x is given by: 
 
𝑃(𝑋 = 𝑥) =
1
𝑍
exp (∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑖
𝑛𝑖(𝑥)) =
1
𝑍
∏ 𝜙𝑖(𝑥[𝑖])
𝑛𝑖(𝑥)
𝑖
 
(4.4) 
where ni(x) is the number of true groundings of Fi in x, x[i] is the state or 
configuration (i.e., the truth assignments) of the predicates in Fi, and 𝜙𝑖(𝑥[𝑖]) = 𝑒
𝑤𝑖 .  
4.3.2 The FIRE and EVACUATE emergency situations 
Fire and evacuate are among the important types of emergencies that occur on 
offshore petroleum installations (Spouge, 1999). Chowdhury (2016 pp. 176-177) 
describes various emergencies, such as fire/blowout, evacuate, H2S release, and the 
types of alarms used on different offshore rigs. A fire may erupt due to many reasons, 
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such as a gas release near an igniting source, or an electrical spark near a fuel line. 
Explosions also result in fires. In any case, if a fire event occurs a fire alarm is raised, 
and people on board must leave their work and report to their designated muster 
station, which is usually their primary muster station. This type of situation is called 
a FIRE situation, and it will end when an all-clear alarm sounds, which means that 
the fire has been taken care of and the people can now return to their duties. In case a 
FIRE situation escalates, meaning that the fire spreads and blocks various paths so 
that personnel’s safety could be further compromised, an EVACUATE situation may 
come into effect, and this new situation is communicated to people by another alarm, 
different from the fire alarm. In the EVACUATE situation, people must report to their 
designated secondary muster station, the lifeboat station, from where the final 
evacuation from the platform can proceed.   
4.3.3 Knowledge representation of emergency situations 
An interesting aspect of modeling a situation is to identify the factors that lead to the 
situation of interest. Typically, a situation involves preconditions or events, some of 
which are observable, and some are not directly visible (Snidaro et al., 2015). Since 
MLNs are based on FOL rules, the basic methodology as described in (Domingos & 
Lowd, 2009; Domingos & Richardson, 2007), and followed here, requires developing 
FOL rules, followed by assigning the weights, and finally performing the required 
inference. Nonetheless, there is no straightforward way of writing FOL rules for a 
knowledge domain. Writing FOL rules requires experience and thorough domain 
knowledge. Also, the developed FOL rules must fulfill some criteria of acceptance. 
For example, a rule like “smoke causes cancer” has been given serious attention 
among medical practitioners (Cornfield et al., 2009) since the constitution of a study 
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group in 1957 (“Smoking and Health: Joint Report of the Study Group on Smoking 
and Health,” 1957). This group was appointed by several institutes, including the 
National Cancer Institute, and it concludes, by considering the scientific evidence, 
that cigarette smoking is a causative factor for a rapid increase in the incidence of 
human epidermoid carcinoma of the lung. 
Figure 4.1 proposes a methodology that incorporates the basic steps of constructing 
an MLN (Domingos & Lowd, 2009; Domingos & Richardson, 2007) iteratively so 
that each rule could be judged against some heuristic criteria of acceptance, for 
example, by assigning the weights to rules through empirical findings using a learning 
algorithm (Singla & Domingos, 2005) and then seeing if the weights make sense. In 
any case, if many of the rules come up as negatively weighted, then such a 
knowledgebase will have little practical value, and one must look into the training 
samples and/or the rules themselves. In the former case, it is possible that the training 
sample includes little evidence where the rules were successful. In the latter case, it 
is possible that the rules were not constituted correctly, regarding the specification of 
different predicates, their connections using logical connectives, and their implication 
into a consequent. In short, one must go back and update the rules and/or training-
testing data sample, as shown in Figure 4.1 until the desired results are met. The 
choice of a learning algorithm is also a point to consider. Since discriminative learning 
does not model dependencies between inputs within the training sample, it often 
produces results (Singla & Domingos, 2005) better than generative learning 
techniques. Using the testing samples as evidence, the probability that a query  
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Figure 4.1. The proposed methodology to develop a situationally aware agent model based 
on MLN. 
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Table 4.1. Variable/predicate names and description 
Variables Predicate 
name 
Parameter types Description 
Listens  L (agent, alarm, 
time) 
An agent listens to an alarm 
during time interval time. 
Recognizes R (agent, alarm, 
time) 
An agent recognizes an 
alarm during time. 
HasIntentToReach HITR (agent, 
musterLoc, time) 
An agent has intention to 
reach a muster location 
during time. 
HasEmrgSit HES (agent, 
emgSitType, 
time) 
An agent has an emergency 
situation during time. 
SeesThreat ST (agent, 
threatType, time) 
An agent sees a threat during 
time. 
HasFocusOn HFO (agent, pa, time) An agent has focus on a PA 
during time. 
HasSomeEmrgSit HSES (agent) An agent gets a sense of 
some emergency situation. 
FollowsPA FPA (agent, pa, time) An agent understands and 
follows a PA during time. 
KnowsEmrgTypeOfAlarm KETA (emgSitType, 
alarm) 
An agent knows which alarm 
is used in a given emergency 
type.  
KnowsEmrgTypeOfThreat KETT (threatType, 
emgSitType) 
An agent knows which threat 
type would give rise to a 
particular emergency 
situation. 
KnowsEmrgTypeOfPA KETPA (pa, emgSitType) An agent knows what 
emergency situation is being 
announced in PA. 
BeforeSeeingThreat BST (agent, alarm, 
time) 
BST is paired with HITR 
with logical ‘and’ connective 
to mean that HITR is true 
only when the agent has 
determined the muster 
location before seeing a 
threat. 
 
predicate holds is estimated by employing an inference mechanism, such as by using 
the MC-SAT algorithm (Poon & Domingos, 2006).  
Table 4.1 lists the variables studied in this work for SA about the situations discussed 
earlier in Section 4.3.2, the FIRE situation, which asks all personnel to move to the 
primary muster station, and the EVACUATE situation, which involves escalation of a 
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Table 4.2. The FOL rules that are showing the knowledge base for basic emergency 
preparedness.  
# Rules 
1 L(ag,al,)=> R(ag,al,). 
2 L(ag,+al,)^HITR(ag,+mloc,)^BST(ag,+al,)=> 
      R(ag,+al,) 
3 L(ag,al,)=>HSES(ag) 
4 ST(ag,thrt,)=>HSES(ag) 
5 (HFO(ag,+p_a,)^FPA(ag,+p_a, )^KETPA(+p_a,+eTyp))v  
      (ST(ag,+thrt,)^KETT(+thrt,+eTyp))v(L(ag,+al, )^     
      HITR(ag,+mloc, )^KETA(+al,+eTyp)^BST(ag,+al, )) 
  => HES(ag, +eTyp, ) 
6 HES(ag,FIRE, )=> HES(ag,EVACUATE, ) 
7 HES(ag,EVACUATE, )=> HES(ag,FIRE, ) 
8 HES(ag,FIRE, 0)^HES(ag,EVACUATE, 1)^ 
      Gt(1, 0)=>HES(ag,FIRE, 1) 
 
fire into a larger fire that obstructs the primary escape-route leading to the primary 
muster station, thereby necessitating re-routing to the alternative or lifeboat station. 
A set of FOL rules are proposed in Table 4.2 so that an agent recognizes these 
situations like the way a human counterpart recognizes them. The preconditions 
(antecedents of FOL rules) used here are common among experts and have been 
suggested in earlier studies (Chowdhury, 2016; ExxonMobil, 2010; Proulx, 2007; J. 
Smith, 2015; Sneddon, Mearns, & Flin, 2013; Spouge, 1999; Thilakarathne, 2015; 
Tong & Canter, 1985; Tutolo, 1979; Wankhede, 2017). The query predicates 
determine the probability of recognizing alarms, having a FIRE situation, having an 
EVACUATE situation, and having some (unknown) situation given the evidence 
predicates. 
4.3.4 Reasoning  
The variability in the emergency alarm systems and indicators used at different 
offshore installations is a source of confusion when a real emergency occurs, 
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especially for personnel who frequently move from one to another platform for 
performing special tasks. Alarm recognition is considered a major contributor to the 
awareness of an emergency type (Chowdhury, 2016). Different alarms mean different 
situations requiring a different course of actions by the personnel onboard. The scope 
of the present work is limited to SA and does not extend to finding a suitable course 
of action in case of an emergency. Recognition of alarms is something that cannot 
directly be observed unless the person is asked, so a search for further factors that 
indicate that an alarm has been recognized is required. An alarm cannot be recognized 
if it was not heard, whereas listening needs attention towards the alarm signal 
(Reason, 1990). Emergency alarm signals are so loud that it is hard not to hear them, 
but that does not mean that people will always recognize which situation the present 
alarm is for. An agent can exploit rule # 1 in Table 4.2 to express the behavior of not 
recognizing an alarm if, for any reason, such as the inertial tendency of people to keep 
doing what they are doing (Winerman, 2004), the agent does not listen to it. Several 
studies (Proulx, 2007; Tong & Canter, 1985) show that people do not start evacuating 
a building or moving to a muster location automatically when they hear alarms unless 
they are trained to do so, and there are some other factors or cues that lead them to 
act as needed in that situation.  
Rule#2 uses two more factors to frame the conclusion of recognizing an alarm beside 
just listening. The first factor reflects a person’s ability to develop the intention of 
moving to the required muster station. The required muster station is referred to by 
the variable mloc that takes values from the set {MESSHALL, LIFEBOAT}. 
Literature shows that intention is an important cognitive state that affects one’s ability 
to participate in a decision-making process (Bratman, 1987; Thilakarathne, 2015). 
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Intention is modeled here as a predicate HITR that takes a value true if the agent 
develops the intention to move to mloc during a time interval . An agent’s intention 
can be inferred by observing which route is taken up immediately after listening to 
the alarm. The agent can also be delayed in developing the intention to reach mloc 
and may require other cues for building up this intention.  Therefore, to know if an 
alarm is recognized without the help of other cues, such as observing smoke, it is 
necessary to know when the agent develops the intention of moving to the required 
muster station after listening to an alarm. HITR is used in conjunction with the 
predicate BST that ensures the intention of moving to the muster location is developed 
before seeing a threat because if an agent sees a threat, it would be unclear if its 
intention of moving to mloc is due to the threat or the alarm. The probability of 
recognizing the alarm is determined by using the conjunction of the three predicates. 
If any of the antecedent predicates fail, the chances of recognizing the alarm will be 
reduced.  
The variable ST (see Table 4.1) is used to indicate that the agent observes a threat. An 
agent who sees a threat (such as smoke or blowout) is highly likely to discover the 
type of emergencies involved (FIRE or EVACUATE). Rules # 3 and 4 say that an 
agent will be aware of ‘some’ emergency if it just listens to an alarm or observes a 
threat.  
Public address (PA) announcements are also important cues for getting to know 
details about a developing situation (Chowdhury, 2016; ExxonMobil, 2010; Spouge, 
1999; Wankhede, 2017). PAs are verbal announcements with clear words detailing the 
situation. The details include the location of a threat or hazard, what actions are 
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needed, and what areas are affected. The agent can take advantage of the PA to learn 
about a developing emergency. However, this needs a focus on the words in the PA. 
The literature on distraction explains how people get distracted in different situations. 
Tutolo (1979) says that children’s ability to listen without being distracted improves 
with age. Inattention to the available information has been studied for the offshore 
drilling environment in (Sneddon et al., 2013). The authors discuss other factors, such 
as stress, that influence focus of attention by producing a narrowing or tunneling 
effect so that a person is left focusing on only a limited number of cues under some 
stressors. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) call this cognitive tunnel vision. The 
predicate HFO is true when the agent has a focus on a PA being uttered. An agent 
that is engaged in all activities except what is communicated in the PA is defined to 
have no focus, whereas one that suspends its current engagements and begins 
performing the actions according to the PA is considered to have focused on the PA. 
Similarly, if an agent, while moving, suddenly changes its course because of 
instructions given in the PA a moment before, this also considered to have exhibited 
a clear sign of responding to the PA. In general, gestures can be noticed to determine 
if an agent has a focus on an ongoing PA or not. The predicate FPA is used to 
demonstrate the requirement of following the PA. If HFO is true, but FPA is 
false, it means that, though the agent had focused on the PA’s words, it is confused 
or does not have an understanding of the situation, and therefore, the agent is unable 
to follow the PA. Rule#5 is a disjunction of three different rules: the first determines 
SA about the emergency based on focus and understanding of PA, the second uses 
direct exposure to the threat/hazard, and the third is based on the recognition of 
alarms. This last disjunct in rule#5 uses the predicate KETA to link an alarm to the 
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corresponding situation or emergency type because that is needed to conclude in the 
consequent predicate HSES. Rules # 6 & 7 are to ensure that FIRE and EVACUATE 
are two distinct types of situations, besides that EVACUATE may occur because of a 
fire (Chowdhury, 2016; Spouge, 1999). 
Rule # 8 says that if during some initial time interval 0 a FIRE situation is observed, 
and during some later interval 1 (where 0≺1) this situation escalates to 
EVACUATE, then the FIRE situation will no longer exist during 1, although one 
may witness real fires during the EVACUATE situation. 
4.4 Case studies: SA during offshore emergency 
scenarios  
This work uses two case studies developed using the experiment performed in (J. 
Smith, 2015) to acquire training and testing data for SA during offshore platform 
egress scenarios so that the proposed model (in Table 4.2) can be judged against the 
empirical data. The objective of Smith’s experiment was to assess VE training effects 
S1: Basic 
training
Group 1 Practice Testing Feedback
Group 2 Testing Feedback
S2: 
Testing
Feedback
S3: 
Testing
Feedback
S2: Training, 
practice, testing and 
feedback sessions
S3: Training, 
practice, testing and 
feedback sessions
 
Figure 4.2. Training exposure to participants. Sessions S1, S2, and S3. The datasets are 
obtained from S3 for both groups. Source: Adopted from (Smith, 2015). 
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on people’s ability to learn and respond during offshore egress scenarios involving 
fire hazards. The distribution of training of the participants and testing their 
performance is shown in Figure 4.2. The experiment targeted six learning objectives: 
(1) establish spatial awareness of the environment, (2) routes and mapping, (3) 
emergency alarm recognition, (4) continually assess situation and avoid hazards on 
route, (5) register at temporary refuge, and (6) general safe practices such as closing 
the doors when there is an emergency alarm in effect due to fire or smoke hazard. 
There were three sessions with increasing complexity. Session 1 (S1) involved 
training, practice, and testing for the learning objectives 1, 2, 5 & 6, session 2 (S2) 
used scenarios involving the learning objectives 3, 5 & 6, and session 3 targeted the 
objectives 3, 4, 5 & 6. The experiment involved 36 participants divided into two 
groups: Group 1 contained 17, and Group 2 contained 19 participants. Group 1 was 
trained in several sessions, whereas Group 2 participants received only a single 
training session. The VE used in this experiment was All-hands Virtual Emergency 
Response Trainer (AVERT). AVERT is a research simulator of an offshore petroleum 
facility (see Appendix B.1). It is used to train participants to improve their response 
should they face an emergency such as a fire or an explosion. The present work uses 
only the third and the fourth learning objectives because they deal with the SA the 
participants exhibited during each scenario. The data was obtained by a careful 
reading of the log files and watching the replay videos of session S3 recorded for each 
participant during the testing phase of the relevant scenarios.  
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4.4.1 Situations in Experimental Scenarios 
Smith’s experiment (Smith, 2015) involves emergencies in which, initially, there is a 
fire in the galley. After some time, the fire escalates so that the primary muster station, 
which is the mess hall on deck A of the platform, becomes compromised. An audible 
fire alarm (the General Platform Alarm, GPA) followed by the relevant PA is made 
right after the initial fire event. The escalation of the fire in the galley to fire in the 
mess hall is then announced by a Prepare to Abandon Platform Alarm (PAPA), 
followed by another PA. Initially, a participant is situated in their cabin (see the floor 
 
Figure 4.3. Floor map for decks A and C in AVERT simulator. A participant starts from Cabin 
(S) in part (1) and ends either at the mess hall or the lifeboat station in part (2) using external 
stairwell or main stairwell. The dotted lines show the alternate route, and the solid lines refer 
to the primary route. 
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map in Figure 4.3-1) when a GPA alarm activates, followed by a platform 
announcement. The PA announcement directs the participant to muster at their 
designated muster station, which is the mess hall on A-deck for a FIRE situation. 
Upon hearing the GPA, the participant needs to move out of the cabin and choose from 
the primary route (the solid lines, which goes through the main stairwell), or the 
secondary escape route (the dotted lines, which uses the external stairwell) to reach 
A-deck. The participants were trained to deal with these situations earlier using escape 
route training videos and instructions in the training session S1. While moving toward 
the mess hall, after a fixed interval of time 0, the participant receives a call to 
abandon the platform. This is the PAPA alarm, which indicates to the participants that 
they should immediately move to the secondary or alternative muster location, which 
is the lifeboat station at the starboard side of the platform (see Figure 4.3-2). The time 
interval when PAPA is activated to the end of a scenario is termed 1. Thus, 0 is the 
time interval in which the participants get all cues related with the FIRE emergency, 
such as smoke in the stairwell, GPA alarm, and PA announcement that includes the 
words “fire in the galley”. Similarly, 1 is the time interval that starts when 0 expires 
and ends at the end of the scenario. During the 1 period, the participant receives cues 
related with an EVACUATE situation. The PAs use clear words as to what needs to be 
done in an emergency and what parts of the escape route are expected to be blocked 
due to fire or smoke. Although GPA and PAPA are activated at different times, 
indicating two different situations, the other environmental cues can be observed at 
any time during their lifetimes. For example, smoke in the main stairwell is 
considered as a cue for a FIRE situation. Some participants reached at this spot in the  
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Table 4.3. A sample of validation data for two participants, P1G1 and P2G1. A ‘Y’ before a 
list of parameter values means that the agent has observed these values, an ‘N’ means that these 
values have not been observed empirically. LFB stands for LIFEBOAT station. 
Predicates Parameters 
 P1G1 P2G1 
L Y: P1G1, GPA, 0;  
Y: P1G1, PAPA, 1; 
Y: P2G1, GPA, 0 
Y: P2G1, PAPA, 1 
HML Y: GPA, MSH; 
Y: PAPA, LFB; 
Y: GPA, MSH 
Y: PAPA, LFB 
HITR Y: P1G1,MSH, 0; 
Y:P1G1, MSH, 1; 
Y:P1G1, LFB, 1; 
N: P1G1, LFB, 0; 
Y:P2G1,MSH, 0 
Y:P2G1,LFB, 1 
R Y: P1G1, GPA, 0; 
N: P1G1, PAPA, 1; 
Y: P2G1, GPA, 0 
Y: P2G1, PAPA, 1 
HSES Y: P1G1; Y: P2G1 
ST Y:P1G1, SMK_MSHA, 1; 
Y:P1G1, SMK_STAI, 1; 
Y: P1G1, SMK_VENT, 1 
Y:P2G1,SMK_VENT, 0 
HES Y: P1G1, FIRE, 0; 
Y: P1G1, FIRE, 1; 
Y: P1G1, EVACUATE, 1 
Y: P2G1,FIRE, 0 
Y:P2G1,EVACUATE, 1 
HFO Y: P1G1, PA_GPA, 0; 
N: P1G1, PA_PAPA, 1 
Y: P2G1,PA_GPA, 0 
Y: P2G1,PA_PAPA, 1 
FPA Y: P1G1, PA_GPA, 0; 
Y: P1G1, PA_PAPA, 1; 
Y:P2G1,PA_GPA, 0 
Y: P2G1, PA_PAPA,1 
KETA Y: GPA, FIRE; 
Y: PAPA, EVACUATE; 
Y: GPA, FIRE 
Y: PAPA, EVACUATE 
KETT Y: SMK_VENT,EVACUATE; 
Y: SMK_STAI,FIRE; 
Y:SMK_MSHA, EVACUATE; 
Y:SMK_VENT,EVACUATE 
Y:SMK_STAI,FIRE 
Y:SMK_MSHA,EVACUATE 
KETPA Y: PA_GPA, FIRE; 
Y: PA_PAPA,EVACUATE; 
Y: PA_GPA, FIRE 
Y:PA_PAPA, EVACUATE 
Greater Y: 1, 0; Y: 1, 0 
 
main stairwell after the PAPA was activated. Situations like these are complex 
because of confusion due to conflicting cues.  
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4.4.2 Data set for training and testing the model 
4.4.2.1 EMPIRICAL DATA SET (D1) 
The empirical dataset D1 comprises the data collected from 17 participants in Group 
1. For brevity, the data from only two participants are shown in Table 4.3. Each 
predicate takes typed variables, so corresponding ground atoms are shown in the 
second and third columns of the table. The data set D1 is split into two parts. Based 
on the methodology in Figure 4.1, the model in Table 4.2 was trained with different 
sizes of training/testing ratios, like 50/50, 60/40, 80/20. Eventually, an 80/20 split of 
D1 was found to produce good results. That is, 80% of the data in D1 was used for 
training the rules in Table 4.2, and 20% of the data was used here for testing the model. 
4.4.2.2 EMPIRICAL DATASET (D2) 
The empirical dataset D2 comprises the data collected from all 19 participants in 
Group 2. Again, based on the methodology in Figure 4.1, different samples sizes were 
tried for partitioning the dataset D2; the 80/20 ratio for training and testing samples 
was used here. 
4.4.2.3 SETTING UP THE MODEL  
We consider close world assumption for all predicates except KETA, KETT, and 
KETPA. The predicates KETA, KETT, and KETPA employ open world assumption 
because these predicates are designed to be present in the model as a container for the 
background knowledge. KETA is true when the agent has knowledge about which 
alarm is for which emergency situation type, i.e., the fact that the GPA alarm sounds 
for the FIRE type emergency, and the PAPA alarm is activated for EVACUATE type. 
KETT is used to mean which type of threat is observed in an emergency. For example, 
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a fire confined to a small area, at most, could mean to move to the primary muster 
station. Three types of threats are considered in this study. The threat smoke in the 
stairwell (SMK_STAI) should be recognized as a FIRE type emergency. If an agent 
sees smoke coming out of the mess hall vent (SMK_VENT), or the agent enters into 
the mess hall and sees smoke (SMK_MSHA) there, it means the situation is of type 
EVACUATE because the primary muster station is compromised. If KETT is true, 
it means that the agent knows the relationships between a threat and possible type of 
emergency situation that could originate from this threat. Similarly, the KETPA 
predicate is true if the agent knows which words in the PA would lead to a particular 
emergency type. For example, the sentences, “a fire in the galley” or “move to primary 
muster station” mean that the emergency type is FIRE. On the other hand, the words, 
“primary escape route is blocked” or “a fire has escalated” mean that the situation is 
EVACUATE. This knowledge was given to the participants of Smith’s experiment as 
part of the training curriculum. Therefore, during training of the model the truth 
values of KETA, KETT, and KETPA are taken as true to mean that the agents based 
on the proposed model have this background knowledge. 
4.4.2.4 CALCULATING THE MODEL WEIGHTS 
We use the software package Alchemy 2.0 (2012) for developing the proposed MLN 
model. The non-evidence predicates used for both D1 and D2 are R, HES and HSES. 
The model is trained separately for data sets D1 and D2 using a discriminative 
learning method so that weights can be assigned to the rules presented in Table 4.2. It 
was observed that some participants did not listen to an alarm even though it was 
audible. The use of Listens (L) as a predicate came up (see Table 4.2) with the 
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empirical observations, where, with some participants the predicate takes a false 
value. On the other hand, if Hears were used instead of Listens, then there would 
not be any case with a false value for Hears because all the participants had hearing 
abilities in the normal range. Similar considerations were taken for other rules. Table 
4.4 shows the weights. A portion of ground MN obtained by grounding the rules#2-5 
is depicted in Figure 4.4, which shows how the nodes corresponding to each predicate 
are related. 
4.5 Results and discussion  
Querying the proposed MLN based model of agent SA is the same as querying a  
 
R(MBG1,GPA
,T0)
HITR(MBG1,
MH,T0)
L(MBG1,GPA
,T0)
BST(MBG1,G
PA,T0)
HITR(MBG1,
LFB,T0)
HSES(MBG1)
ST(MBG1,SM
K_MSHA,T0)
ST(MBG1,SM
K_VENT,T0)
ST(MBG1,SM
K_STAI,T0)
KETA(GPA, FIRE)
HES(MBG1,FIRE,T0)
 
Figure 4.4. Portion of ground MN obtained using grounding of the predicates in rules 2-5. 
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Table 4.4. Weights assigned to rules using datasets D1 and D2. Only 12 out of a total of 59 
ground rules obtained by different groundings of the rules in Table 4.2 are shown for brevity.  
# Rules wD1 wD2 
1  L(ag,al,) R(ag,al, ).   
2 L(ag,GPA, )^HITR(ag,MSH, )^BST(ag,+al, )   
    R(ag,+al, ) 
2.1 1.9 
3 L(ag,PAPA, )^HITR(ag,MSH, )^BST(ag,+al, )  
    R(ag,+al, ) 
0.8 0.2 
4 L(ag,PAPA, )^HITR(ag,LFB, )^BST(ag,+al, )  
    R(ag,+al, ) 
2.7 2.7 
5 L(ag,al, )  HSES(ag) 1.3 1.4 
6 L(ag,al, )^ R(ag,al, )  HSES(ag) 0.3 0.4 
7 ST(ag,thrt, )  HSES(ag) 0.9 1.0 
8 (HFO(ag,PA_GPA,)^FPA(ag,+p_a,)^KETPA(+p_a, 
    FIRE))v(ST(ag,SMK_VENT,)^KETT(+thrt, 
    +eTyp))v(L(ag,GPA,)^HITR(ag,MSH,)^ 
    KETA(+al,+eTyp)^BST(ag,+al,)) 
    HES(ag,+eTyp,) 
0.3 0.3 
9 (HFO(ag,PA_GPA,)^FPA(ag,+p_a,)^KETPA(+p_a, 
    FIRE))v(ST(ag,SMK_VENT,)^KETT(+thrt, 
    +eTyp))v(L(ag,GPA,)^HITR(ag,LFB,)^    
    KETA(+al,+eTyp)^BST(ag,+al,))  
     HES(ag,+eTyp,) 
0.2 0.2 
10 HES(ag,FIRE,)  HES(ag,EVACUATE, ) 1.4 1.5 
11 HES(ag,EVACUATE, )  HES(ag,FIRE, ) 1.4 1.5 
12 HES(ag,FIRE,0)^HES(ag,EVACUATE,1)^Gt(1,0)  
     HES(ag,FIRE,1) 
−1.4 −0.4 
 
knowledgebase. We use the MC-SAT algorithm using the Alchemy inference engine 
for querying. Now if the model is used in an agent program as a part of situation 
assessment logic, the evidence would come via the available sensors. Given the 
evidence predicates, the agent can determine the chances that a query predicate is 
true in the present conditions. The most important things an agent seeks in an 
evolving emergency are the recognition of alarms and determination of the type of 
emergency it is in at a given time. For this reason, the query predicates are obtained 
by grounding the following predicates:  
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 ? R(agent ag, alarm al, time ),  
 ? HES(agent ag, emgSitType e, time ), 
and 
(4.5) 
 ? HSES(agent ag),  
where, the predicate R is read as the agent, ag, recognizes an alarm, al, during 
the time interval . HES means that the agent, ag, has an emergency, e, of type 
emgSitType, during time , and the predicate HSES represents an agent, ag, 
who has got some sense of emergency. If in any case, the truth value of HSES is true 
and HES is false, it would mean that the agent is unable to determine the type of 
emergency despite that it has sensed the emergency situation. The predicates obtained 
after grounding the predicates listed in Table 4.2 other than the query predicates 
mentioned in (4.5) are used as part of the evidence predicates that need to be provided 
to the inference engine to obtain the results of the queries presented in (4.5).  
Table 4.5 presents the probabilities estimated against the queries for the cases in the 
testing datasets. The test datasets were formed by taking 20% of the total samples 
from D1 and D2 respectively, as reported in Section 4.4.2. 
With regards to the training and testing datasets for the model, the total duration each 
participant spends during a training or testing session has been divided into two 
intervals. The first is the interval 0 that starts from the beginning of a session until 
the time when the GPA alarm stops. The second interval is termed 1, which is the 
interval that follows immediately after 0 ends, and it ends at the end of each session. 
0 covers the period when there is FIRE type emergency, and 1 covers the duration 
when there is EVACUATE type emergency. This division of time is important to assess 
the importance of cues relevant to each emergency type. For example, if an agent 
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observes smoke in the central stairwell, then this is an important cue for FIRE type 
emergency because in that case, the agent should move to the primary muster station, 
the mess hall. On the other hand, smoke in the central stairwell should not be 
considered during 1, or when the PAPA alarm sounds, because PAPA alarm is a call 
to gather at the secondary, or alternative muster station, the LIFEBOAT station. Often 
in such cases, the primary muster station may have been compromised, or the routes 
that lead to the primary muster station may have been blocked. 
Table 4.5 presents the results that are obtained for seven participants P1G1, P2G1, 
P3G1, P1G2, P2G2, P3G2, and P4G2. The names of these participants are kept hidden 
due to privacy. The information obtained by watching the replay videos and by 
observing the log files is divided into two columns with the view that those predicates 
that are used as part of the evidence in the inference algorithm are kept under the 
heading of evidence and those that are used to query the model are kept as empirical 
results. Both columns contain the empirical results obtained from Smith’s experiment. 
The truth values of the empirical results are used for validating the model output that 
is described as the last column in Table 4.5. 
4.5.1 Simulation results against the participant P1G1 
Now consider the case when the participant, P1G1, was tested in AVERT. The 
evidence predicates suggest that immediately after hearing the alarm, P1G1 
developed the intention to move to the mess hall, the primary muster station, which 
was correct, but the participant spent more time than needed and so reached the mess 
hall when 0 had already expired. On the other hand, this also means that P1G1 
recognized the GPA alarm, R(P1G1, GPA, 0), and developed awareness about 
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Table 4.5. Query results. The symbol ‘’ is the logical not operator. A predicate followed by 
a symbol ‘’ has a truth value of false, otherwise true. The column for empirical results contains 
the results obtained from participants. Corresponding to each empirical result is a probability 
the model generated for that predicate. For example, R(P1G1, GPA, 0)meaning that the 
participant P1G1 has recognized the GPA alarm during time interval 0. The probability that 
this predicate R(P1G1, GPA, 0) is true is 0.91. Notice that the constant EVAC means 
EVACUATE in the following predicates. 
#  Evidence  Empirical result Model 
output 
probability 
1. 1 L(P1G1, GPA, 0) R(P1G1, GPA, 0) 0.91 
 2 HITR(P1G1, MSH, 0) HES(P1G1, FIRE, 0) 0.92 
 3 BST(P1G1, GPA, 0) HES(P1G1, FIRE, 1) 0.74 
 4 HITR(P1G1, MSH, 1) HES(P1G1, EVAC,1) 0.16  
 5 ST(P1G1, SMK_MSHA, 1) HES(P1G1, EVAC,0) 0.12 
 6 ST(P1G1, SMK_STAI, 1) HSES(P1G1) 0.99 
 7 ST(P1G1, SMK_VENT, 1) R(P1G1, PAPA,1) 0.0 
 8 HFO(P1G1, PA_GPA, 0)   
 9 FPA(P1G1, PA_GPA, 0)   
 10 L(P1G1, PAPA, 1)   
 11 BST(P1G1, PAPA, 1)   
 12  HFO(P1G1, PA_PAPA, 
1) 
  
 13 FPA(P1G1, PA_PAPA, 
1) 
  
 14 HITR(P1G1, LFB, 1)   
2. 1 L(P2G1, GPA, 0) R(P2G1, GPA, 0) 0.87 
 2 HITR(P2G1, MSH, 0) HES(P2G1, FIRE,0) 0.94 
 3 BST(P2G1, GPA, 0) HES(P2G1, FIRE, 1) 0.29 
 4 ST(P2G1, SMK_VENT, 0) R(P2G1, PAPA, 1) 0.92 
 5 HFO(P2G1, PA_GPA, 0) HES(P2G1, EVAC, 1) 0.98 
 6 FPA(P2G1, PA_GPA, 0) HES(P2G1,EVAC,0) 0.07 
 7 L(P2G1, PAPA, 1) HSES(P2G1) 0.98 
 8 HFO(P2G1, PA_PAPA, 1)   
 9 FPA(P2G1, PA_PAPA, 1)   
 10 BST(P2G1, PAPA, 1)   
 11 HITR(P2G1, LFB, 1)   
3. 1 L(P3G1, GPA, 0) R(P3G1, GPA, 0) 0.49 
 2 HITR(P3G1,MSH, 0) HES(P3G1, FIRE, 0) 0.44 
 3 BST(P3G1, GPA, 0) HES(P3G1, FIRE, 1) 0.15 
 4 ST(P3G1, SMK_VENT, 0) R(P3G1, PAPA, 1) 0.93 
 5 HFO(P3G1,PA_GPA, 0) HES(P3G1, EVAC,1) 0.99 
 6 FPA(P3G1, PA_GPA, 0) HES(P3G1,EVAC,0) 0.24 
 7 L(P3G1, PAPA, 1) HSES(P3G1) 0.90 
 8 HFO(P3G1, PA_PAPA, 1)   
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#  Evidence  Empirical result Model 
output 
probability 
 9 FPA(P3G1, PA_PAPA, 1)   
 10 BST(P3G1, PAPA, 1)   
 11 HITR(P3G1, LFB, 1)   
4. 1 L(P1G2,GPA, 0) R(P1G2, GPA, 0) 0.88 
 2 HITR(P1G2,MSH, 0) HES(P1G2, FIRE, 0) 0.88 
 3 BST(P1G2,GPA, 0) HES(P1G2,FIRE, 1) 0.08 
 4 HITR(P1G2,MSH, 1) R(P1G2, PAPA, 1) 0.94 
 5 ST(P1G2, SMK_VENT, 0) HES(P1G2,EVAC, 1) 0.98 
 6 ST(P1G2, SMK_VENT, 1) HSES(P1G2) 0.99 
 7 HFO(P1G2, PA_GPA, 0) HES(P1G2,EVAC,0) 0.15 
 8 FPA(P1G2, PA_GPA, 0)   
 9 L(P1G2, PAPA, 1)   
 10 HFO(P1G2, PA_PAPA, 1)   
 11 FPA(P1G2, PA_PAPA, 1)   
 12 HITR(P1G2, LFB, 1)   
 13 BST(P1G2,PAPA, 1)   
5. 1 L(P2G2,GPA, 0) R(P2G2,GPA, 0) 0.87 
 2 HITR(P2G2,MSH, 0) R(P2G2, GPA, 1) 0.0 
 3 BST(P2G2, GPA, 0) R(P2G2, PAPA, 0) 0.0 
 4 HITR(P2G2,MSH, 1) R(P2G2,PAPA,1) 0.49 
 5 ST(P2G2,SMK_MSHA, 1) HES(P2G2,FIRE,0) 0.93 
 6 ST(P2G2,SMK_VENT, 1) HES(P2G2,FIRE,1) 0.52 
 7 ST(P2G2,SMK_STAI, 1) HES(P2G2,EVAC,0) 0.06 
 8 HFO(P2G2,PA_GPA, 0) HES(P2G2,EVAC,1) 0.47 
 9 FPA(P2G2,PA_GPA, 0) HSES(P2G2) 0.99 
 10 L(P2G2,PAPA, 1)   
 11 BST(P2G2,PAPA, 1)   
 12 HFO(P2G2,PA_PAPA, 1)   
 13 FPA(P2G2,PA_PAPA, 1)   
 14 HITR(P2G2,LFB, 1)   
6. 1 L(P3G2,GPA, 0) R(P3G2,GPA,0) 0.5 
 2 HITR(P3G2,MSH,0) R(P3G2,GPA, 1) 0.0 
 3 BST(P3G2,GPA, 0) R(P3G2,PAPA, 0) 0.0 
 4 ST(P3G2,SMK_MSHA,0) R(P3G2,PAPA, 1) 0.91 
 5 ST(P3G2,SMK_VENT,1) HES(P3G2,FIRE, 0) 0.99 
 6 ST(P3G2,SMK_STAI,1) HES(P3G2,FIRE, 1) 0.13 
 7 HFO(P3G2,PA_GPA,0) HES(P3G2,EVAC, 1) 0.98 
 8 FPA(P3G2,PA_GPA,0) HSES(P3G2) 0.99 
 9 L(P3G2,PAPA, 1) HES(P3G2,EVAC,0) 0.05 
 10 HFO(P3G2,PA_PAPA, 1)   
 11 BST(P3G2,PAPA, 1)   
 12 FPA(P3G2,PA_PAPA, 1)   
 13 HITR(P3G2,LFB, 1)   
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#  Evidence  Empirical result Model 
output 
probability 
7. 1 L(P4G2,GPA, 0) R(P4G2,GPA, 0) 0.87 
 2 HITR(P4G2,MSH, 0) HES(P4G2,FIRE, 0) 0.93 
 3 BST(P4G2,GPA, 0) HES(P4G2,FIRE, 1) 0.56 
 4 HITR(P4G2,MSH, 1) R(P4G2,PAPA, 1) 0.49  
 5 ST(P4G2,SMK_MSHA,1) HES(P4G2,EVAC,1) 0.47 
 6 ST(P4G2,SMK_VENT,1) HSES(P4G2) 0.99 
 7 ST(P4G2,SMK_STAI,1)   
 8 HFO(P4G2,PA_GPA, 0)   
 9 FPA(P4G2,PA_GPA, 0)   
 10 L(P4G2,PAPA, 1)   
 11 BST(P4G2,PAPA, 1)   
 12 HFO(P4G2,PA_PAPA,1)   
 13 FPA(P4G2,PA_PAPA,1)   
 14 HITR(P4G2,LFB,1)   
 
the FIRE situation, HES(P1G1, FIRE, 0), during the initial time interval 0. 
But as a slow mover, P1G1 observed the smoke in the stairwell, mess hall, and the 
smoke coming through the mess hall ventilation during 1. P1G1 also did not pay 
attention to the PAPA alarm, which is the reason for L(P1G1, PAPA,1), which 
was activated when P1G1 was still in the main stairwell. P1G1 took about 20 seconds 
more in 1, ignoring the fact that the PAPA alarm implies a re-route towards the 
lifeboat station through the secondary escape route. So, unnoticed from the PAPA 
alarm and the relevant PA, P1G1 entered the mess hall and saw thick smoke. Studies 
(Posner, Nissen, & Klein, 1976; Sinnett, Spence, & Soto-Faraco, 2007) suggest that 
humans show dominance on visual information than on other types of sensory cues 
such as auditory information. Observing smoke drew the P1G1’s attention on smoke, 
and he instantly realized a need to move out of the mess hall, which was done by re-
routing to the lifeboat. But this realization of the situation comes only when P1G1 
saw smoke, and it was not due to the PAPA alarm or the relevant PA. In a real 
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situation, entering an area filled with smoke due to fire or any other toxic element 
could be lethal. Also, observing a fire or smoke is a natural cue that would develop 
awareness about a fire situation. It is, nevertheless, hard to develop awareness about 
an evacuation situation by watching a fire or smoke unless the relevant alarms and/or 
platform announcements are heard and recognized. This is the reason why P1G1, 
although mustered at the lifeboat station, is considered to be poor in responding to the 
evacuation situation, and that is why we have R(P1G1, PAPA,1) and 
HES(P1G1, EVACUATE,1) in the empirical results for P1G1. Similarly, P1G1 
spent a fraction of the interval 1 maintaining the impression of a fire situation, 
although the fire situation had already been escalated to an evacuation situation, 
which is why we have a predicate HES(P1G1, FIRE, 1) in the empirical results. 
The model output is probabilities obtained against the query predicates, as shown in 
the last column of Table 4.5.  
Ideally, a high probability is a good fit for a queried predicate when the corresponding 
empirical result has a truth value of true. Similarly, a low output probability should 
serve a good fit for the queries predicate when its empirical truth value is false. 
This is very much evident for P1G1. Given the listed evidence for P1G1, the 
probability that an agent would recognize a GPA is 0.91, and the probability the same 
agent would get immediate fire emergency awareness is 0.92. However, there are 
fewer chances (only 16%) that the agent would respond to the escalating situation 
from FIRE to EVACUATE because the likelihood of recognition of the PAPA alarm 
is zero, as the agent does not listen to or has no focus on the sounding alarm. In any 
case, if we change the evidence truth value for the predicate 1.10 in Table 4.5 from 
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false to true, the corresponding probability of recognizing PAPA during 1 would 
increase from 0.0 to 0.48. The reason for getting a zero probability is due to the hard 
constraint (rule#1) listed in Table 4.4. Similarly, if P1G1 realized the presence of 
smoke in the stairwell during 0 rather than 1, for example, if P1G1 had moved fast, 
then the chances for having a FIRE situation during 1 would have been lowered 
from 0.74 to 0.46, and the chances for getting awareness about the EVACUATE 
situation would be increased from 16% to 23% during 1. This is because the 
SMK_STAI, i.e., seeing smoke in the stairs, is a positive cue for a fire situation, but 
when one observes it in the presence of a cue that is for an evacuation situation, for 
example, a PAPA alarm, the two conflicting cues would cause confusion, and the 
agent needs to decide which cue should be considered. P1G1 preferred SMK_STAI 
during 1 over the PAPA alarm and so entered the mess hall, although this decision 
was wrong as it wasted egress time and exposed the participant to a hazard. 
4.5.2 Simulation results against the participant P2G1 
The case of participant P2G1 shows a slight deviation between the model output and 
the empirical results at only one place (see empirical result # 2.3 and corresponding 
model output probability in Table 4.5). The model output probability of keeping the 
impression of a fire situation, though the situation had turned into an evacuation 
situation, is a bit high (0.29) compared to the empirical result where the truth value 
of the involved predicate, HES(P2G1, FIRE, 1), was false. The rest of the 
model output probabilities, estimated for modeling P2G1’s behavior, are reasonable.  
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4.5.3 Simulation results against the participants P3G1 and P1G2 
The only thing participant P3G1 took into consideration during 0 was the smoke 
coming out from the mess hall ventilation.  P3G1 did not recognize the GPA alarm 
nor heed the PA for the FIRE emergency. P3G1 never had any intention to move to 
the mess hall. The model output for recognizing the GPA alarm (0.49) during 0 is 
reasonable because the time when the GPA starts sounding is the time when the 
participant is in the cabin, and there are no other available cues except the alarm sound 
and the relevant PA. The model output probabilities are in good agreement with the 
empirical results except for a slightly larger value of 0.44 for the probability of having 
awareness about FIRE emergency during 0, whereas P3G1 remained unaware about 
the fire emergency, and from the beginning of the scenario P3G1 had decided to 
muster at the LIFEBOAT station. The results obtained against the evidence for the 
participant P1G2 are all in good agreement with the empirical values. 
4.5.4 Simulation results against the participant P2G2  
By giving the evidence of P2G2, the model recognizes the fire alarm during 0 with 
0.87 probability. P2G2 did not recognize the PAPA during the experiment, and the 
model output is 0.49 for the predicate R(P2G2, PAPA, 1). The reason for having 
a probability near 0.5 is that when the interval shifted from 0 to 1, there are only 
two cues suggesting that the situation has escalated from FIRE to EVACUATE (smoke 
from the vents and the smoke in the mess hall) and the smoke in the stairwell is a cue 
for moving to the mess hall. This is a conflicting situation. Moreover, as P2G2 moved 
into the mess hall while the PAPA alarm was still on along with the relevant PA, the 
predicate BST(P2G2, PAPA, 1) takes a false value in the evidence that 
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reduced the probability of recognizing PAPA during 1 from 0.94 (if BST(P2G2, 
PAPA, 1) is true) to 0.49 when the predicate BST is false, as in the case of 
P2G2. Similar reasoning is true for recognizing the FIRE and EVACUATE 
situations during 1. If we set BST(P2G2, PAPA, 1) true in the evidence 
dataset for P2G2, then the new values for probabilities for having awareness about 
FIRE and EVACUATE situations during 0 and 1 come out to be 0.94 for a FIRE at 
0 and 0.96 for EVACUATE at 1. This shows the importance of recognizing the alarm 
before seeing any real threat.  
4.5.5 Simulation results against the participants P3G2 and P4G2 
The participant P3G2 did not recognize the GPA alarm, and the model probability 
against the query predicate is 0.5 for similar reasons we observed in the case of P3G1. 
The rest of the results for P3G2, as reported in Table 4.5, support the empirical results 
for P3G2. Similar reasons are there for the results obtained against the query 
predicates for P4G2. 
4.6 Conclusions  
A MLN-based model of SA for agents in a VE is proposed in this work. The 
methodology used here involves assessing the environmental and cognitive factors, 
such as alarms, fire/smoke, intention, and focus of attention, for potential impact on 
awareness of emergencies. The proposed model has been used to represent two case 
studies that involve fire and evacuation situations on an offshore petroleum platform. 
The case studies were carried out in a VE with real people. Data obtained from the 
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case studies are used to validate the model output. Empirical and simulated results 
agree in asserting the importance of alarm recognition and focus of attention for 
awareness about the emergency situations involving smoke and fire.  
Endsley’s SA model describes how people get awareness about a situation, but it does 
not provide how such a model can be used for software agents (Kokar et al., 2009). 
The present work shows a potential approach to modeling SA for software agents. 
Agents based on this model can be used in several application areas. For example, 
one can exploit such agents so that different situations can be considered as different 
experiences, and hence a repertoire of situations can be made as a basis for decision-
making regarding choosing actions in a given a situation. Virtual training 
environments are good examples of using such agents for cohort training where 
agents, based on the proposed methodology, can exhibit different behaviors in 
different situations for training purposes. Due to the inherent stochasticity of the 
proposed approach, the model is dynamic, and it has an advantage over other models, 
such as ontology-based SA models (Kokar et al., 2009; Kokar, Shin, Ulicny, & 
Moskal, 2014; Malizia, Onorati, Diaz, Aedo, & Astorga-Paliza, 2010), and case-based 
SA models (Nwiabu, Allison, Holt, Lowit, & Oyeneyin, 2012), in that it can recognize 
a situation even if some of the FOL rules violate. 
This work has the potential to be used in Naturalistic Decision-Making (NDM) 
environments where situations are central entities to decision making (Gore, Flin, 
Stanton, & Wong, 2015). Another application is in intelligent tutoring where the 
model can be used to make student models in a VE for training people for different 
tasks of SA. Different kinds of agents can be developed ⎯ even without using 
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training-testing samples, by manually selecting weights (Jain, 2011) ⎯ for tutoring 
different behaviors. For example, an agent that has poor capabilities of recognizing 
alarms should use a real positive number near zero as a weight for rule#2. Similarly, 
an agent that acts as an expert should have high values of weights in the rules, and the 
evidence database should contain as much of the needed information as possible so 
that the agent acts as an expert in retrieving cues from the environment.   
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Chapter 5  
On the real izat ion of  the Recognit ion -
Pr imed Decis ion model for  ar t i f ic ial  
agents §§§ 
 
Co-authorship statement. A version of this chapter is in peer-review in the 
journal Human-centric Computing and Information Science published by Springer-
Verlag. The author, Syed Nasir Danial, has developed and implement the model and 
extracted the empirical data using re-play video files for validation of the model. 
The co-author Jennifer Smith performed the experiment and verified the data 
extracted from the experiment. Co-authors Dr. Faisal Khan and Dr. Brian Veitch 
supervised the study. All authors read and approved the final draft. 
Abstract. This work proposes a methodology to program an artificial agent that 
can make decisions based on a naturalistic decision-making approach called 
recognition-primed decision model (RPDM). The proposed methodology represents 
the main constructs of RPDM in the language of Belief-Desire-Intention logic. 
RPDM considers decision-making as a synthesis of three phenomenal abilities of 
the human mind. The first is one’s use of experience to recognize a situation and 
suggest appropriate responses. The main concern here is on situation awareness 
because the decision-maker needs to establish that a current situation is the same or 
similar to one previously experienced, and the same solution is likely to work this 
time too. To this end, the proposed modeling approach uses a Markov logic network 
to develop an Experiential-Learning and Decision-Support module. The second 
component of RPDM deals with the cases when a decision-maker’s experience 
becomes secondary because the situation has not been recognized as typical. In this 
case, RPDM suggests a diagnostic mechanism that involves feature-matching, and, 
therefore, an ontology (of the domain of interest) based reasoning approach is 
 
§§§ Danial, S. N., Smith, J., Khan, F., & Veitch, B. (2019). On the realization of the recognition-primed 
decision model for artificial agents. Human-centric Computing and Information Sciences. (Accepted 
for publication). 
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proposed here to deal with all such cases. The third component of RPDM is the 
proposal that human beings use intuition and imagination (mental simulation) to 
make sure whether a course of action should work in a given situation or not. Mental 
simulation is modeled here as a Bayesian network that computes the probability of 
occurrence of an effect when a cause is more likely. The agent-based model of 
RPDM has been validated with real (empirical) data to compare the simulated and 
empirical results and develop a correspondence in terms of the value of the result, 
as well as the reasoning.
___________________________ 
5.1 Introduction  
NDM is a relatively new approach to decision-making that relies on SA (Endsley, 
1988) rather than having a fixed set of principles from which to choose the best or 
optimal solution. One of the prominent models of NDM is G. Klein's (1998) 
recognition-primed decision model. RPDM has a descriptive nature, and it requires a 
thorough understanding of philosophical concepts, such as intuition, perception, and 
mental simulation. The purpose of this study is to develop a method based on the 
theory of RPDM that can be implemented in an artificial agent.  
There may be many reasons for why an artificial agent based on RPDM should be 
preferred over those that exploit conventional decision theories. Here are a few 
concerns important to us. The first being the way how a human mind operates when 
a decision is to be made. This is even true for cases outside of typical NDM 
environment that usually is characterized by contextual factors as ill-structured 
problems, time stress, etc. (Zsambok, 1997). For example, in a typical chess play, 
factors like memory abilities, and the depth of planning (including the number of 
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moves ahead in planning), which are important factors for a decision-making 
algorithm in terms of comparisons (comparing moves to find the best one in a given 
state of chess board) and checking alternatives, or finding the best move, have been 
assessed in experts and novice chess plays (Chase & Simon, 1973; de Groot, 1965). 
Notice that these factors are important for logical deductions, and so are considered 
great source of motivations in writing chess programs. The real chess masters, 
however, have been found to exploit none of these factors, in general, for their mastery 
in chess playing (Means, Salas, Crandall, & Jacobs, 1993). de Groot (1965) have 
discovered that novice and expert chess players behave similarly in terms of the 
overall structure of their thought processes ⎯ chess master’s ability to handle the 
depth of search is almost the same as for the weaker players. The idea that masters 
can see further ahead than naïve players was dismissed by de Groot’s analysis of 
verbal protocols, which were obtained when masters and novice players played chess 
games by thinking a loud in an experiment in 1965. de Groot (1965) was unable to 
pinpoint quantitative differences that could be considered main players for obtaining 
a mastery in chess except that the masters were found to be able to reconstruct a chess 
position almost perfectly after viewing it for only 5 seconds or so (Chase & Simon, 
1973, p. 217). The second reason why RPDM based artificial agents would be better 
in decision-making lies in the ability to see familiar patterns in the form that could be 
used to retrieve associated or related information from memory, e.g., the actions 
performed in a similar situation before, unlike brute force calculations that needs a 
high-end or a supercomputer to produce desired results by including every bit of 
information. An example of brute force based calculations used in chess playing was 
in the IBM Deep Blue that was a supercomputer that defeated the world champion 
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Garry Kasparov in 1996 (Press, 2018). The RPDM based agent model has scope in 
potentially any decision problem, most importantly are those that involve high stakes, 
and time pressure, such as trading agents, firefighting, and emergency evacuation 
simulation applications.  
RPDM may be considered as a way to develop insight into improving ways to better 
respond in different operating conditions. However, the model is for experienced 
people, not for artificial agents. The purpose of this study is to develop a realization 
of RPDM suitable to be implemented in an agent that is expected to show human-
centered artificial intelligence (AI). RPDM (see Figure 5.1) explains how human 
decision-makers plan, in the event of an emergency, to mitigate the aftereffects or to 
Is Situation typical?
[Prototype or Analogue]
Experience the Situation in a changing context
YES
Diagnose
[Feature matching]
[Story building]
NO
Anomaly
[Expectancies 
violated?]
inference
Evaluate actions {n}
[Mental simulation]
Will it 
work?
Recognition has four by-products
Relevant 
Cues
Actions
    n
Plausible 
goals
Expectancies
NO
Implement course of action
YES
Modify
Yes, but
Calrify
 
Figure 5.1. Integrated G. Klein’s RPD model. Source (G. Klein, 1998, p. 27).  
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save life and property (Zsambok & Klein, 1997). The model argues that people are 
naturally inclined to making a plan based on their experiences (G. Klein, 1998) and 
intuition or intuitive knowledge (G. Klein, 2004), especially when the context has 
certain important elements such as time stress and high stakes. The nature of Klein’s 
RPDM model is qualitative or perhaps philosophical where specific details regarding 
the kinds of methods to use for decision-making and planning have not been specified, 
which the authors of this work believe would be different for different people. This 
study identifies tools and methods suitable for the design and development of an agent 
model that satisfies the RPDM principles to the extent practicable.  
Nowroozi et al. (2012) proposed a model of RPDM called Computational-RPD (C-
RPD) and defined the constructs of RPD in Unified Modelling Language (UML). 
Although C-RPD’s general form is slightly more detailed than the original RPDM, 
and the authors claim that different sections of their work describe different constructs 
of RPDM. It is unclear how the modeling was performed; C-RPD does not seem to 
add a scientific methodology that may be considered as a general model covering the 
concepts in RPDM. For example, how can “Evaluate Actions” be done quantitatively, 
or how can an agent build stories. Will it be a process that incorporates if-then-else 
conditions, where the consequent comes by interacting with the physical world13? Or 
by using an old belief about how the world reacts to when the condition in the if-
clause is true? Or will it be a hard-coded knowledgebase where each action has been 
assigned some pros and some cons, and the agent or the model needs only to fetch the 
required information? Such questions require a thorough investigation into how each 
 
13 Consider an agent having a class A fire extinguisher (such as water), willing to apply to a fire due to flammable 
liquids. If the agent applies fire extinguisher, the result could tell the agent whether that action was good or bad. 
The fire due to flammable liquids will spread by application of pouring water! 
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concept in RPDM can be modeled separately into different modules, and then how 
interactions among the modules could be setup so that the overall activity of all 
modules, combined together, may resemble RPDM. Norling (2004), and Norling, 
Sonenberg, and Rönnquist (2000) proposed a BDI based agent model by integrating 
it with RPDM so that the agent can behave more like a human when it comes to 
deciding something. The agent model can be used to populate a multi-agent 
simulation environment. Ji et al. (2007) proposed an RPDM based model that can be 
used to analyze drug effects. Based on the experience of how a military commander 
contributes to decision-making during warfare operations, Sokolowski (2003), uses 
RPDM to capture the dynamics of human mental processes that are involved in 
decision-making at critical situations. 
The authors could not find studies suggesting a rigorous methodology to implement 
the RPD model. The majority of the literature seen, even where the researchers claim 
their model as quantitative, present their realization of RPDM as more descriptive or 
sometimes less formal than RPDM itself (Canellas & Feigh, 2016; Hassard, 2009; 
Hutton, Warwick, Stanard, McDermott, & McIlwaine, 2001; Norling et al., 2000; 
Nowroozi et al., 2012; Patterson, Fournier, Pierce, Winterbottom, & Tripp, 2009; 
Resnick, 2001). This work aims to add more precisely defined components of a 
realization of RPDM. For example, the SA part is modeled as an Experiential-learning 
and decision support (ELDS) module, which is based on an MLN that needs training 
to acquire experience. An informational theory based account on modeling SA is 
given in (Devlin, 1991a), which is based on Barwise and Perry's (1983) situation 
semantics. A common approach to quantitative modeling of SA involves BNs (Hu et 
al., 2018; Naderpour et al., 2014). However, BNs do not support cyclic dependencies 
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that may arise in the causal structure among the factors or conditions on which a 
situation is dependent. To overcome this limitation Domingos and Richardson (2007) 
proposed Markov logic, whereby a Markov network, which supports cycles, is 
developed based on information represented in the form of FOL rules. The mental 
simulation component is considered here as a cause-and-effect phenomenon (G. 
Klein, 1998 pp. 89-90), and is proposed to be represented in the form of Bayesian 
formalism (Pearl, 1988). Lastly, the diagnostic mechanism of RPDM is modeled as 
an ontology of the domain in which the agent is supposed to operate. An ontology is 
considered as a tool to represent a set of concepts and their relations in a domain of 
interest. Sowa (2000) exploits ontologies to represent different situations in the world. 
Because the purpose of OBR module is to diagnose a situation based on common 
knowledge of the domain of interest, therefore, the choice of using an ontology to 
represent that knowledge, and thereby suggesting possible matching situations seems 
reasonable, unlike other approaches to SA that require training (as in MLNs) or prior 
probabilities (as in BNs). 
A recent study (Hu et al., 2018) exploits RPDM to model human pilot behavior during 
midair encounters. A fundamental difference between this work and earlier works is 
in the way SA is modeled. Hu et al. (2018) use Bayesian network for SA unlike 
previous attempts, e.g. (Nowroozi et al., 2012) where the authors use a direct count 
on the number of matched features, e.g., by using a similarity criterion, see (Fan et 
al., 2010),  as a sufficient representation of SA. The pilot models are important to 
study midair encounter scenarios. The model proposed in (Hu et al., 2018) simplifies 
the diagnostic mechanism originally proposed in RPDM by proposing that if a 
situation is not recognized as typical at the first place, then the model will ask for  
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Table 5.1. A comparison / mapping of the major concepts of Klein’s RPD model with the 
components in the proposed realization, and in some previous works. Model A is proposed 
in (Hu et al., 2018), Model B is proposed in (Nowroozi et al., 2012), and Model C is proposed 
in (Mueller, 2009). 
Klein’s RPDM Proposed model Model A Model B Model C 
Experience the 
situation 
Input cues Input cues Input cues Input cues 
SA based on 
experience 
ELDS module 
that uses MLN 
Bayesian 
classifier (BC) 
Feature by 
feature 
matching 
Bayesian 
classifier 
SA: Diagnostic 
mechanism / story 
building / feature 
matching 
OBR module 
that uses 
ontology for 
story building 
Not modeled 
separately. 
Diagnostics is 
done by 
providing more 
cues to the BC. 
Not 
modeled. 
Not 
modeled 
Expectation 
modelling 
Stored as part of 
plans 
Stored as part 
of plans 
Stored as 
part of plan 
Not 
modeled 
Action 
Evaluation: 
Mental simulation 
BN Specific to 
midair collision 
scenarios 
Not 
specified 
Not 
modeled 
Action (plan) 
selection  
BDI framework Not modeled Not 
specified 
Not 
modeled 
Plan execution BDI framework Not modeled Not 
specified 
Not 
modeled 
 
more information for the recognition of the situation, but the same mechanism, BN, 
will be used the second time too. Our main concern is why all-important information 
was not sent to the model in the first place even though it was available through the 
sensors? Also, what is the criterion to decide how much information will be sufficient 
for decision-making in the first place? The RPDM says that the diagnostic mechanism 
should incorporate, at the very basic level, some level of feature-matching (G. Klein, 
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1998 p. 91). At the advanced level of diagnosing a situation, a point should come 
when all the matched features of a situation suggest a larger picture. This is where the 
authors of the present study think that story building should come into play. We also 
think that there must be involvement of an inference mechanism in order to decide 
which story best suits the matched symptoms or cues of a situation under 
consideration. The present study exploits ontological-based reasoning (OBR) that 
uses feature-matching between the available features (not dependent on new or more 
information) and the ontological knowledge of the agent as opposed to the operational 
or experience-based knowledge to dig out and give the situation a name. Table 5.1 
explains how each concept of Klein’s RPD model may be mapped onto the constructs 
proposed in the present study. Also, OBR supports inference based on which a 
recognized situation can be used to suggest a more meaningful interpretation. For 
example, a situation: “a cat is on a mat”, may mean something about the past of the 
cat, by interpreting this as, “the cat has taken her meal”. Or by connecting a current 
situation into a future state, which is the requirement of level 3 SA (Endsley, 1988), 
for example, if the situation “a fire is spreading” is related with another situation 
“people must escape”, then such a general (domain) knowledge is an important tool 
for an expression of rational behavior. 
Section 5.2 describes some background concepts, which will help develop an 
understanding of this study. Section 5.3 explains the methodology proposed here, 
which includes the development of ELDS and OBR modules. In section 5.4, we 
present a case study that explains how the methodology of section 5.3 can be 
implemented in the form of an agent. The case study in section 5.4 is based on an 
experiment that is used to collect human performance data, which is later used for 
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validating the simulated results from the proposed RPDM based agent model. The 
ELDS, and OBR modules, which were proposed in section 5.3, are developed and 
explained in detail in this section, and simulation are performed. Section 5.5 
concludes the study with future directions. Appendix B.1 discusses the simulator used 
in this study, and illustrates a floor map of the VE used by participants while 
performing the experiment as explained in Section 5.4. In Appendix B.2, we give an 
account on RPDM. Appendix C describes the assumptions that have been made during 
the knowledge elicitation process. Appendix D and Appendix E provide computer 
codes used in the development of the proposed agent model. 
5.2 Background concepts  
5.2.1 Ontology 
Ontology is defined as, “The study of the categories of things that exist or may exist 
in some domain” (Sowa, 2000, p. 492). The result of such a study comes in the form 
of a catalog that contains types of things that exist in a domain D from the point of 
view of a person who uses a language L to talk about D. There are different Conceptual 
Structures (CS) that can be used to express knowledge about things, in terms of types 
and relations, in an ontology.  
In (Kabbaj, 2006; Kabbaj, Bouzoubaa, & Soudi, 2005), the authors propose four types 
of CSs: type, relation-type, individual, and situation to define an ontology. Formally, 
a CS can be defined in terms of a CG, which is a bipartite graph between concept 
nodes and the relations among the concepts (Sowa, 1984). Because an ontology 
provides a context for representing domain knowledge, the present work exploits the 
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formalism of ontology to provide the agent the knowledge about the domain in which 
it is likely to operate. Using the proposed ontology (Section 5.3.2), the agent would 
be able to retrieve meaningful knowledge and can reason about it. Also, representation 
of domain knowledge in the form of a separate ontology would make the system 
modular in that the operational knowledge, which comes through experience, can be 
represented in a separate formalism. The separation of operational knowledge from 
domain knowledge has benefits in many respects, such as analyzing domain 
knowledge, making domain assumptions explicit, reusing the domain knowledge, and 
sharing of the domain knowledge (Hadzic, Wongthongtham, Dillon, & Chang, 2009).  
5.2.2 Markov network  
A Markov network (MN) is composed of a graph G and a set of potential functions 
k. G has a node for each variable, and MN has a potential function for each clique in 
G. A clique of a graph G is a complete subgraph of G. A potential function is a non-
negative real-valued function of the configuration or state of the variables in the 
corresponding clique. The joint distribution of the variables X1, X2, …, Xn can be 
developed to understand the influence of a site, i.e., a variable, on its neighbors (Raedt 
et al., 2016) as defined below: 
 
𝑃(𝑋 = 𝑥) =
1
𝑍
∏ 𝜙𝑘(𝑥[𝑘])
𝑘
 
(5.1) 
where x[k] is the configuration of the kth clique, i.e., the values of the variables in the 
kth clique. Z is partition function for normalization, 𝑍 = ∑ ∏ 𝜙𝑘(𝑥[𝑘])𝑘𝑥∈Ω .  
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5.2.2.1 MARKOV LOGIC NETWORK 
Because a random variable assigned with a value can be considered as a proposition 
(Halpern, 2003, p. 58). Domingos and Richardson (2007) define MN by first 
considering the variables as rules/formulas in a FOL. Unlike FOL, a formula in MLN 
is assigned a weight (a real number), not just the Boolean true or false. Formally, 
an MLN L is defined as a set of pairs (Fi, wi) with Fis being the formulas and wis being 
the weights assigned to the formulas.  
If C = {c1, c2, …, c|C|} is the set of constants or ground predicates (the facts), then L 
induces a Markov network ML,C such that the probability distribution over possible 
worlds x is given by: 
 
𝑃(𝑋 = 𝑥) =
1
𝑍
exp (∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑖
𝑛𝑖(𝑥)) =
1
𝑍
∏ 𝜙𝑖(𝑥[𝑖])
𝑛𝑖(𝑥)
𝑖
 
(5.2) 
where ni(x) is the number of true groundings of Fi in x, x[i] is the state or 
configuration (i.e., the truth assignments) of the predicates in Fi, and 𝜙𝑖(𝑥[𝑖]) = 𝑒
𝑤𝑖 .  
5.3 Methodology  
The kind of situations suitable for constructing a realization of the RPDM approach 
for artificial agents should include the ingredients of NDM (Orasanu & Connolly, 
1993). At the conceptual level, the agent decision-making process is conceived here 
in terms of the mental modalities suggested in Bratman’s theory of practical reasoning 
(Bratman, 1987). Specifically, these mental attitudes are a belief, desire, and intention, 
which are the basis of the BDI-agent model (Rao & Georgeff, 1995). The proposed 
agent model has a beliefbase that contains context information, past experiences, an 
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ontology (Sowa, 2000) about the domain in which the agent is being operated, and 
any other kind of information that affects a possible deliberation step. A planning 
scheme is responsible for matching available cues and a plan to be executed. In simple 
words, a planning scheme takes all the sensory observations (cues), assesses the 
situation, selects a plan for execution, and performs mental simulation if necessary. 
Figure 5.2 describes the general steps needed to develop the ELDS module based on 
MLN, OBR module containing the ontology for the domain in which the agent 
operates, a module to performs mental simulation as a cause-and- effect mechanism  
(A) Identify situations that require experience for situation-
awareness. Let these are called  W={SIT1, SIT2,   
(B) Identify important concepts and relations for the development 
of basic ontology for the domain of interest.
Start
Collect / analyse empirical 
data for training / testing MLN
Store the MLN-module so it 
can be accessed / queried 
from agent s plans.
STOP
Develop questions / queries that need to be 
answered in each of the situations in W. Let 
these are Q={q1, q2,  
Construct first order logic 
(FOL) rules for MLN.
Assign weights to each FOL 
rule by using the training / 
testing samples
Following Domingos and 
Richardson (2007), construct 
MLN
Develop an ontology for the 
domain of interest:
-construct data types,
-construct relations among data 
types,
-define/describe conceptual 
structures using CGs
-define situations using CGs
-define conceptual rules (CG-
rules)
Store the ontology in agent s 
beliefbase
ELDS module Ontology-module
A BN based mental simulation 
model for assessment of 
action in a plan during plan 
execution phase
Mental simulation module
Store the BN-module so it can 
be accessed from agent s plan 
base.
 
Figure 5.2. Basic steps to implement the method of realization of the RPDM based agent 
decision-making approach. 
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using a BN, and where these modules should be stored within the BDI-framework so 
that upon receiving the sensory data, the agent can have access to each type of 
knowledge. Figure 5.3 describes the flow of control, starting from collecting cues in 
the environment to having a decision for what needs to be done when a situation  
Start
Step 2:Constitute evidence dataset for MLN module 
based on observed cues C={c1, c2,   cr}. NOTE: The 
MLN L has already been trained on empirical findings.
Step 3: Ask the MLN L the queries: Q={q1, q2,   
qk}, and save the resulting probabilities of the 
situations  W={SIT1, SIT2, , SITk}, where each qi 
only asks about SITi, as p(SIT1), p(SIT2),   p(SITk).
Step 4: Set threshold parameter 1, 2 for Algorithm 1.  
Step 5:
 Is there a situation, SITi, that is more 
probable to occur than any other situation?: 
"ip(SITi) >> foreachj, j i p(SITj)?
[i, j runs from 1 to k].  
Step 6: [Select plan against SITi]: Intention y   Plan(SITi).
YES
Step 15: 
Execute y. 
Step 7:[Will the plan work?]: Consult 
beliefbase to evaluate actions in y 
YES
Step 8: [Mental simulation: Modify y]. E.g., if 
agent does not remember part of a primary 
escape route, then the actions need to be 
modified by whatever route the agent knows.
Step 1: Location: near emergency, Cues, C={c1, c2,   
cr}. E.g., c1=smoke from vent, c2= alarm sounds, so 
on. Repeat all steps for timesteps t =1..n
YES but
Stop
Step 9: Find concepts, and relations that match 
the cues c1, c2,   in the ontology in the given 
context.
NO
Step 10: 
[Concepts 
found?]
NO
Step 11: Find 
Conceptual Structure 
based rules (CSRules) 
relevant in the given 
context: Match 
antecedents of each 
CSRule with concepts 
against observed cues 
c1, c2,...
Step 12: 
[CSRule 
found?]
YES
NO
Step 13: Extract situation, 
call it SITi, in the 
descendent of the CSRule
YES
Step 14: [Select plan SIT i used in 
situation similar to SITi]: Consult 
beliefbase for past experience;
Intention y   Plan(SIT i).
NO
 
Figure 5.3. Activities in the process of developing a realization of RPDM. 
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Algorithm 5.1: A general higher-level decision-making. 
Assumptions: An MLN can distinguish among m possible situations. An ith situation is SITi. 
These are considered as typical situations for which the agent is trained. p(SITi) is the 
probability of occurrence of SITi. PLANSIT𝑖refers to a plan associated with the situation 
SITi. 
Inputs: 1>>2 and ε is a positive real number near zero. Theoretically, 1, 2 [0, 1]. 
Output: The decision Φ, which is a plan having actions to perform. 
1. for timesteps = 1 to n do 
2.  if p(SIT1)> 1 && [p(SIT2)< 2, p(SIT3)< 2,…, p(SITm) < 2] then 
3.   Φ ← PLANSIT1  
4.   else if p(SIT2)> 1 && [p(SIT1)< 2, p(SIT3)< 2,…, p(SITm) < 2] then 
5.   Φ ← PLANSIT2 
  ⋮ 
6.   else if p(SITk)>1&& [p(SIT1)<2,…, p(SITk-1)<2,p(SITk+1)<2,…,  
p(SITm)<2] then 
7.   Φ ← PLANSITk 
8.  else if   |p(SIT1) − p(SIT2)| ε &&, …, && |p(SITm−1) − p(SITm)| ε then 
9.   Φ ← PLANDIAGNOSE-SITUATION 
10. return Φ. 
unfolds demanding action on the agent’s part. 
The approach of this work involves modeling decision-making at three levels. The 
first is the situations that are recognized as typical by the ELDS-module, i.e., the 
situations that can be inferred by the MLN inference mechanism. The second is the 
situations where MLN performs poorly by predicting approximately the same 
probabilities for more than one situation so that it becomes difficult to distinguish 
among the candidate situations as being the one currently observed. These are the 
situations when the agent receives inadequate or conflicting cues at a single time step 
at a given location in the environment. An agent in such a situation is considered as 
the one whose experience does not relate well enough to the situation at hand and who 
has to rely on some basic knowledge to classify/recognize a situation based on 
perceived cues. This level of decision-making is modeled here in terms of an ontology 
about possible situations that could arise. These two levels of decision-making ⎯ the 
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one based on experience, and the one involving feature-matching using an ontology⎯ 
are governed by a third level that decides in what circumstances the agent should 
select one of these levels. Algorithm 5.1 describes this higher level of decision-
making. Lines # 2-7 deal with decision-values taken from MLN based inference, and 
lines 8-11 calls a method DIAGNOSE-SITUATION that queries the agent’s ontology 
by using available cues as concepts and then extracts CS-Rules that satisfy the 
concepts. The working of the DIAGNOSE-SITUATION method can be understood 
as actions taken in steps Steps 9-13 in Figure 5.3. For example, if an agent has a visual 
of smoke in the messhall, and for some reasons it is unable to get other cues, then the 
agent will take smoke and messhall as concepts and search the ontology for possible 
relations. If a relation is found the agent applies inference to explore connected or 
related situations that contain specific or doable actions. These actions are the final 
output of the agent. The DIAGNOSE-SITUATION method corresponds to Klein’s 
variation 2 of the RPDM model (G. Klein, 1998 p. 26) as explained in the preceding 
section. Steps 1-8 correspond mainly to recognize the given situation, where there are 
a finite number of observable cues represented as {c1, c2, …}, based on MLN L that 
is developed by using the FOL rules. 
5.3.1 The Experiential-Learning and Decision-making module 
The purpose of the ELDS module is to support decision-making based on experience. 
In the real world, different people consider the same rules differently in terms of how 
effective they are in assisting a person for deciding on a given situation. That is, there 
is a diversity among people for adopting a method for a given decision problem. This 
phenomenon gives rise to people having different experiences about the same or 
similar situations with different beliefs about the choices they make. Klein’s RPDM 
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Table 5.2. The FOL rules for developing the MLN L suitable for emergency response in 
FIRE and EVACUATE emergencies. 
 
# Rules 
1. L(ag, al, t)  R (ag, al, t). 
2. L(ag,+al,t)^HITR(ag,+mloc,t)^ BST(ag,+al,t)R(ag,+al,t) 
3. L(ag, al, t)  HSES(ag) 
4. ST(ag, thrt, t)  HSES(ag) 
5. (HFO(ag,+p_a,t)^FPA(ag,+p_a,t)^KETPA(+p_a,+emgType))v 
(ST(ag,+thrt,t)^KETT(+thrt,+emgType))v 
(L(ag,+al,t)^HITR(ag,+mloc,t)^KETA(+al,+emgType)^BST(ag,
+al,t))  HES(ag, +emgType, t) 
6. HES(ag,FIRE,t0)^HES(ag,EVACUATE,t1)^Gt(t1,t0) 
    HES(ag, FIRE, t1) 
7. HES(ag,FIRE,t)  HES(ag, EVACUATE,t) 
8. HES(ag, EVACUATE, t)  HES(ag, FIRE, t) 
9. HFO(ag, +p_a,+t)^FPA(ag, +p_a,+t)^KMLPA(+p_a,+mloc) 
     HITR(ag,+mloc,+t) 
10. L(ag,+al,t)^R(ag,+al,t)^BST(ag,+al,t)^KMLA (+al,+mloc)  
    HITR(ag,+mloc,t) 
model considers this diverse nature of experiences among experts by generally 
describing that a situation recognition task should result in four by-products: relevant 
cues, typical actions, plausible goals, and expectancies. The RPDM model does not 
argue as to how the goal of computing the four by-products of recognition should be 
achieved. The present study argues that an experiential learning technique is a suitable 
choice to capture the crux of situation recognition in the Endsley’s SA model (1988), 
because this way, different agents can have different experiences about a domain of 
choice. Rules regarding recognition of fire (FIRE) and evacuate (EVACUATE) 
emergencies are proposed in Table 5.2. As an example of how agents with different 
experiences can be made in a real system, consider rule#9 in Table 5.2: 
HFO(a1,+p_a,+t)^FPA(ag,+p_a,+t)^KMLPA(+p_a,+mloc) 
HITR(ag,+mloc,+t) 
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This rule says that if an agent (a1) Has Focus On (HFO) the PA (p_a) announcement 
at some time t, and a1 is able to understand or Follow the PA (FPA), and a1 knows 
what to do in that specific PA announcement (the predicate KMLPA(p_a, mloc) 
is stored as a fact that means the agent knows which muster location is used in which 
PA), then a1 should develop an intention (represented by the predicate HITR) 
according to its knowledge about that specific PA and, thereby, the associated weight, 
w, of the rule. For example, in the case of a PA related to the GPA alarm, a1’s intention 
should be to move to the primary muster station; in the case of a PAPA alarm, the 
intention should be to move to the alternate muster station. However, if an agent keeps 
repeating a mistake by, say, attributing GPA to alternate muster station rather than the 
primary, then in the event of a FIRE emergency this agent will likely move to the 
alternate muster station even though it is contrary to the required action.  
In the current study, the variables p_a, t, and mloc belong to the sets A={PAGPA, 
PAPAPA}, T={t0, t1}, and M={MESSHALL, LIFEBOAT}, respectively. This gives 
rise to eight different permutations resulting from grounding rule#9 for the constants 
in the sets A, T, and M. As there are four predicates in rule#9, there will be 216 total 
number of different worlds altogether. For brevity, assume that the variables p_a, t, 
and mloc belong to sets each having a single constant. So, let p_a={pa}, t = {t} 
and mloc ={m}. Then, there will be 24=16 possible worlds, as shown in Table 5.3, 
where w shows the weight assigned to the rule, and the table excludes the parameters 
of each predicate for better readability. The probability that the world that is 
inconsistent with rule#9 occurs, i.e., the probability 
p({HFO,FPA,KMLPA,HITR}) is equal to 1/Z is less likely than all other  
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Table 5.3. Joint probability table for possible worlds entails by rule#9. The probability 
p({HFO,FPA,KMLPA,HITR})=1/Z represents the probability of a world that is 
inconsistent with rule#9. The probabilities for all other possible worlds are equal to 𝑒𝑤 𝑍⁄ , 
where w is the weight assigned to the rule. The operator ‘’ is for logical implication.  
HFO FPA KMLPA J1=HFO^FPA^KMPLA J2=HITR J1  J2 p(.) 
HFO FPA KMLPA False HITR True 𝑒𝑤 𝑍⁄  
HFO FPA KMLPA False HITR True 𝑒𝑤 𝑍⁄  
HFO FPA KMLPA False HITR True 𝑒𝑤 𝑍⁄  
HFO FPA KMLPA False HITR True 𝑒𝑤 𝑍⁄  
HFO FPA KMLPA False HITR True 𝑒𝑤 𝑍⁄  
HFO FPA KMLPA False HITR True 𝑒𝑤 𝑍⁄  
HFO FPA KMLPA False HITR True 𝑒𝑤 𝑍⁄  
HFO FPA KMLPA False HITR True 𝑒𝑤 𝑍⁄  
HFO FPA KMLPA False HITR True 𝑒𝑤 𝑍⁄  
HFO FPA KMLPA False HITR True 𝑒𝑤 𝑍⁄  
HFO FPA KMLPA False HITR True 𝑒𝑤 𝑍⁄  
HFO FPA KMLPA False HITR True 𝑒𝑤 𝑍⁄  
HFO FPA KMLPA False HITR True 𝑒𝑤 𝑍⁄  
HFO FPA KMLPA False HITR True 𝑒𝑤 𝑍⁄  
HFO FPA KMLPA True HITR False 1 𝑍⁄  
HFO FPA KMLPA True HITR True 𝑒𝑤 𝑍⁄  
probabilities as shown in Table 5.3, provided w > 0. Here Z is the partition function 
as described in Section 5.2.2. The probability for a world to be true depends on the 
weight w assigned to each rule. Agents with the same rules differing in respective 
weights are expected to behave differently. 
5.3.1.1 AN EXPLANATION OF THE FOL RULES 
A set of FOL rules are proposed in Table 5.2 so that an agent can recognize the FIRE 
and EVACUATE situations in the similar way as a human counterpart recognizes them. 
The preconditions (antecedents of FOL rules) used here are common among experts 
and have been suggested in earlier studies (Chowdhury, 2016; ExxonMobil, 2010; 
Proulx, 2007; J. Smith, 2015; Sneddon et al., 2013; Spouge, 1999; Thilakarathne, 
2015; Tong & Canter, 1985; Tutolo, 1979; Wankhede, 2017). Similar work is reported 
in (Musharraf, Smith, Khan, & Veitch, 2018) where the authors constructed decision 
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trees based on some of the preconditions used in this study, such as the presence of 
hazard, route direction in PA that actually is a byproduct of understanding the PA. 
Rule#1 in Table 5.2 is a hard constraint which signifies the fact that for recognizing a 
sound, it must have been heard first. Alarms are made to produce loud and clear audio 
frequencies so that people can hear the alarm sound, but somebody who is hearing an 
alarm sound does not necessarily pay attention to it. Several studies (Proulx, 2007; 
Tong & Canter, 1985; Winerman, 2004) show that people need training to be vigilant 
about alarm sounds. 
There are several sources that give intention a vital role in deliberation (Bratman, 
1987; Thilakarathne, 2015). In rule#2, an agent must be listening to an alarm, which 
means she is paying attention to the alarm, and at the same time developing the 
deliberative intention (Bratman, 1987, p. 56), due to deliberation that involves 
carefully listening the alarm, to moving to a (particular) muster location. Because the 
agent has formed the intention just after listening to the alarm at time t, and the 
deliberation involving the act of listening or the formation of intention is done before 
having to see a visual cue about a possible threat (the predicate BST ensures that the 
intention was formed before seeing a threat), it clearly means that the alarm has been 
recognized at the same time. Nonetheless, the agent cannot act upon the intention 
unless recognition of the alarm is made, because deliberation requires the location of 
the muster station, which can only be decided after recognition of the alarm. 
Therefore, as in rule#2, if the intention is made before recognition, then it needs to be 
updated with the value of the muster location (i.e., MESSHALL or LIFEBOAT) at 
some later time, say t2, before performing the actions in the intention and according 
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to the result of the recognition of the alarm. Rule#2 thus models HITR as a policy-
based intention as explained in the literature (Bratman, 1987, p. 56), that is, the agent 
will form a general intention of moving to a muster location right at the time of 
listening to an alarm, and will later determine which muster station is the right choice. 
Rules#3 & 4 have the same descendent: Has Some Emergency Situation, which is 
referred to here by the predicate name HSES (see Table 5.2). A true value of HSES 
means that the agent knows there is some emergency. Having HSES true does not 
necessarily tell the agent-specific details about the kind of emergency that has 
occurred. Rules # 3 & 4 say that an agent will be aware of ‘some’ emergency situation 
if it just listens to an alarm or observes a threat.  
PA announcements are important cues in a developing situation (Chowdhury, 2016; 
ExxonMobil, 2010; Spouge, 1999; Wankhede, 2017). PAs are verbal announcements 
with clear words detailing the situation with the type and location of a hazard, other 
affected areas, and possible plan to assist evacuation. An agent needs to focus on PA 
wordings in order to gain advantage of the message in a developing emergency. Stress 
is considered a factor that influences focus of attention in offshore environments 
(Sneddon et al., 2013). In short, the predicate HFO is true when the agent has a focus 
on a PA being uttered. An agent that is engaged in all activities except what is 
communicated in the PA is defined to have no focus, whereas one that suspends its 
current engagements and begins performing the required actions is considered to have 
focus on the PA. Similarly, if an agent, while moving, suddenly changes its course 
because of instructions given in the PA a moment before, this also considered to have 
exhibited a clear sign of deliberative intention (Bratman, 1987) in response to the PA. 
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This deliberative intention is captured in rule#9 by the predicate HITR when the agent 
considers HFO and FPA, and has a prior knowledge about possible deliberation steps 
(the predicate KMLPA that stands for Knows Muster Location according to PA). The 
predicate FPA is used to demonstrate the requirement of following the PA. If HFO is 
true, but FPA is false, it means that, though the agent had focus on the PA’s words, 
it is confused or does not have understanding of the situation, and therefore, the agent 
is unable to follow the PA. Rule#5 is a disjunction of three different rules: the first 
determines SA about the emergency based on focus and understanding of PA, the 
second uses direct exposure to the threat/hazard, and the third is based on the 
recognition of alarms. This last disjunct in rule#5 uses the predicate KETA to link an 
alarm to the corresponding situation or emergency type because that is needed to 
conclude in the consequent predicate HSES.  
Rule #6 uses time as factor for ignoring an earlier understanding about a FIRE 
situation when FIRE is escalated to EVACUATE. That is, if an agent has awareness 
about a FIRE at t1, and at some later time t2 the situation escalates to EVACUATE, 
then there is no need to keep the impression of FIRE situation because the agent 
needs to act according to EVACUATE situation. Rules# 7 & 8 are to ensure that FIRE 
and EVACUATE are two distinct types of situations, besides that EVACUATE may 
occur because of a fire (Chowdhury, 2016; Spouge, 1999). Rule # 10 determines a 
formation of intention to move to a muster location by listening to an alarm (the 
predicate L), recognition of alarm (the predicate R), and belief about what is needed 
in that particular alarm type (the predicate KMLA that stands for Knows Muster 
location against the Alarm). In this case, the formation of deliberative intention 
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(Bratman, 1987, p. 56) is based on deliberation about the act of listening and 
recognizing the alarm type.  
5.3.1.2 TRAINING THE ELDS MODULE 
The dataset Tr is used for training the ELDS module, and the dataset Te is used as 
testing/evidence while querying the ELDS’s MLN L. The model is trained by 
employing a discriminative learning method (Domingos & Lowd, 2009; Singla & 
Domingos, 2005) using the software package Alchemy (2012) so that weights can be 
assigned to the rules presented in Table 5.2. A fragment of the MLN L is depicted in 
Figure 5.4. The nodes in Figure 5.4 are obtained for each possible grounding of each 
predicate appearing in a formula. An edge between two nodes means that the  
HES(P4G1,EVAC,T1)
KETPA(PAPA,EVAC)
KETA(PAPA,EVAC)
HITR(P4G1,LIFEBOAT,T1)
KMLA(PAPA,LIFEBOAT)
L(P4G1,PAPA,T1)
KMLPA(PA-PAPA,LIFEBOAT)
FPA(P4G1,PA-PAPA,T1)
HFO(P4G1,PA-PAPA,T1)
 
 
Figure 5.4. A portion of the MLN L obtained by grounding the predicates in Rules 2, 5, and 
9 using the constants/facts obtained from Group 1 dataset. The above network was obtained 
by using facts/data for the participant P4G1 only.  
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corresponding ground predicates have appeared at the same time in at least one 
grounding of one formula in L. 
5.3.2 The Ontology-based Reasoning module 
The OBR module incorporates the need for basic concepts that may come into one’s 
mind when an emergency is encountered that involves fire, smoke, evacuation, or 
escape. These basic concepts and those derived from them have been defined in the 
ontology by exploiting the formalism of Sowa (1984, 2000), that is, by using CGs. 
Figure 5.5 shows a fragment of important concepts represented in the proposed 
ontology for offshore emergency situations. 
Universal
Situation
Relation
Action
Object
Attribute
Person
Unexpected
Event
Emergency Hazard
Explosion
Smoke
Fire
Escape
Flame
Alarm
Route
Light
Arch
chrc
hasagnt
inst
thme
involve
area
 
Figure 5.5. Fragment of the proposed ontology for offshore emergency awareness. 
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The conceptual relations: agent (agnt), attribute (attr), characteristic (chrc), 
experiencer (expr), instrument (inst), object (obj), and theme (thme) are used 
here as defined in (Sowa, 1984, pp. 415-419). The concept agnt does not refer to the 
concept of agent as defined in AI literature, rather, it is a relation used in conceptual 
structures to refer to a relation that links an [ACT] to an [ANIMATE], where the 
ANIMATE concept represents the actor of the action. The concept of ACT is defined 
as an event with an animate agent. 
 
Definition 5.1. The relation agnt links the concept [ACT] to [ANIMATE], where 
the ANIMATE concept refers to an actor of the action. Example: A CG for “A Man 
moves to a destination” in the linear form (LF) will be represented as: 
[MoveTo] − (agnt) → [Person], 
       − (attr) → [Destination]. 
 
 
Definition 5.2. The relation attr links [Entity: *x] to [Entity: *y], where *x has 
an attribute *y. Example: Fire has flame. The CG is: [Fire] → (attr) → [Flame] 
such that Fire and Flame are represented as two concepts of type Entity, and Fire has 
an attribute Flame. 
Definition 5.3. The relation chrc links [Entity: *x] to [Entity: *y] such that *x has 
a characteristic *y. Example: Emergency is a danger to people and property. The CG 
is: [Emergency] → (chrc) →[danger] → [Person_Property]. 
Definition 5.4. The relation expr links a [State] to an [Animate], who is 
experiencing that state. For example, because Emergency is defined here as a situation 
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as well as a state, therefore, the concepts in the sentence, “Emergency is experienced 
by people”, are described as CG by [Emergency] → (expr) → [Person]. 
Definition 5.5. The relation inst links an [Entity] to an [Act] in which the entity 
is causally involved. For example, the CG [Fire]  (obj) → [Produce] → 
(inst) → [Combustion] reflects a causal relationship between the chemical 
process of combustion and the birth of a fire. 
Definition 5.6. The relation obj links an [Act] to an [Entity], which is acted upon. 
For example, in the event of an emergency “a person moves to the secondary muster 
station (LIFEBOAT)”, is represented in the ontology as descendent of a CS-Rule as: 
Antecedent part 
[MESSHALL] − (attr) → [Compromised], 
                 − (expr) → [Person]. 
 
Descendent part 
[MoveTo] − (agnt) → [Person], 
        − (attr) − [Destination] − (obj) → [LIFEBOAT]. 
 Definition 5.7. The relation thme is to represent a thematic role. For example to 
express the intent in the sentence, “Muster station has hazard”, one can write the CG 
as [MusterStation] − (thme) → [Hazard] (see (Sowa, 2000, pp. 506-512) for 
a detail account on thematic roles in ontologies). 
Definition 5.8. The relations require (req) and (involve) links a [Person] to an 
[Action], and an [Action: *x] to an [Action: *y], respectively where *x involves *y. 
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As an example, the descendent in following CS-Rule represents the use of req 
relation. 
Antecedent part: 
[Place] − (thme) →[Hazard], 
                − expr → [Person]. 
 
Descendent part: 
[Person] − (req) → [ImmediateAction] − (involve) → [RaiseAlarm], 
                  (agnt) − [MoveOut]. 
 
Definition 5.9. The concept Combustion is defined as an act of burning. The CG 
is: [Combustion] −(actOf)→[Burning]. 
Definition 5.10. The concept Fire is defined as an entity that has attributes of heat, 
light, flame and that is produced as a result of combustion. The CG is: 
[Fire] − (attr) →[Heat], 
             − (attr) →[Flame], 
             − (attr) →[Light], 
              (obj) − [Produce]−(inst)→ [Combustion]. 
Definition 5.11. The concept Smoke is defined as a child concept of [Hazard] that 
is produced as a result of combustion. The CG is: 
[Produce] − (inst) →[Combustion], 
                    − (obj) →[Hazard: super]. 
Definition 5.12. The concept of muster station is defined as a place of temporary 
refuge during an emergency. It is represented as: 
[MusterStation] − (attr) − 
 → [TemporaryRefugeArea] − (attr) →[Duration] − 
       − (involve) → [Emergency]. 
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Definition 5.13. The concept of emergency is classified as a situation, and as a 
state. It is formally defined in terms of a CG as: 
[Emergency] − 
                −(isa)→[UnexpectedEvent]−(isa)→[Situation :super ], 
                −(req)→[ImmediateAction], 
                −(attr) → [Duration], 
                −(attr) → [Area], 
                −(chrc) → [Danger]−(to)→[Person_Property], 
                −(involve) → [Hazard], 
                −(expr) → [Person], 
                −(notifiedBy) → [Alarm]. 
 
Definition 5.14. The following CS-rules are stored for memory-based inference: 
 
CS-rule # 1 
If a muster station, x, gets a hazard, then the muster station, x, will be considered 
as compromised. 
Antecedent: 
[MusterStation: *x] − (thme) → [Hazard]. 
Consequent: 
[MusterStation: *x] −  
              − (attr) → [Compromised], 
           − (expr) → [Person]. 
 
CS-rule#2 
If a person finds the MESSHAL compromised, then the person should move to the 
LIFEBOAT station. 
Antecedent: 
[MESSHALL] − 
     −(attr) →[Compromised], 
     −(expr) →[Person]. 
Consequent: 
[Person]  (agnt) − [MoveTo] −(attr) → [Destination] − (obj) → 
[LIFEBOAT]. 
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CS-rule#3 
If a person finds the LIFEBOAT station compromised, then the person should 
escape from the platform as quickly as possible. 
Antecedent: 
[LIFEBOAT] − 
     −(attr) →[Compromised], 
     −(expr) →[Person]. 
Consequent: 
[Person]  (agnt) − [Escape] −(actOf) → [ImmediateAction] − 
(involve) → [EMERGENCY]. 
 
CS-rule#4 
If a person finds a hazard at some location, then the Person should raise alarm 
and move out of that location. 
Antecedent: 
[Place] − 
   − (thme) →[Hazard], 
   − (expr) →[Person]. 
Consequent: 
[Person] − 
 (agnt) − [MoveOut], 
− (req) → [ImmediateAction] − (involve) →  
[RaiseAlarm]. 
 
5.4 Implementing the proposed realization of RPDM 
model: A case study  
A general methodology to prepare a working model of RPDM for agents is described 
in Figures 5.2 & 5.3. It is not possible to proceed with it unless there are specific 
modules for ELDS, OBR, and mental simulation. These modules, in turn, require 
situation-specific data so that rules can be outlined on the basis of which ELDS-
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module for SA is made, and an ontology for basic terms and general principles can be 
designed. In this section, we will discuss how the concepts explored in Section 3 can 
shape a working model for an artificially intelligent agent that makes decisions in the 
sense of the theory behind the RPDM model as explained in (G. Klein, 1998). We will 
describe an experiment that has been used here for developing some situations in 
which the proposed methodology of Section 5.3 may be implemented. Moreover, 
subsequent subsections will discuss how the insight developed in the experiment is 
used to develop the ELDS-module and an ontology for basic domain knowledge.  
5.4.1 Human-competence measurement in a virtual environment 
J. Smith (2015) performed an experiment to assess how training in a VE for 
emergency response affects human competence in different emergency egress 
scenarios. Emergency response training is a regulated part of industrial safety. For 
example, SOLAS Chapter II-2 Regulation 13 (IMO, 2009) describes specific 
guidelines about the use of exit signs in escape routes on offshore petroleum 
platforms. The OSHA fact sheet (OSHA, 2018) describes operational features of all 
escape routes and urges at least two routes for rapid and safe evacuation in an 
emergency. A thorough investigation into different kinds of accidents, hazards, 
emergencies, and required responses is given in (Chowdhury, 2016; Crowl & Louvar, 
2011). Smith’s experiment involved 36 participants divided into two groups: Group 1 
containing 17 and Group 2 containing 19 participants. Group 1 participants were 
trained in several training sessions, and Group 2 participants received only a single 
basic training exposure (Figure 5.6). 
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5.4.2 Evacuation scenarios and decision tasks 
The training curriculum of Smith’s study (J. Smith, 2015) targeted six learning 
objectives: (1) establish spatial awareness of the environment, (2) alarms recognition, 
(3) routes and mapping, (4) continually assess situation and avoid hazards on routes, 
(5) register at temporary safe refuge, and (6) general safe practices. In the present 
study, Group 1 participants’ data from cabin-side scenarios are used for validating the 
simulation results from the agent model proposed in Section 5.3. The agent is 
supposed to operate given the same input as was perceived by participants in Smith’s 
experiment. 
The participants were tested throughout three separate sessions: S1, S2, and S3, each 
comprising various training and testing sessions involving a range of activities. The 
testing sessions were recorded as replay video files so they can be watched later using 
AVERT. In cabin side scenarios, session one (S1) comprised two learning (LE2, LE3) 
and two testing (TE1, TE3) scenarios. At the beginning of S1, the participants were 
given a 30-minute video tour (named LE1) to get acquainted with the virtual platform. 
As the participants were trained in S1 and S2 prior to S3 it means a compounding 
training effect from S1 and S2 was already present in S3. Session 2 (S2) targeted 
training and testing for emergency alarm recognition during muster drills. For cabin-
side scenarios, S2 contained two training (LA2, LA3) and testing (TA1, TA3) 
scenarios. The purpose of S2 was to train the participants for alarm recognition in  
S3: Training Practice Testing Feedback
S1: Basic Training, 
practice, testing and 
feedback sessions
S2: Training, 
practice, testing and 
feedback sessions
Session S3
 
Figure 5.6. Each session S1-S3 comprises various training, practice, and testing sessions. 
Group 1 participants received repeated training and testing throughout the experiment.  
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fire and evacuation emergencies so that they can decide, upon listening to an alarm, 
which type of emergency has occurred. Session 3 (S3) was developed to train and test 
the participants for muster drills for fire and evacuation emergencies. In these drills, 
participants listen to platform alarms followed by public address (PA) 
announcements, and encounter fires and smoke hazards. S3 comprises two training 
(LH3, LH4) and two testing (TH1, TH2) scenarios. 
The hazards block part of the primary escape route and compromise the primary 
muster location in TH1. A detailed account on these training/testing scenarios is 
available in (J. Smith, 2015). In scenario TH1, initially a fire broke out in a galley, 
and a general platform alarm (GPA) began sounding to notify personnel of a FIRE 
situation. The GPA alarm was also followed by a PA announcement that told the 
participants the kind of hazard, the location of the hazard, and possible actions needed 
(where to muster, the primary or the secondary muster station). The protocol 
instructed the participants to leave their cabins immediately and proceed to the 
primary muster station and register there by moving the T-card from the steady to 
mustered state. After some time, the fire escalated, and the situation turned from FIRE 
to EVACUATE emergency. This was signaled by a change in the alarm sound from 
GPA to Prepare- To-Abandon-Alarm (PAPA) followed by another PA announcement. 
Participants need to decide which muster location is the right choice and which egress 
route to follow in case the primary escape route becomes inaccessible. 
All training and testing scenarios were recorded, and a log file for each participant 
was maintained that contained specific information about the way the participant  
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Table 5.4. Variables (and corresponding predicate names) to be used in the ELDS module 
development along with parameter types and description are shown. 
Factor/variable Predicate Parameters Descriptions 
Alarm 
Recognition. 
R (agent, alarm, t) An agent recognizes an 
alarm as being GPA or PAPA 
during time interval t. 
Focus of 
attention or has 
focus on. 
HFO  (agent, pa, t) An agent has focus on pa 
message14 during time t. 
Encounters or 
sees a threat or 
hazard. 
ST (agent, thtType, 
t) 
An agent has seen a hazard of 
type, thtType, during t. 
Follows a PA. FPA (agent, pa, t) An agent understands the 
wording in PA. 
Intention to move 
to a specific 
muster location. 
HITR (agent, 
musterLoc, t) 
An agent has (developed) an 
intention during t to reach a 
specific muster location. 
Situation 
awareness of 
emergency. 
HES (agent, 
emgSitType, t) 
An agent got awareness about 
the situation type, 
emgSitType, during time t. 
Paying attention 
to alarm  
L (agent,alarm,t) An agent listens to an alarm 
during time interval t. 
Assessment of 
alarm recognition 
based on 
listening alarm. 
BST (agent,alarm,t) An agent listens to an alarm 
before seeing the threat. This 
predicate is used in conjunction 
with others in rules 2, 5, 9 to 
assess if the alarm recognition 
is done before seeing a threat 
(BST). This concludes that the 
alarm is recognized otherwise 
the SA might be due to some 
other factor such as watching a 
fire. 
Sensing of an 
emergency 
HSES (agent) Based on the antecedent in 
rules 3 & 4 an agent will get a 
sense of some emergency 
without getting further details. 
proceeded in a scenario towards making a required decision. Factors that play 
important roles in deciding about the kind of emergency (FIRE or EVACUATE), 
 
14 The PA was made by a verbal announcement of the message, “Attention all personnel! This is the 
offshore installation manager speaking. We have report of a fire in a galley.”. 
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recognizing alarms, and developing an intention to move to a particular muster 
location using an escape route are listed in Table 5.4. 
5.4.3 Data collection 
All observations were collected in the form of Boolean variables or predicates 
reported in Table 5.4. Table 5.5 reports a sample of data collected through knowledge 
elicitation that involves breaking each participant’s session into two parts. The first 
part concerned with the question of recognizing a FIRE emergency and then deciding 
upon accordingly. The second part involves recognition of EVACUATE emergency 
and act accordingly.  
The methodology to collect data for each of the predicate is based on “Observing 
participants’ performing tasks” (Crandall, Klein, & Hoffman, 2006, pp. 14-15). There 
are three methods to perform this type of data collection. The first is based on the 
approach called theory theory (TT) that says, given the information about a person’s 
observed behaviors, or gestures, an attributor can make inferences about the person’s 
intentions, beliefs and goals (Davies & Stone, 1995). The second approach to mind 
reading, called rationality theory (RT), exploits the use of principles of rationality 
(Dennett, 1987) to attribute different states to others based on their behavior. The third 
approach used in this work to collect data through re-play videos is referred in 
cognitive science literature (Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Shanton & Goldman, 2010) 
as simulation theory (ST).  Appendix C describes a set of assumptions that are made 
about the participants of Smith’s experiment. 
In order to show how data pertaining to each predicate is gathered from the re-play  
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Table 5.5. A sample of empirical observations for the decision choices made by the five participants. The time interval t0 starts with the beginning 
of the scenario until the GPA alarm ends. The interval t1 starts when the PAPA alarm begins sounding, i.e., just after the GPA ends and the situation 
escalates from FIRE to EVACUATE. It ends at the end of the scenario. 
Predicates 
Participant L 
(.,GPA,t0) 
R 
(.,GPA,t0) 
BST 
(.,GPA,t0) 
HITR 
(.,MSH,t0) 
ST HFO 
(.,PAGPA,t0) 
FPA 
(.,PAGPA,t0) 
HES 
(.,FIRE,t0) 
P4G1 True False False False True
15
 True False True 
P5G1 True True True True True
16
 True True True 
P6G1 True True True False
17
 True
18
 True True True
19
 
P7G1 True True True False True
20
 True True True 
P10G1 True True True True True
21
 True True True 
         
 L 
(.,PAPA,t1) 
R 
(.,PAPA,t1) 
BST 
(.,PAPA,t1) 
HITR 
(.,LBS,t1) 
ST HFO 
(.,PAPAPA,t1) 
FPA 
(.,PAPAPA,t1) 
HES 
(.,EVAC,t1) 
P4G1 True False False True False
22
 True True True 
P5G1 True True True True True
23
 True True True 
P6G1 True True True True True
24
 False False True
25
 
 
15 Parameters observed are: P4G1, SMK_VENT, and t0 
16 Parameters observed are: P5G1, SMK_STAI, and t0 
17 The intention for moving to the messhal was developed late during the beginning of the interval t1. 
18 Parameters observed are: P6G1, SMK_STAI, and t0 
19 P6G1 kept the impression of FIRE until it recognizes EVACUATE situation in t1.  
20 Parameters observed are: P7G1, SMK_STAI, and t0 
21 Parameters observed are: P10G1, SMK_MSHA, and t0 
22 P4G1 did not see any threat during t1 
23 Parameters observed are: P5G1, SMK_MSHA, and t1 
24 Parameters observed are: (P6G1, SMK_MSHA, t1), and (P6G1, SMK_STAI,t1) 
25 P6G1 kept impression of FIRE emergency during the beginning of the interval t1, later understood escalation of situation from FIRE to EVACUATE, thus HES has three groundings: 
HES(P6G1,FIRE,t0), HES(P6G1,FIRE,t1), and HES(P6G1,EVACUATE,t1). 
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Predicates 
Participant L 
(.,GPA,t0) 
R 
(.,GPA,t0) 
BST 
(.,GPA,t0) 
HITR 
(.,MSH,t0) 
ST HFO 
(.,PAGPA,t0) 
FPA 
(.,PAGPA,t0) 
HES 
(.,FIRE,t0) 
P7G1 True True True True True
26
 False False True
27
 
P10G1 True False False False True
28
 False False False
29
 
 
26 Parameters observed are: P7G1, SMK_MSHA, and t1 
27 P7G1 behaved same as P6G1 and kept impression of FIRE during some time in the beginning of the interval t1 
28 Parameters observed are: P10G1, SMK_MSHA, and t1 
29 P10G1 could not recognize EVACUATE situation and kept the impression of FIRE situation till the end of the scenario. 
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videos of participants, we present here, for brevity, only the procedure adopted to 
collect data for the predicates HFO and FPA. The primary way to determine whether 
a participant had focus on PA wordings was to see if the participant’s movement has 
changed starting with the PA. For instance, if it is observed that as soon as the PA 
begins the participant starts getting slowed down in speed, or stopped, or kept walking 
slowly as if trying to listen to the words. Only one participant ignored PA for FIRE 
situation. This participant ignored all other cues too. This participant’s behaviors were 
tracked in other scenarios, not reported here, and it is found that he had developed a 
tendency to move to the lifeboat station, irrespective of any situation. Four other 
participants were found who only ignored or did not focus on PA related with 
EVACUATE situation as their gestures showed no change in their pace of their 
previously selected actions. For instance, all of them were heading towards the 
messhall when the GPA alarm turned to PAPA and the PA related with PAPA started 
being announced. But none of them re-routed to show their understanding or vigilance 
with the new demands in the PA. That is the reason, the authors inferred that these 
four participants did not put their attention on the PA. So, in all these five cases the 
predicate HFO was assigned with a Boolean false value.  
For the predicate FPA, if a person does not focus on PA wordings, no actions 
according to the PA should be expected unless another cue triggers the same. In all 
cases, where a participant did not focus on the PA wording, we assigned FPA a false 
value. Also, there were four cases where the participants showed focus on the PA by 
pausing their activities, which they were engaged in before the PA announcement 
began, and then resuming after the PA is over, but they did not act according to the 
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PA wordings. These PAs were related to EVACUATE situation but none of these 
participants re-routed immediately after listening to the PA. Therefore, we have 
assigned false values to FPA for these cases too with corresponding HFO having 
true values. In the rest of the cases FPA takes a true value. 
The dataset for all 17 participants of Group 1, each participant having data for two 
situations, the FIRE and the EVACUATE situation, was collected and split into the 
training sample, Tr, containing 80% of the data, and the testing/evidence sample, Te, 
containing the remaining 20%. The testing/evidence data is used here for making 
inferences from the trained ELDS module. 
5.4.4. Simulation results 
An agent has been programmed using the concepts proposed in the work. The agent 
program is made using three technologies: (1) an object-oriented design pattern for 
the autonomous agent programming language called OO2APL (Dastani & Testerink, 
2014), which is available as a Java API, (2) Alchemy 2.0 (2012) that supports Markov 
logic network development, and (3) the Amine platform (Kabbaj, 2006; Kabbaj, 
Bouzouba, El Hachimi, & Ourdani, 2006; Kabbaj et al., 2005) for the design and 
development of ontology. This section reports the results obtained after executing the 
agent program, and a comparison is performed between the simulated scenarios, 
which are the results of the query predicates R, HITR, and HES, and the empirical 
observations. MC-SAT (Poon & Domingos, 2006) inference algorithm is used for 
querying the ELDS module. Table 5.6 reports the simulated results along with the 
evidence data Te that is used to make inference from the MLN in ELDS module.  
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5.4.4.1 SITUATION # 1A 
In this situation, the agent was provided with the same factors that were available 
when the participant P1G1 was performing the test scenario TH1 during the first half 
of the total testing time, i.e., the interval t0, in which a GPA alarm begins sounding 
followed by the relevant PA while the participant was in the cabin. The agent’s ELDS 
module was set with the values of the predicates L, BST, ST, HFO, and FPA as 
evidence as mentioned in Sit#1A in Table 5.6. MC-SAT algorithm was executed with 
queries ?R, ?HITR, and ?HES (with required arguments) and the probabilities that 
these predicates are true are found to be 0.87 for recognizing the alarm (i.e., the 
predicate R), 0.66 for developing the intention to move to MESSHALL during t0, and 
0.46 for moving to LIFEBOAT station during t0 (i.e., HITR(., LIFEBOAT, 
t0)), where the parameter values MESSHALL and LIFEBOAT represent the primary 
and alternate muster locations, respectively. The probabilities for the agent to 
recognize and be aware of FIRE and EVACUATE emergencies during t0 are found 
to be 0.94 and 0.64 respectively. As there are two sets of probabilities for each of 
the queried predicate, the agent needs to decide which value to use. Algorithm 5.1 has 
been implemented to resolve this issue. The parameter 1 has been set to 0.6, and the 
value of 2 has been set to 20% of the value of 1. These values were obtained so that 
the simulated results are found to be as close to the empirical values as possible. The 
result of Algorithm 5.1 based on its implementation in Appendix D.1, determines that 
during t0 the agent will move to the primary muster station. This result is the same 
that was observed in the empirical finding where the participant chose to move to the 
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Table 5.6. The evidence/test data collected as 20% of the empirical observations. Columns with predicate names having a preceding ‘?’ contain 
simulated results, which are the probabilities these predicates are true given the evidence data. 
 Predicates 
Sit
# 
L 
(.,GPA,t0) 
?R 
(.,GPA,t0) 
BST 
(.,GPA,t0) 
?HITR 
(.,M1|M2,t0) 
ST HFO(., 
PAGPA,t0) 
FPA 
(.,PAGPA,t0) 
?HES 
(.,H1|H2,t0) 
1A True True (0.87) True True  (0.66M1, 0.46M2) False True True True30 
(0.94H1,0.64H2) 
2A True True (0.87) True True (0.66M1, 0.43M2) True31 True True True (0.96H1, 0.26H2) 
3A False False (0.0) False False (0.51M1,0.51M2) True32 False False False (0.44H1,0.24H2) 
         
 L 
(.,PAPA,t1) 
?R 
(.,PAPA,t1) 
BST 
(.,PAPA,t1) 
?HITR(.,M1|M2,t1) ST HFO(., 
PAPAPA,t1) 
FPA 
(.,PAPAPA,t1) 
?HES 
(.,H1|H2,t1) 
1B False False (0.0) False True (0.46M1,0.50M2)  True33 False False False (0.01H1,0.38H2) 
2B True True (0.9) True True (0.44M1,0.92M2) False True True True (0.07H1,0.96H2) 
3B True True (0.9) True True (0.43M1,0.94M2) False True True True (0.14H1,0.96H2) 
NOTE:  
(a) M1 is short for messhall, the primary muster station, and M2 is short for the alternate muster station, the lifeboat station.  (b) True and false are the empirically observed states 
for the predicates in each column.  (c) A predicate starting with a ‘?’ is the one that has been queried in the ELDS module. The remaining predicates are used as evidence/test data 
in the query process. ELDS module that comprises MLN is queried by employing the MC-SAT inference algorithm. (d) The results of querying for R, HITR, and HES are reported 
as the probability that the predicates are true given the evidence data. These probabilities are reported as values in parenthesis under the respective columns. A probability value 
with a subscript M1 stands for the result related with the primary muster station, whereas the one having a subscript M2 refers to the probability that the predicate is true involving 
the alternate muster station. (e) H1 refers to FIRE emergency, H2 refers to EVACUATE emergency. The probability that a FIRE emergency is occurred is referred to by nH1, and 
the probability that an EVACUATE emergency has occurred is referred to by nH2, where 0 ≤ n ≤ 1. 
 
30 The participant kept impression of FIRE during some time in the beginning of the interval t1. 
31 Observed SMK_VENT during t0 
32 Observed SMK_VENT during t0 
33 SMK_MSHA, SMK_STAI, SMK_VENT all observed during t1. 
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primary muster station (see the value true in the last column of row 1A in Table 5.6) 
during interval t0. 
5.4.4.2 SITUATION # 1B 
The empirical findings during the second half of the testing scenario for participant 
P1G1 is reported in Sit#1B in Table 5.6 by using the Boolean (true or false) 
values. The numeric parenthesized values are obtained by running the simulation 
using the agent. The agent was provided with the same evidence that was perceived 
by the participant P1G1. The evidence formed the collection of Boolean values for 
the predicates L, BST, ST, HFO, and FPA. Although, P1G1 was able to form the 
intention of moving to the right muster station, i.e., the LIFEBOAT station during t1, 
despite the fact that P1G1 was not found to focus on listening to the PAPA alarm and 
following relevant PA. The moment when P1G1 was entering into the MESSHALL 
during t0, the interval t0 had ended and the PAPA alarm started sounding. The 
presence of smoke was a visual cue that has a dominance (Reason, 1990) over the 
other cues like audio signals (such as listening to the PAPA alarm and PA), therefore, 
we argue that P1G1 could not utilize the PAPA alarm and the relevant PA to come to 
form the intention of moving to the LIFEBOAT station. The only cue that was used 
during t1 was the presence of smoke in the MESSHALL. P1G1 made intention to 
move to the LIFEBOAT station because he found the MESSHALL compromised 
already. The simulation results for this part of the emergency are given here as under:  
Because the rules where HITR is consequent (rule#9, 10 in Table 5.2) are based on 
HFO, FPA, L, R, and BST. All of these predicate values were set to false because 
of the inability of P1G1 to perceive the corresponding cues. The probability that 
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HITR(P1G1, M2=LIFEBOAT, t1) results true has been found to be 0.5. This 
value is inconclusive based on Algorithm 5.1. While the agent is present in the 
MESSHALL (due to the decision in Situation 1A as reported in Section 5.4.4.1), and 
smoke was in the MESSHALL, the agent perceived the smoke, determined its current 
position (which was MESSHALL), and passed this information in the form of the 
following CG:  
[MESSHALL]−(thme) →[Smoke] (5.3) 
to the OBR- module (reported in Section 5.3.2). A match of the CG in (5.3) was made 
with the antecedent of CS-rule#1 because MESSHALL is a subtype of 
MusterStation, and Smoke is a subtype of Hazard. The inferred consequent 
that comes from CS-rule#1 is: 
[MESSHALL]− (5.4) 
− (attr) → [Compromised],  
    − (expr) → [Person].  
The above CG (5.4) has further been considered as antecedent of CS-rule#2, and the 
final inferred output is the following CG: 
[MESSHALL]− (5.5) 
   − (attr) → [Compromised],  
 − (thme) → [Smoke],  
    
 
- (expr) →[Person](agnt)-[MoveTo]- 
    - (attr)→[Destination]-(obj)→[LIFEBOAT]. 
 
This final CG (5.5) contains the relevant cues, which are Smoke that was present at 
the MESSHALL, and the destination to be reached, which is the LIFEBOAT station. 
The above CS-rule, during the simulation, has been used to form the intention to move 
to the destination := LIFEBOAT station, and the BDI framework executes the plan 
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associated with moving to the lifeboat station, which was the required action when 
the primary muster station is engulfed in a hazard.  
5.4.4.3 SITUATION # 2A 
The situation reflects a participant, P2G1, in his cabin when the GPA alarm begins 
sounding. In the next second, the PA announces that there is a FIRE in the galley. The 
participant clearly listened to the GPA, understood the PA announcement and made an 
intention to move to the primary muster location. In this situation, as shown in Table 
5.6 (line 2A), P2G1 has perceived all the cues that led all the predicates to true. 
During simulation, the agent, was provided with the evidence predicates, L, BST, ST, 
HFO, and FPA, all having the Boolean values true. The ELDS module computed 
the probability of forming intention to move to the MESSHALL as 0.66. At the same 
time, the probability of moving to the LIFEBOAT station was found to be 0.43. 
Algorithm 5.1 decides the MESSHALL as the destination location during the interval 
t0 because the probability of HES has been calculated as 0.96 for the FIRE 
emergency. As the agent knows the plan about what to do in case of FIRE emergency, 
which is to move to the MESSHALL, the agent performs the action of moving to the 
MESSHALL.  
5.4.4.4 SITUATION # 2B 
Continuing the situation 2A, during the next half interval of time, i.e., t1, P2G1 
received a PAPA alarm with the relevant PA, and perceived correctly all the available 
cues corresponding to the predicates as shown in Table 5.6 (line 2B). The participant 
decided to move to the LIFEBOAT station during t1. The agent, in simulating the 
participant P2G1, was given the same values of the predicates as was perceived by 
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the participant, and the ELDS module arrived at the same result by computing the 
probability of moving to the LIFEBOAT station as 0.96. 
5.4.4.5 SITUATION # 3A 
In this situation, the participant P3G1 did not pay attention to the GPA alarm when it 
started sounding while the participant was in the cabin. Right from the beginning, 
P3G1 made an intention to move to the LIFEBOAT station. By watching P3G1’s 
replay video, no rationale could be found that explains why P3G1 did this, except that 
this behavior was dominant throughout all the scenarios in which P3G1 participated. 
The repeated use of the same decision irrespective of what a scenario demands may 
be considered as an example of similarity-matching and frequency bias (Reason, 
1990) because all emergency scenarios considered here have similarities in terms of 
the cues, like smoke, fire, and alarms. Because P3G1 did not use the cues for decision-
making, the predicates L, R, BST, HITR, HFO, FPA and HES are assigned the value 
false during t0, as shown in Table 5.6 (line 3A). The ELDS module (during 
simulation), correspondingly, resulted in low probabilities that ultimately brought the 
OBR-module in action. Here, the agent exploits the only available cue, which was the 
observation that there was smoke coming out of the MESSHALL vent, and therefore, 
the agent determined that MESSHALL is compromised. The CG: 
[MESSHALL]−(thme)→[Smoke] is used to initiate memory-based inference on the 
OBR-module. This CG is matched with the antecedent of CS-rule#1, which is a more 
general form in the ontology, and the consequent was generated as: 
[MESSHALL]− (5.6) 
− (attr) → [Compromised],  
    − (expr) → [Person].  
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This result was further matched with other CS-rules. Since the antecedent of CS-
rule#2 is matched with the above result, therefore, the final inference is made in the 
form of the CG in (5.7). 
[MESSHALL]− (5.7) 
   − (attr) → [Compromised],  
 − (thme) → [Smoke],  
    
 
- (expr) →[Person](agnt)-[MoveTo]- 
    - (attr)→[Destination]-(obj)→[LIFEBOAT], 
 
which has clear instruction to move to the LIFEBOAT station during t0. 
5.4.4.6 SITUATION # 3B 
The situation 3A turns to 3B when t0 ends and t1 began. At this time, the PAPA 
alarm began sounding followed by the relevant PA announcement. This happened 
right after the time when the decision was made as described by the CG (5.7). Since 
we have given the agent all the cues that were observed by the participant P3G1 during 
t1, using the ELDS module, the agent was able to hold the initial decision of moving 
to the LIFEBOAT station using the primary egress route. In other words, during 
situations 3A and 3B, the agent came up with the same decision of moving to the 
muster station. When the second decision was being made, the plan of the first 
decision was not yet complete. The BDI framework, as implemented in OO2APL, 
allows only one plan against a single trigger, therefore, two same decisions of moving 
to the LIFEBOAT station did not execute two plans, but a single plan corresponding 
to moving to the LIFEBOAT station was executed. Also, the decision was 
implemented using a plan that was executed by first setting ‘moving to LIFEBOAT’ 
station as a goal, and then fetching a plan that is associated with this goal. During the 
course of following actions in the plan, the agent kept observing and found smoke in 
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the stairwell. This is a typical situation in which the agent needs to modify the plan 
by adding or dropping some actions according to the current situation. In a general 
sense, G. Klein (1998) demonstrates the need to modify actions in a plan by a label 
“Evaluate Actions – Mental simulation” that follows “Modify” block. A typical plan 
that performs on-the-fly modification is given in Appendix E, where a plan of moving 
to a muster station is considered as a goal that is made up of other goals such as 
MoveTo, TraverseEdge, Seek and Arrive, which are the standard steering behaviors 
(Buckland, 2004; Millington & Funge, 2009) used to perform various actions in a 
plan’s execution process. The agent mustered at the LIFEBOAT station. The 
corresponding probabilities for the queried predicates R, HITR, and HES have been 
found to be 0.9, 0.94, and 0.96 respectively (see Table 5.6, line 3B). In order to show 
how the process of mental simulation works in accordance with RPDM literature, the 
agent’s beliefbase has been slightly modified by setting the primary escape route 
(PER) as ‘not learned’. The problem of learning by remembering waypoints along a 
route considering landmarks as opportunities for better retention is considered in 
(Danial et al., 2018, 2019). Now what are the consequences, in a hazard, when the 
agent adapts a route that it does not know? For the present case, the agent exploits a 
Bayesian network (see Figure 5.7) to assess the consequences of choosing PER and 
the secondary escape route (SER) under current circumstances when a hazard has 
already been recognized and the agent did not know the primary escape route. The 
probability of being trapped is found to be higher in choosing PER than that of SER 
in case PER is not remembered or has not been learned. Therefore, the agent acts on 
the plan of moving to the LIFEBOAT station using the secondary escape route.  
  
209 
 
 
5.5. Conclusion  
The present work proposes a model that has potential to be used as a realization of 
Klein’s recognition-primed decision model for human decision-making in 
emergencies. The present work proposes, for the first time, concrete scientific 
methods that can be used to address the modelling of philosophical modalities of 
RPDM in a pragmatic setting by also providing a case study as an application. There 
are two major components of the RPDM that are focused upon here. The first is the 
SA modelling using experience. This part is modelled in the form of an experiential 
learning and decision-making module that comprises a Markov logic network L. The 
network is trained by using empirical data collected by estimating human 
performance in a VE for different offshore emergency situations involving fire and 
evacuation. Coupled with the ELDS-module is a feature matching module that comes 
into play when the agent’s experience could not recognize a given situation. The 
feature-matching module is based on an ontology of concepts related with fire and 
evacuation situations, and this part is the second component of RPDM that is 
modelled here. 
 
Figure 5.7. A model of mental simulation during deliberation of the plan of moving to the 
LIFEBOAT station. The agent weighs its chances of being trapped for each case of choosing 
PER and SER. 
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The results show that the model outputs are similar to the decisions made by human 
participants given the same input cues. Several examples serve to illustrate. In 
situation 1A the agent recognizes the GPA alarm and has SA about a FIRE situation, 
forms intention to move to the primary muster station, and initiates a plan to muster 
at the primary muster station. Situation 1A was the situation the agent had experience 
about during the training session, so the decision was made because of the agent’s 
experience. Situation 1B was new to the agent because the agent had no training 
session in which all cues were absent except a visual of a smoke hazard. The agent 
exploited the visual cue, that is, smoke in the primary muster station, and used its 
general knowledge about how to react in case of smoke at a location. Both of the 
situations 2A and 2B are found to be typical as the agent was able to be aware about 
the emergency and was able to make decisions as required. In situation 3A, there is a 
deviation in terms of the reasons behind the decision the agent made, and the decision 
made by the participant P3G1. P3G1 was found to have used no known cues for 
his/her intention of moving to the alternate muster station, the LIFEBOAT station. 
We think that the participant made the choice based on his/her training sessions that 
show the same trend of moving to the LIFEBOAT station no matter what the 
circumstances demand. On the contrary, during simulation, when the agent was given 
the same input cues as was perceived by P3G1, the agent used the only available cue, 
smoke coming out from the MESSHALL vent, and decided to move to the LIFEBOAT 
station. In situation 3B, the agent retained the initial decision that it made during 
interval t0 in situation 3A. 
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The proposed model performed well on the evidence data (Te dataset) collected. 
Further work is needed to improve the results. RPDM has many dimensions, such as 
the use of mental simulation for determining if a certain (already decided) course of 
actions would work or not. We have simulated a version of this strand of thinking by 
providing a mechanism right within a plan in the BDI framework that could be used 
to avoid or mitigate anything wrong that was not expected. For example, one can think 
that if a wrong choice of a route is made, the repercussions, during an emergency, 
might be life-threatening. If that is considered as a violation of expectancies then the 
relevant plan should make sure such a choice would never be made. Appendix E 
describes a pseudo-code for a plan used in this study that has a capability to avoid 
violation of expectancies about the choice of a route after a decision about where to 
muster has been made. Future work should aim to verify the agent’s responses in more 
complex and demanding environments for which human performance data is 
available.  
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Chapter 6  
Conclusions & Recommendations  
6.1 Conclusions 
This thesis presents four research papers that describe the development of an agent 
model that exhibits a capability to make human-like decisions in evolving situations 
such as offshore emergencies. The agent model has three major components: (1) a 
spatial-learning module for learning escape routes, which are designated routes for 
emergency evacuation, (2) a situation awareness module, which is used to recognize 
emergency situations, and (3) a decision-support module that exploits modules in (1) 
and (2), and implements an RPDM based decision-logic for producing human-like 
responses during emergencies.  
RPDM involves decision-making on the basis of knowledge about the environment. 
The environment is the place or platform where decisions are supposed to transform 
into actions. It could be an industrial setup where FIRE or other types of emergencies 
can occur, or an offshore oil & gas platform. RPDM also requires an ability to perceive 
the changes in the situation occurring in the environment, and develop an 
understanding so that the decision-maker can recognize new or emerging situations 
and interpret them, moment by moment, in the form of important cues, plausible 
goals, actions to be done, and expected results of performing the actions. RPDM was 
developed by considering how experts make decisions in real situations, therefore, it 
demands a good deal of experience of dealing with the situations in which decision-
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making is sought. Further, RPDM requires an ability to diagnose a situation on the 
basis of in-depth analysis of the input signals or cues in cases when the decision-
maker is confronted with a totally new situation for which his experience has turned 
out to be insufficient. One distinguishing aspect of RPDM is the concept of story 
building. Story building works at two levels. The first is when the decision-maker 
foresees the impact of actions on the current state of the environment/situation. The 
second is when an unknown situation is discovered. In this case, the task of a decision-
maker is to define the new situation in terms of previously seen situations.  
The proposed agent model transforms the philosophical faculties of RPDM into 
concrete computational terms. Thus,  
(1) the ‘knowledge about the environment’ is modeled as a spatial-learning module 
based on generalized stochastic Petri net, presented in Chapters 2 and 3. The 
approach used in the spatial learning module is unique in the sense that it exploits 
environmental features required in learning routes rather than providing the agent 
the complete knowledge of the environment, as is the case of conventional 
wayfinding methods such as A* algorithm, in the form of a navigation graph. This 
approach enables one to develop agents with different route knowledge in the 
same environment, i.e., an agent can be created that has partial or full route 
knowledge of a particular route. Agents with different skills of learning escape 
routes can be developed by using different sets of stochastic transition rates. 
Different sets of stochastic rates have been tested here and a bound for the range 
of rates of transitions have been developed on the basis of empirical findings. This 
means that the model output cannot go beyond these limits unless the ranges of 
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the rates of transitions defined in this work are altered. Based on this, an agent 
that has been created with transition rates selected near the upper bound of the 
range was found to be more prone to error (forgetting part of a route) than those 
agents that used rates near the lower bound.  
 
(2) the ‘constantly perceiving cues to recognize a situation’ is modeled (see Chapters 
4 & 5) keeping in mind that the presence of a cue has a special meaning as in 
‘smoke means fire’. Thus, FOL rules are considered the first step in quantifying a 
situation. Because FOL rules are hard constraints, a Markov logic network is 
developed to represent the situations of FIRE and EVACUATE emergencies. The 
network training exploits empirical findings. Based on training datasets, two 
different agents have been developed. The first agent was better at recognizing the 
GPA alarm than the second one. The second agent was found to be better in 
recognizing the FIRE and EVACUATE emergencies when more than one cue was 
present (such as platform alarms, PAs, hazard types, etc.) than the first one. The 
second agent was also found to be better in recognizing the PAPA alarm. Also, the 
first agent was more prone to keep the impression of a FIRE situation despite that 
the FIRE situation had escalated to an EVACUATE situation. The behavior of 
agents correspond to the average behavior of two groups of people who 
participated in J. Smith's (2015) experiment in recognizing the same situations. 
 
(3) the ‘diagnosing of a situation’ is modeled (Chapter 5) as a method that uses 
ontological reasoning to classify situations. This part of the work models story 
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building in the form of formally representing a situation, and then inferring 
another situation in the same way a story progresses in real life. An agent shows 
this behavior only when the required experience to resolve a situation is 
inadequate. Conceptual graphs have been used to represent general knowledge 
about the situations involved. On top of conceptual graphs are conceptual 
structure rules that help agents infer a new situation on the basis of an observed 
situation. This phenomenon can also be regarded as level-3 of the Endsley’s SA 
model (1988, 1995, 2000) that says people project their comprehension about a 
situation to foresee a future status of the situation. For example, an agent, as 
reported in section 5.4.4.5, makes a CG on the basis of perceived cues as 
[MESSHALL]−(thme)→[Smoke]. Because the agent possesses the ontological 
knowledge about how to interpret the situation when a messhall is filled with 
smoke, the agent can infer a new situation, 
[MESSHALL]−(attr)→[Compromised]. This new situation is further matched 
in the agent’s repertoire of situations and resulted in still another situation (as 
reported in CG (5.7)) where the agent could find relevant actions to be performed, 
which was ‘move to the LIFEBOAT station’.  
The author concludes that agents developed in this work can produce human-like 
behaviors (decisions) as observed in empirical findings related with decision-making 
in offshore emergency evacuation situations. The agents reported here do not copy 
human-behavior, nonetheless, the decisions made are found to be more natural 
choices that were difficult to produce using a conventional decision-theoretic logic. 
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6.2 Contributions fulfilling the Research Objectives  
Table 6.1. A side-by-side comparison of the contributions and the research objectives of this dissertation.  
Title Research objectives Contributions fulfilling the research objectives 
Chapter 2.  • To develop an agent model that simulates 
how much of a route will be remembered 
after being exposed to a route for the first 
time. The model should simulate human-like 
behavior of remembering a route when a 
person, on the average, sees the same route.   
 
• To develop agents with different skills of 
remembering parts of a route. 
• Landmark saliency based classification is introduced in Algorithm 
2.3 (Chapter 2). Based on this algorithm, the GSPN model (see 
Figure 2.4.) quantify how an agent can exhibit forgetting and 
remembering of the landmarks along a route that it traverses the 
first time. The probability of forgetting or remembering depends 
on the saliency of the nearby landmarks as well as on the stochastic 
transition rates so that the output satisfies the empirical evidence. 
• Using different rates for the stochastic transitions as parameters to 
the GSPN model, one can develop agents with different 
memorizing abilities. For instance, see the results of using 
different types of agents in Figure 2.7 on page 65. This was 
achieved by employing different sets of transition rates as depicted 
in Table 2.2 on 57. 
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Title Research objectives Contributions fulfilling the research objectives 
Chapter 3 To develop agents with different route 
knowledge in an environment. 
 
• The method presented in Figure 3.8 on page 100 shows how an 
agent can run through learning a route over a series of training 
exposures. Each iteration makes the agent more informed about 
the route being traversed. By using agents with different ability to 
remember a route (using different sets of transition rates) one can 
witness how agents differ in their knowledge of a route. 
Chapter 4 To develop agents with different experiences of 
recognizing fire and evacuation emergencies. 
  
The method presented in Chapter 4 on page 131 in Figure 4.1 is used 
to develop SA model based on Markov logic network. This model was 
trained using two different training datasets obtained from an 
experiment as described in Section 4.4. The result of training are two 
agents which show differences in the SA recognition skills. In the same 
way several other agents can be trained with varying abilities to 
perform recognition tasks of certain situations. 
   
   
Chapter 5 To develop agents with different ability to make 
decisions as to what needs to be done in an 
emergency situation in a similar way that people 
make decisions. 
 
In chapter 5, a realization of RPDM based decision-making model for 
agent is proposed. The SA part of the model exploits experiences as 
well as domain knowledge to recognize evolving emergency 
situations. This agent model has been tested for different fire and 
emergency situations and the results are found to be consistent with 
the empirical findings. 
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6.3 Limitations, Recommendations & Future Work  
1. In the present study, spatial learning is achieved as a linear process whereby 
the difficulty of remembering a landmark is gradually decreased, in a linear 
way, during successive training episodes. This can be improved by 
incorporating a dynamical system’s approach where a learning curve is used 
to adjust the rates of stochastic transitions in successive training episodes. An 
interesting aspect of such modeling is in line with the concept of mass/action 
kinetics in chemical or bio-chemical reactions. Thus, rates of stochastic 
transitions will depend on some other factors, for example, the agent’s ability 
to focus on environmental features, fatigue, the agent’s ability to memorize, 
the amount of light available to see the environmental features, and the like. 
Interesting literature in this regard should begin with concepts in (Heiner & 
Gilbert, 2011). 
2. Route learning gives rise to survey knowledge of the environment when a path 
integration technique is used. Agents having the ability to integrate paths can 
find shortcuts during emergency evacuation. The spatial learning module can 
be enhanced by employing path integration.  
3. Based on the preceding paragraph, agents with the ability to create cognitive 
maps of an environment can be developed by exploiting techniques such as 
the one reported in (Golledge, 1977) where a real environment is mapped into 
agent’s memory. The mapped environment does not include correct distances 
and exact turn angles, but still it works as an efficient guide to navigate along 
a path in the environment. 
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4. An important way to improve situation awareness should incorporate a 
distinction between important and unimportant cues, and relevant or irrelevant 
cues. Questions arise, such as how one cue is relevant at a single instance of 
time and how it can become irrelevant at some other times. For example, if an 
agent knows that there is a fire event because a fire is currently being observed, 
then the agent should consider this situation a FIRE situation. But at the same 
time, if the agent starts listening to a PAPA alarm, then it should forget about 
the FIRE situation and consider the present moment as having an EVACUATE 
situation. 
5. Detection of anomaly after applying actions according to a plan is an important 
module in RPDM. Future work should consider how this can be achieved. The 
author suggests that only those agents that have detailed knowledge about the 
objects and their relationships (i.e., the ontological knowledge) might be 
suitable for anomaly detection because only then reasons of an anomaly could 
be discovered. Important techniques in this regard should include a fault tree 
analysis starting with the anomaly as a top node and digging down to the 
possible causes that may lead to the failure of actions in the selected plan.  
6. An interesting area of study involves modeling the activity of writing a plan 
using simple actions, where actions are ordered in a particular fashion to 
produce the desired result. In contemporary times, an agent or any other 
computer program selects ready made plans and they do not write new plans 
from scratch. How can a new plan, due to a particular demand, be made at the 
execution time of a computer program? This is an important research problem. 
In the present work, the author has implemented a way to modify a given plan 
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(see Appendix E) but a general technique of making new plans out of a need 
is an interesting research problem with uncountable applications.  
7. In the last, this work can be used to provide human-like abilities to agents 
acting as operators, or to agents assisting real operators in a complex system 
such as a nuclear plant. Literature on human reliability analysis (HRA) 
(Azarkhil, 2013; Azarkhil & Mosleh, 2014; Coyne, 2009; Y. Li, 2013; Mosleh 
& Chang, 2004; Reason, 1990) confirms that human fallibility has profound 
consequences in sensitive installations during emergencies. Because the 
decision-making (as modeled here) makes use of two types of situation 
assessment methods, the one based on experience, and the other based on story 
building, an interesting question for future work may be to explore how the 
proposed agent model can benefit HRA-based decision-making models34 to 
facilitate human-error analysis. 
 
 
 
34 As an example see Accident Dynamic Simulator-Information, Decision, and Action in a Crew (ADS-
IDAC) model of operator response in complex systems (Chang & Mosleh, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 
2007d, 2007e) https://www.risksciences.ucla.edu/software/ads-idac  
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Appendix A  
The GSPNRL model  
GSPN stands for generalized stochastic Petri net. The RL stands for route learning 
and hence the acronym GSPNRL is a model of route learning that exploits the 
stochastic Petri nets for representation of the phenomenon a human being undergoes 
when there is a need to learn a new route in an environment.  
The model has thirty places, ten stochastic transition, and twenty-three immediate 
transitions. The stochastic transitions are depicted in Figure 3.2 as simple rectangles, 
and solid rectangles show the immediate transitions. Circles show the places. A circle 
with one dot shows a single token on the place, and a circle with a number inside 
shows the number of tokens that are present in that place. The place A22 is of integer 
type. The type integer is referred to as NUM in the model. The place A21 and A23 are 
of type NUMLEVELS, where NUMLEVELS is a product type in which the first member 
is NUM and the second member is an enumerated datatype D = {LOW, LOWEST, 
MEDIUM, HIGH, HIGHEST}, which represents the difficulty levels associated 
with a landmark. The remaining places do not associate any type and, therefore, 
represent only simple tokens in the model.  
The GSPNRL model is 1-bounded. Thus, if any of the transitions from t28-t32 are 
enabled, the others will be disabled and cannot execute allowing only one landmark 
to be processed at a single time. This resembles a real-life situation where people 
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avoid getting confused dealing with more than one landmarks at a time, rather every 
landmark is processed in a sequential way. The net N3 is the only net in the model 
that uses colored tokens ⎯ tokens with custom datatypes such as the type 
NUMLEVELS. Colored Petri-net allows the development of compact and 
parameterized models, which otherwise require a difficult to read and understand, and 
lengthy models. 
The net N2 is the main component of the model. It integrates the information coming 
from N1 and N3 by using a semi-Markov process (Bause & Kritzinger, 1996) such 
that the firing rates of the stochastic transitions are kept higher for inputs with higher 
difficulty level landmarks. Table 3.1 describes the range of stochastic transition rates 
assigned to the GSPNRL model. The rate ranges in Table 3.1 are selected, so that: (i) 
at the lowest difficulty possible, the rate of forgetting is at the minimum, (ii) at the 
highest difficulty possible, the rate of remembering is at the minimum. The 
boundaries of the rate ranges are defined to produce results close to the empirical 
values. The stochastic transitions t8, t10, t12, t14, and t16 can be assigned randomly 
picked values from the ranges defined in Table 3.1. A particular assignment of 
stochastic transition rates is dependent on the application. If a rate  is to be used, the 
average time to fire (execute) will be 1/, because the model uses exponentially 
distributed firing delays. The distribution of firing time of transition ti is given by 
the rule: 
𝐹(𝑥) = 1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑖𝑥. 
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Transitions t8 and t9 are conflicting transitions: if t8 fires, then t9 will become 
disabled and vice versa. Firing of t8 means that the model will not retain the 
navigation command, whereas firing of t9 will save the navigation command along 
with the landmark information. The pairs of stochastic transitions (t8, t9), (t10, t11), 
(t12, t13), (t14, t15), and (t16, t17) are developed so that the first transition in each 
pair, if fired, is responsible for showing the behavior of forgetting, say by not saving 
any of its input data. The second transition in each pair shows the remembering 
behavior by saving its inputs into the memory of an agent that uses the GSPNRL 
model. 
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Appendix B  
B.1 AVERT simulator  
This study used a VE called All-Hands Virtual Emergency Response Trainer 
(AVERT). AVERT is a first- person vantage point simulator of an offshore platform 
that is intended to train workers in emergency egress in offshore platforms. AVERT 
simulator offers a high-fidelity VE that simulates many things that make up a real 
offshore facility, such as the control room, the engine room, the steering gear room, 
stairwells, different sorts of machines, a helipad, muster stations, exit signage, escape 
ladders, TV-lounge, messhall, and so on. Each participant was allocated to a cabin 
and a worksite. There were two muster locations: a primary muster location at the 
messhall, and a secondary or alternative muster location called the lifeboat station; 
both are located at the starboard side at A-deck of the vessel. Lifeboats are the primary 
means of marine evacuation. There were two escape routes from cabins at C-deck to 
both muster stations (primary or alternative). These routes are called the primary and 
the secondary escape routes. A schematic of the primary escape route from the cabin 
to the primary and alternative muster stations is shown in the floor map diagram in 
Figure B.1. 
B.2 The Recognition-Primed Decision Model  
The RPDM fuses two types of processes. The first is the process that decision makers 
use to recognize a given situation and come up with a reasonable plan to carry out a 
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course of action. The second is a subtle problem that involves imagining how the 
course of actions, which having been decided upon, would make sense in the current 
situation. Will it really make sense? Or does it need modification? These questions 
are addressed in RPDM at the conceptual level by conditioning that the model output 
should make sense in situations where a decision-maker does not have time to work 
on and evaluate all possible logical options by comparing one with others (Klein, 
1998). In RPDM, a decision-maker should pick one option and evaluate if this will 
work in the current scenario.  
 
Figure B.1. A portion of the floor map of A-deck, and C-deck (accommodation block). The primary 
escape route is shown with arrows pointing towards the main stairwell from the cabin. The participant 
has to go down two levels from the cabin to A-deck, where the muster stations are located. Hazards at 
different locations are shown to illustrate an emergency.  
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There are three variations of RPDM, which should be applied to three distinct types 
of scenarios a decision-maker may encounter. Interested readers should consult 
(Klein, 1998, 2004) for details about these variations. Figure 5.1 shows the Klein’s 
RPDM integrated version that combines all features of the three variations of RPDM. 
In this first variation of RPDM, a decision-maker, due to his/her experience, discovers 
that the situation is familiar with one that had been solved earlier. The decision-maker 
is aware of important cues to consider, the expected outcome, plausible goals, and the 
plan of action. This situation is the most straight forward because the solution to the 
problem in the given context is already known. Therefore, not much information is 
needed.  
In the second variation of RPDM, a decision-maker comes across a situation that 
needs more focus on the recognition part. The decision-maker needs more cues to 
diagnose the nature of the problem to suggest a remedy. The situation may arise due 
to the reason that the cues do not match clearly with a single typical case or may map 
onto more than one typical case. This situation makes use of the possibility of making 
a misinterpretation of some cues until the decision-maker realizes that some 
expectancies have been violated. The time when the violation of expected outcome is 
realized, the decision-maker should respond to the anomaly by trying to build a story 
(by doing mental simulation) to address the discrepancies.  
The last variation of RPDM focuses on evaluating a course of actions that have been 
decided as a solution to the problem in the given situation. The evaluation process 
exploits mental simulation, which is a process “that weaves together different events 
into a story that shows how the causes led to the effects” (Klein, 1998, pp. 89-90). 
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The purpose of the evaluation process is to make sure the decided course of action 
would work in a complex situation where there is a doubt about the actions in the plan 
of handling the situation. 
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Appendix C 
Assumptions for knowledge elicitation  
Because each participant has performed the scenarios as explained in Section 4.2, the 
following assumptions seems reasonable about the participants of Smith’s (2015) 
experiment. 
(1) All participants can recognize the primary and secondary muster stations by 
seeing these stations. This assumption is based on the fact that each participant 
has already visited these muster stations many times (at least 4-5 times) before 
appearing in the session (TH1) used in this study. 
(2) If a participant recognizes GPA (by listening an audible alarm sound), he/she 
will know which muster station to move, which is the messhall (primary 
muster station) in this case. The same is true for the PAPA alarm, which asks 
to move to the secondary muster station or the lifeboat station. 
(3) If a participant understands or follow the PA related with the GPA alarm, he 
knows where to muster and which path to take. 
(4) If a participant understands or follow the PA related with the PAPA alarm, he 
knows where to muster and which path to take. 
(5) All participants know GPA alarm means a FIRE situation, and PAPA alarm 
means the EVACUATE situation. 
(6) All participants know that the PA announcement during the GPA alarm is for 
FIRE emergency and that of during the PAPA alarm is for EVACUATE 
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emergency. The only thing that matters is whether a participant understands 
the PA or not. 
(7) All participants know that smoke in the stairwell is caused by a fire in the 
galley, and that situation is a FIRE situation. 
(8) All participants know that if smoke comes out of the messhall vent then the 
messhall is at FIRE. The messhall is, therefore, compromised and this situation 
is the EVACUATE situation. 
(9) All participants know that a fire seen somewhere not inside the messhall is a 
FIRE situation unless the PAPA alarm is ringing. 
(10) All participants know that a fire or smoke in the messhall means EVACUATE 
situation. 
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Appendix D  
D.1 An implementation of Algorithm 5.1 in OO2APL 
based BDI agent.  
Let p1, p2 are probabilities for two competing situations (FIRE & EVACUATE) 
during time interval T.  
Let p3, is the probability that the agent has developed intention to move to the primary 
muster station, i.e., the messhall during the time interval T. 
Let p4, is the probability that the agent has developed intention to move to the 
secondary muster station, i.e., the lifeboat station. 
Assume that the agent knows which muster station to move in case of which 
emergency type, FIRE or EVACUATE. 
1. if(p1>=alpha1&&p2<=alpha2) 
2.   exp.arrDecision.add(DecisionalVal.MoveToPMS); 
3.  else if(p2>=alpha1&&p1<=alpha2) 
4.  exp.arrDecision.add(DecisionalVal.MoveToSMS); 
5.  else{ 
6.   if(p3>=alpha1&&p4<=alpha2) 
7.    exp.arrDecision.add(DecisionalVal.MoveToPMS); 
8.   else if(p4>=alpha1)&&(p3<=alpha2) 
9.    exp.arrDecision.add(DecisionalVal.MoveToSMS); 
10.  else 
11.    exp.arrDecision.add(DecisionalVal.Diagnose); 
12.  } 
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The above code fragment implements a simple conflict resolution scheme in order to 
decide which situation should be taken as most promising based on the obtained 
probabilities from MLN inference. If a conflict between two probabilities cannot be 
resolved the trigger Diagnose is added and the BDI framework will call DiagnosePlan 
method where ontological reasoning will be used to figure out what actions should be 
taken in the situation given the available cues. 
D.2 The Java class for DiagnosePlan in OO2APL BDI 
framework  
public class DiagnoseSituationPlan extends RunOncePlan { 
 final Experience currObs;//contains current cues and 
previous experiences 
 public DiagnoseSituationPlan(Experience currObs) { 
  this.currObs=currObs;} 
 @Override 
public void executeOnce(PlanToAgentInterface planInterface) 
throws  
PlanExecutionError  
{ 
  Ontology ontology=(Ontology)planInterface. 
getContext(BeliefBase.class).getOnt(); 
  Lexicon lexicon= 
planInterface.getContext(BeliefBase.class). 
getLex(); 
  System.out.println("Diagnosing Plan"); 
  for(int i=0;i<currObs.arrCue.size();i++) 
  { 
   ⋮ 
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   //check if smoke is visible in the messhall 
if(currObs.arrCue.get(i).getST_SMK_MSHA()==true) { 
   try { 
    CG cg=CG.parseLF("[PMS]-\n"+ 
       "-thme->[Smoke]",lexicon); 
MemoryDeductiveInference m= new 
MemoryDeductiveInference(ontology,  
lexicon); 
    //perform ontology based reasoning using strict 
//inference algorithm 
    CG cgRslt = m.strictInferenceChain(cg); 
    System.out.println(cgRslt.toString(lexicon)); 
   }catch(Exception e) { 
    e.printStackTrace(); 
   } 
   } 
⋮ 
   //write code for other observed cues 
  }   
 } 
} 
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Appendix E  
Actions evaluation and modifications  
Let x[1], x[2], …, x[n] represent successive waypoints in a selected route that lead to 
a muster station. 
A typical plan for moving to a muster station 
SelectESCroute //Imagine using BN (see Figure7) what is more likely in each case of 
//selecting PER and SER. 
 p(trapped) := “Calculate probability of being trapped given the current context 
information and agent’s belief about PER and SER.” 
if(p(trapped | PER, hazard) > p(trapped|SER,hazard) 
SetRoute(SER) 
else SetRoute(PER) 
MoveTo(destination:= x[n])//a goal, move to x[n] from the current position 
FollowPath       //subgoal of MoveTo 
    TraverseEdge(x[1])    //x[1] is 1st waypoint, a subgoal of FollowPath 
    TraverseEdge(x[2]) //x[2] is the 2nd waypoint along the route. 
    ⁝ 
TraverseEdge(x[i]) //move down to the ith waypoint 
AssessEdgeForBlockage //subgoal of TraverseEdge; an edge is in the 
//navigation graph 
    if(route is blocked at x[i]) 
1. “Estimate how many waypoints beyond x[i] (including x[i]) be 
avoided let this be k.” 
2. “Find a detour that leads to the x[i+k]th waypoint, let the detour is 
D.” 
SetRoute(D) 
MoveTo(destination:= x[i+k]) 
    else 
  SetTargetToSteer(x[i]) 
     if(x[i] is the last waypoint in the current route) 
Arrive(x[i])//a steering behavior, see (Buckland, 2004). 
     else 
      Seek(x[i]) //a steering behavior. 
    ⁝ 
    TraverseEdge(w[n]) 
    stop 
 
